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ABSTRACT 
EMERGING IN THE IMAGE OF GOD: FROM EVOLUTION TO  
ETHICS IN A SECOND NAÏVETÉ UNDERSTANDING OF  
CHRISTIAN ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 
Jason P. Roberts, B.A., M.A. 
 
Marquette University, 2013 
 
 
Through a careful integration of theological, philosophical, and the natural 
scientific sources, the biblical concepts of the image of God and the knowledge of good 
and evil have the potential to remain important and appropriate descriptors of the human 
condition, including the possibility and necessity of human morality. This study employs 
French philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s notion of “second naïveté” understanding to 
demonstrate the hermeneutical significance of contemporary biocultural evolutionary 
theory for reinterpreting and reappropriating these ancient symbols of Christian 
anthropology as terms equipped to encapsulate a morally fruitful and intellectually honest 
conceptual framework for constructing, conducting, and evaluating theological 
anthropology and ethics today. Forging and polishing this hermeneutical lens for the 
purpose of recasting a biblically-based picture of humanity involves alloying these 
ancient concepts with others from the interrelated fields of cognitive linguistics, 
evolutionary psychology, and emergence. Viewed through this lens, the opening chapters 
of Genesis describe human beings as creatures wrought of the creation and embedded 
within it to the same extent as all other creatures. Though ordinary in every other aspect, 
human creatures are unique in that they have emerged with an ambivalent condition of 
freedom through which they bear the vocation to re-present the creative beneficence of 
the God who shares power and does not create through violence.  
I defend this thesis in seven chapters. In the first chapter, I introduce the research 
topic, goals, and hermeneutical procedure for this study. Chapters 2 and 3 describe 
biocultural evolution and evolutionary psychology within a non-reductive emergentist 
perspective as sources and resources for contemporary theological anthropology. In 
chapter 4, I propose an articulation of the doctrine of the imago Dei within this 
evolutionary worldview. Chapter 5 situates the knowledge of good and evil vis-à-vis 
biocultural evolution and recent biblical studies. I then construct a proposal in chapter 6 
for how this second naïveté understanding of the image of God and the knowledge of 
good and evil opens up new frameworks and frontiers for fundamental theological ethics. 
Finally, chapter 7 offers a summative and prospective conclusion to this study and its 
likely impact on my future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
TOWARD A SECOND NAÏVETÉ: BIOCULTURAL EVOLUTION AS 
HERMENEUTICAL LENS 
 
 
Found in the Primeval History in Genesis, the biblical concepts of the image of God and 
the knowledge of good and evil remain integral to Christian anthropology. These concepts 
have been the subject of theological reflections for centuries and continue to stimulate 
discussion in academic and ecclesial circles. Through a careful integration of theological, 
philosophical, and the natural scientific sources, these concepts have the potential to 
remain important and appropriate descriptors of the human condition, including the 
possibility and necessity of human morality.  
This study employs French philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s notion of “second naïveté” 
understanding to demonstrate the hermeneutical significance of contemporary biocultural 
evolutionary theory for reinterpreting and reappropriating these ancient symbols of 
Christian anthropology as terms equipped to encapsulate a morally fruitful and 
intellectually honest conceptual framework for constructing, conducting, and evaluating 
theological anthropology and ethics today. Forging and polishing this hermeneutical lens 
for the purpose of recasting a biblically-based picture of humanity involves alloying these 
ancient concepts with others from the interrelated fields of cognitive linguistics, 
evolutionary psychology, and emergence. Viewed through this lens, the opening chapters 
of Genesis describe human beings as creatures wrought of the creation and embedded 
within it to the same extent as all other creatures. Though ordinary in every other aspect, 
human creatures are unique in that they have emerged with an ambivalent condition of 
freedom through which they bear the vocation to re-present the creative beneficence of 
the God who shares power and does not create through violence.  
2 
 The following section of this opening chapter explicates the subject and structure 
of this study and introduces the topics of each subsequent chapter. The final three 
sections define second naïveté as a guiding hermeneutical construct for reappropriating 
the biblical concepts under investigation, outline the scholarly precedent for utilizing 
biocultural evolution as a hermeneutical tool for gaining a second naïveté understanding 
of Christian anthropological concepts, and construct the emergentist hermeneutical 
perspective and procedure adopted for doing so.
1
 
Statement of the problem and research goals 
 
 
Ricoeur’s “aim at a second naïveté” is a critical-hermeneutical endeavor targeting 
the ancient and perennial symbols of human self-understanding. This journey of self-re-
discovery begins “as an awareness of [a] myth as myth,” such as the biblical myths of 
creation and “fall.” For Ricoeur this project of “demythologization is the irreversible gain 
of truthfulness, intellectual honesty, objectivity.”2 The goal of the interpreter is to 
revivify myth-symbols, not repudiate them. He wonders, therefore, “Does that mean that 
we could go back to a primitive naïveté? Not at all,” he responds:  
In every way, something has been lost, irremediably lost: immediacy of 
belief. But if we can no longer live the great symbolisms of the sacred in 
accordance with the original belief in them, we can, we modern [people], 
aim at a second naïveté in and through criticism. In short, it is by 
interpreting that we can hear again. Thus it is in hermeneutics that the 
                                                 
1
 The following papers were presented at the Annual Meeting for the Society of Biblical Literature, 
Chicago, Illinois, November 17-20, 2012. Should any of these find their way into publication, they will 
provide a sounding board for the hermeneutical procedure developed in this study: Ryan Bonfiglio, “Is 
Ricoeur Still Relevant? Reconsidering the Contributions of The Rule of Metaphor to Biblical Studies”; 
Read Marlatte, “The Challenge of Pauline Metaphor: Metaphor Theory on the Edge of Explanation and 
Understanding”; Todd Oakley, “Mental Space Theory and Hermeneutics”; Eve Sweeter, “Cognitive 
Linguistics and the Interpretation of Sacred Texts.”  
2
 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 350; 
originally, Philosophie de la volonte: Finitude et culpabilité, II: La symbolique du mal (Paris: Aubier-
Montaigne, 1960), 326; emphasis original.  
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symbol’s gift of meaning and the endeavor to understand by deciphering 
are knotted together.
3
  
 
This insight is as true for the theological interpretation of Scripture as it is for the 
natural sciences and other disciplines from which theological anthropology must draw 
many of its background distinctions. A growing epistemological consensus across the 
gamut of contemporary academia indicates that in science, theology, and especially 
where the former informs the latter, what human beings know about themselves is a 
function of how they know it as historically-situated embodied selves participating in 
particular spheres of communal discourse. As an expert in the interdisciplinary 
interaction of science and theology, J. Wentzel van Huyssteen argues that in postmodern, 
“postfoundationalist” discourse, one is able “to retain the language of epistemology by 
fusing it with hermeneutics.”4 What human beings know about being human emerges out 
of the confluence of our biological, ecological, and cultural inheritance and interactions. 
Through this ongoing creation of meanings and in what theologian Philip Hefner calls the 
“symbiotic relationship” between the streams of inherited genetic information and 
cultural information, Homo sapiens has emerged in the natural history of our world as a 
“defined self-definer,” a “created co-creator,” a bearer of the image of the creator God.5 
For Hefner, “at the core of this analogy [of the image of God] today is the character of 
Homo sapiens as a free creator of meanings, one who takes action based on those 
meanings and is also responsible for those meanings and actions.”6 
                                                 
3
 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 351; La symbolique du mal, hereafter SM, 326. 
4
 J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Alone in the World?: Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2006), 22. 
5
 Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 
27, 118, 119; cf. 45, 47, 120-21, 265, 277.  
6
 Ibid., 239. 
4 
In distinct but commensurable ways, the biblical and natural historical narratives 
of human origins depict human beings as creatures whose self-consciousness emerges 
with a capacity and necessity for ethical interaction and reflection. Homo sapiens qua 
human have a knowledge of good and evil. According to an evolutionary perspective, 
“good” and “evil”—wellbeing and ill-being, cooperation and conflict—condition and 
catalyze the development of humankind’s ability to construe these values-laden concepts 
linguistically. Viewed through this lens, the attainment of what Genesis 3 and theologians 
and exegetes throughout the centuries call the “knowledge of good and evil” does not 
constitute a falling away from the divine image and likeness. Instead, this development is 
more a falling into or stumbling upon the original ambivalence of humanity’s evolved 
and evolving nature. In an evolutionary understanding of Christian anthropology, this 
fateful discovery is inextricable from the emergence of humankind as bearers of the 
imago Dei.  
To develop the perennial symbols of Christian anthropology in this way is to offer 
a response to Hefner’s call when he professes at the conclusion of his seminal article 
exploring “biological perspectives on fall and original sin”:  
The rudimentary probes that have formed the substance of this essay have 
not touched in any depth the constructive challenge that awaits the 
theologian and philosopher in fulfilling the task that [Paul] Ricoeur set 
before us—to transport the traditional symbols, where they are important 
vessels of information for us, into the realm of contemporary, second-
naivete [sic] experience, and enable them to coalesce with our experience 
to provide genuine knowledge of reality, for the sake of our wholesome 
living.
7
 
 
Therefore, from a Ricoeurian-inspired hermeneutical perspective which integrates 
scientific and theological disciplines, the goal of this study is to demonstrate how a 
                                                 
7
 Philip Hefner, “Biological Perspectives on Fall and Original Sin,” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 
28 (1993): 99-100; cf. The Human Factor, 142. 
5 
contemporary scientific understanding of human uniqueness and its emergence provides a 
fruitful hermeneutical lens for gaining a second naïveté understanding of the image of 
God and the knowledge of good and evil that integrates these concepts and provides a 
paradigm for framing Christian ethics. By providing reliable knowledge about the world 
Christians call “the creation,” natural-scientific understandings are able to inform, though 
not fully determine, the course and content of Christian anthropology and ethics rooted in 
historical revelation and theological tradition. Biblical scholars and theologians are able 
to utilize the data and methods of the natural sciences through secondary and even 
primary research, in supporting their (hypo)theses and conclusions. However, theological 
data, procedures, and their resulting inferences concerning a reality transcending that of 
the natural world are distinct from and not reducible to those of the natural sciences or 
historical- and literary-critical biblical scholarship.  
Despite these methodological distinctions, many exegetes and theologians who 
engage in dialogue with natural scientists tend to agree that the knowledge of good and 
evil is part and parcel of the image of God, even if they converge on this point along 
slightly different paths. One group reaches this destination through careful textual and 
historical analysis; the other through placing the theological tradition in dialogue with 
contemporary human self-understanding. Of course, the latter group interacts with the 
former, though rarely as extensively as I do in chapters 4 and 5 below.  
After exploring, developing, and defending this insight, I submit that the concept 
of the knowledge of good and evil might best be understood in terms of what theologian 
Edward Schillebeeckx calls the “negative contrast experience,” what moral theologian 
Daniel Maguire calls the “foundational moral experience,” and what structural 
6 
anthropologist René Girard calls “mimetic desire.”  These perspectives represent three 
meta-ethical “camps” that mutually inform and interpret one another, as they each 
provide an anthropological concept aimed at locating the biocultural conditions of 
possibility for both ethics and religion. What a particularly Christian ethic provides for 
each of these camps is a vision of human flourishing or salvation that cannot be fully 
accomplished through biological and cultural processes. Culminating in Jesus Christ and 
the already-but-not-yet kingdom or reign of God, the economy of salvation to which the 
Hebrew Bible and New Testament bear tandem witness exemplifies and foreshadows a 
completion of the image of God that fulfills the dynamism of the negative contrast 
experience, the foundational moral experience, and mimetic desire, while calling for 
loving modes of action reflecting—imaging—an eschatologically oriented faith and hope. 
 This study proceeds along the following seven steps in delineating and defending 
this thesis. As indicated above, the three remaining sections of this introductory chapter 
continue to explicate the research topic, goals, and procedure for this study. Chapters 2 
and 3 describe biocultural evolution and evolutionary psychology within a non-reductive 
emergentist perspective as sources and resources for contemporary theological 
anthropology. In chapter 4, I propose an articulation of the doctrine of the imago Dei 
within this evolutionary worldview, integrating biblical scholarship on Genesis 1:26-28 
and the contributions of several recent and current scientists and theologians. Chapter 5 
situates the knowledge of good and evil vis-à-vis biocultural evolution, recent biblical 
studies, and theological insights pertaining to the concept of the image of God. I then 
construct a proposal in chapter 6 for how this second naïveté understanding of the image 
of God and the knowledge of good and evil opens up new frameworks and frontiers for 
7 
fundamental theological ethics. Finally, chapter 7 offers a summative and prospective 
conclusion to this study and its likely impact on my future research. 
 To clarify, when italicized, the terms “image of God” and “knowledge of good 
and evil” (among other key terms in English) refer to these concepts as concepts—as in, 
“the concept of the image of God” or “the concept of the knowledge of good and evil.” As 
in the above paragraph, this use of italics is sometimes made explicit, but not always. 
When not italicized, these theological terms refer to the manner in which Homo sapiens 
may be understood to bear (and in this sense to be) God’s image and know good and 
bad/evil. To avoid another potential source of confusion, the term image of God is never 
used to convey a “conception of God” or a “God concept.”  
  My description of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil as 
created and creative processes emerging within the natural world presents another danger. 
One could argue that depicting the image of God and the concept of God as products of 
biocultural evolution is to naturalize the divine image and the God imaged. If the natural 
world is capable—on its own—of producing God-imaging creatures, what role is left for 
God to play in their creation? Why not apply Ockham’s razor and simply eliminate the 
extraneous causal explanation, i.e., God? The short answer is to say that this study’s 
strong naturalistic claims about the emergence of the image of God must be read as the 
“bottom-up” arc of a hermeneutical circle which includes robust, “top-down” theological 
claims. The limited scope of my thesis dictates that these theistic tenets cannot be fully 
explored in the course of this study, even where they bear mention. An equally extensive 
project would be required to explicate my understanding of how God creates through 
evolutionary processes, values created realities, wills their wellbeing, and communicates 
8 
with God-imaging creatures through gracious acts of self-revelation. Let it suffice to say 
that I presuppose these basic tenets of a theistic, Christian perspective, and that the pages 
of this study intimate the manner in which I hold them.    
Second naïveté defined 
 
 
 Ricoeur defines second naïveté as “a creative interpretation of meaning, faithful to 
the impulsion, to the gift of meaning from the symbol, and faithful also to the 
philosopher’s oath to seek understanding.”8 When Ricoeur turns to the myth-symbols of 
what he calls “the ‘Adamic’ myth and ‘eschatological’ vision of history,” this pursuit of 
the philosopher becomes the “essentially Anselmian” hermeneutical circle of the 
theologian—of faith seeking understanding.9  “Such is the circle” Ricoeur envisions: 
“hermeneutics proceeds from a prior understanding of the very thing that it tries to 
understand by interpreting it.”10 To seek a second naïveté understanding is to 
acknowledge that there is no stepping outside, before, above, or behind the perennial 
symbols of human self-understanding bequeathed by a religious tradition and its texts. 
From within the tradition, these symbols and their own presuppositions are assumed, in 
that they are taken a priori to be indispensible, if relatively raw, data.  
In the hermeneutical circle of theology and its various sub-disciplines, the critical 
function of exegesis gives rise and gives way to the appropriative function of 
interpretation.
11
 This task is accomplished through reframing the original significance of 
the myth-symbol (as best can be determined) via a reconceptualization that is both 
contiguous and commensurable with ancient meanings, while demanding and allowing “a 
                                                 
8
 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 348; SM, 324. 
9
 Ibid., 357; cf. 308, 352-57; SM, 332; cf. 286, 328-32. 
10
 Ibid., 352; SM, 327. 
11
 Ibid., 350; SM, 326. 
9 
qualitative transformation of reflexive consciousness.”12 The creation of a second naïveté 
understanding must involve the emergence of a new kind of meaning and activity that 
would not be available apart from the continued use of the myth-symbol. To live out of 
the continual, critical re-appropriation of sacred symbols such as the image of God and 
the knowledge of good and evil is to open up novel modes of human being, knowing, and 
doing.  
 For the hermeneutical circle on which biblical symbols necessarily lie to be 
constructive and not vicious, these sacred symbols must gain verification or justification. 
In order to attain and maintain such truth-value, first, the myth-symbol must be plastic 
enough to appropriate new conceptual infrastructure in its reappropriation. Further, the 
myth-symbol must make good on what Ricoeur calls the “wager” that the symbol will 
allow for increased, irreplaceable, and irreducible “intelligibility,” “power of reflection,” 
“coherent discourse,” and “power to raise up, to illuminate, to give order to [a] region of 
human experience.”13 Relative to three other “myths that speak of the beginning and end 
of evil,”14 Ricoeur argues that elements of all these myths have been appropriated, 
repudiated, and/or refined in “the place where the pre-eminence of one of these myths is 
proclaimed still today—namely, the Adamic myth.”15 By the end of Ricoeur’s La 
symbolique du mal, this assignment of preeminence is more a descriptive assessment than 
an evaluative one. His argument at this stage is that an important reason the Judeo-
Christian traditions have had so much more staying power in Western religious thought 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., 356; SM, 331. 
13
 Ibid., 355; cf. 357; SM, 330; cf. 332. 
14
 Ibid., 5; SM, 13. 
15
 Ibid., 306; cf. 309; SM, 285; cf. 287-88. For a summary of Ricoeur’s Symbolism of Evil and a Christian 
theological argument for attributing preeminence to the Adamic myth, see Peter B. Ely, “Revisiting Paul 
Ricoeur on the Symbolism of Evil: A Theological Retrieval,” Ultimate Reality and Meaning 24.1 (2001), 
40-64. 
10 
than their early parallels and competitors is the explanatory power and hope they have 
provided regarding the human condition and its future.  
 A “myth,” according to Ricoeur, is “not a false explanation by means of images 
and fables, but a traditional narration which relates to events that happened at the 
beginning of time and which has the purpose of providing grounds for the ritual actions 
of [people] of today and, in a general manner, establishing all the forms of action and 
thought by which [humanity] understands [itself] in [its] world.”16 For Ricoeur Genesis 1 
marks the beginning of “the ‘Adamic’ myth and the ‘eschatological’ vision of history” 
recorded in the Hebrew Bible and New Testament.
17
 The myths over against which 
Ricoeur sets biblical depictions of the human condition are “the drama of creation and the 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., 5; SM, 12-13. To be precise, while the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are both 
taken here to be myth-symbols, the Garden Narrative that begins in Gen. 2:4b does not fall as neatly into 
the genre of “myth” as the material that precedes it. Yet, for reasons that will become clearer in chapters 4 
and 5, there are good reasons to conclude that the Priestly writer(s) (P) of Genesis 1informs the meaning of 
this more ritual-oriented myth with the more sapiential creation narrative of the Yahwist (J) via the process 
of redaction. In this case, as both writer(s) and redactor(s), P creates a composite creation account in which 
the older narrative follows the myth, which becomes its prologue. Genesis 2-3 becomes an expansion and 
elaboration of many elements of the new myth, thereby taking on its own mythic quality. For instance, 
Yahweh Elohim’s declaration that humankind as “become like one of Us” in Gen. 3:22 has a bearing on the 
significance of Elohim’s plural jussive in Gen. 1:26, “Let Us make [humankind] in our image, according to 
our likeness” (NASB).  
In a collaborative work with Ricoeur, André LaCocque also argues that Genesis 1 follows the 
“trajectory” (trajectoire) of temporally earlier creation tradition, especially Genesis 2-3 (André LaCocque 
and Paul Ricoeur, Thinking Biblically: Exegetical and Hermeneutical Studies, translated by David Pellauer 
[Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998], 9; cf. Paul Ricoeur, “On the Exegesis of 
Genesis 1:1-2:4a,” In Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, translated by David 
Pellauer, edited by Mark I. Wallace [Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1995], 132, 134; originally, “Sur 
l’exégèse de Genèse 1,1-2,4a.” In Exégèse et herméneutique, edited by Éditions du Seuil [Paris: Éditions du 
Seuil, 1971], 70-71, 73). According to LaCocque, “it is a mistake to oppose the two ‘versions’ of creation 
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Genesis 1-2:4 in full knowledge of the J version in Genesis 2ff. We have seen above what P had in mind. 
The myth of Genesis 1 is meant to relate narrative to ritual, in parallel with the old Mesopotamian Enuma 
Elish, for example. By contrast, Genesis 2-3 is simply narrative, a story. Its role is pedagogical and 
explanatory, rather than restorative as in myth and ritual. With J’s etiology of creation, we are still formally 
close to myth, but generically the distance from myth is considerable” (LaCocque and Ricoeur, Thinking 
Biblically, 10-11).  
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‘ritual’ vision of the world,” “the wicked god and the ‘tragic’ vision of existence,” and 
“the myth of the exiled soul and salvation through knowledge.”18  
To summarize, through relating these myths to one another, Ricoeur argues that 
the Adamic myth is unique because its eschatological vision of history offers an ultimate 
solution to what he calls “the concept of the servile will.” In the polytheistic creation 
myth human beings are bound to recapitulate the violent exploits of the creator gods in 
the realms of political conquest and religious ritual; in Greek tragedy the evil incurred 
and committed by people is fated by the gods and only assuaged through public spectacle 
and corporate catharsis, not forgiveness; in the Adamic myth the chaos to which Yahweh 
Elohim (Gen 2:4) brings order in “the beginning” of creation continues to threaten to 
encroach upon the primordial goodness of the world in the forms of natural hardship and 
the knowledge that the creation itself and human action can bring about both tov vara’—
good and bad/evil; in the orphic myth of Platonism and Neo-Platonism, the human body 
is a double punishment for the exiled soul, forced to mingle with matter as a consequence 
for wrongdoing and bound to commit further evil in that state, resulting in cyclic re-
incarnation. Only the Adamic myth and the eschatological vision of history forgoes the 
primordial mischief of the gods, affirms the goodness of material existence, and short 
circuits the penal cycle of life, death, and return. 
Again, for all its staying power in Western culture as a purveyor of 
anthropological information and an eschatological vision of the future, the Adamic myth 
is for Ricoeur, the preeminent, dominant, or central myth of the four he analyzes. 
Because the three other myths influence various canonical books of Christian Scripture, 
Ricoeur creates a metaphor in which “[t]he cycle of the myths can be compared to a 
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gravitational space, in which masses attract and repel each other at various distances.”19 
By gaining a controlling influence over its conceptual satellites and by shedding light 
upon them, the Adamic myth encompasses the center of gravity of this mythic solar 
system.  
At the same time, and to step with Ricoeur beyond his original metaphor, stars 
emit light because their cores undergo nuclear fusion. Likewise the core concepts of the 
Adamic myth must fuse with others as this star ages, in order to continue to provide a 
hospitable environment for human life, as it evolves. As new and valid modes of human 
self-understanding inform how persons understand and live out of the traditional symbols 
of the Adamic myth, they enter, through criticism, the realm of second naïveté. Through 
interpretation, these ancient symbols continue, as Hefner has alluded, to remain 
“important vessels of information” for Christian theology, able “to provide genuine 
knowledge of reality for the sake of our wholesome living.”20 
 Beyond this pragmatic potential, Ricoeur’s insights also imply that the biblical 
cosmology and anthropology of the first few chapters of Genesis are themselves results 
of a critical interpretation and appropriation of extant religious mythology. While not a 
self-proclaimed critique, analysis, and synthesis of theological cosmology and 
anthropology inherited from inside and outside an Israelite religious community and its 
corporate religious experience, the opening chapters of Genesis comprise just such a 
body of sacred literature. Yet what these ancient writers and hearers gained through 
updating their mythology was a new primitive naïveté, not a second naïveté.  
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Acknowledging these hermeneutical differences, the fourth and fifth chapters of 
this study propose that the composition and redaction of this biblical material in the 
shadow of Mesopotamian cosmology and ideology sets a precedent for synthesizing 
elements of one’s own canon of sacred literature among themselves and with external 
sources in order to construct a renewed theological vision of humanity, its origins, and 
destiny. Taking this approach reclaims, as Ricoeur explains, “the purpose of providing 
grounds for the ritual actions of [people] of today and, in a general manner, establishing 
all the forms of action and thought by which [humanity] understands [itself] in [its] 
world.”21   
Relying upon Gerhard von Rad’s assessment of how established source material 
fed into the final composite narration of origins in Genesis 1-3, and acknowledging the 
influence ancient near eastern parallels apparently had on these passages in the historical-
cultural context of their redaction, Ricoeur concludes that “the very idea of Creation 
emerges enriched from this kind of proliferation of originary events.”22  Within this 
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process of theological enrichment and refinement, Ricoeur identifies a hermeneutical 
“trajectory” (trajectoire) which, among other things, relativizes the role of violence in the 
divine acts of creating something from nothing, order from chaos, and liberation from 
oppression.
23
 Acting as prologue to the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, Genesis 1 
confers a vocation to humankind to act creatively and responsibly “in the image” of the 
creator, indicating the ethical import of the passage’s ideological trajectory.   
The question now becomes, can current scientific understanding of human 
uniqueness also facilitate the emergence of an enriched and enriching understanding of 
the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil today? Both the biblical redactor(s) 
of Genesis and the scientist are asking the same kinds of questions, albeit with very 
different sets of data, tools, and purposes: “What is the state of things?” “How did they 
and we get this way?” “Where might this lead?” “Where can we go from here?” Of 
course, the ethicist, the theologian, the interpreter of Scripture is allowed a further 
question, for which scientists enable, even demand, new and ever-more intellectually 
honest responses today: “Where ought we to go from here?”  
 Ricoeur is satisfied to wager that the preeminence of the Adamic myth and the 
eschatological vision of history will be vindicated by its continued explanatory power 
concerning the human condition, provided that its theological anthropology is based upon 
a second naïveté understanding of Christianity’s myth-symbols. However, for Hefner a 
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second naïveté understanding of these symbols must lend itself to a “genuine knowledge 
of reality” and “our wholesome living.”  
 Theologian Mark I. Wallace sees this ethical aim of biblical interpretation 
surfacing in Ricoeur’s later works and as “the true telos of a theological hermeneutic of 
the second naiveté [sic], what Ricoeur calls ‘putting the Word to work.’”24 Effecting 
tectonic reformations in one’s symbolic worldview can be a bitter-sweet process of 
intellectual maturation. As Wallace implies, because the theological realism of a second 
naïveté understanding is “a self-corrective and always revisable realism,” living out of 
the biblical myth-symbols with integrity means living in constant tension with the 
symbolic world of the first naïveté and the facile immediacy of belief it once afforded.
25
 
Then again, perhaps the biblical writer(s) already knew this: “Then the eyes of both of 
them were opened, and they knew that they were naked” (Gen 3:7a). From “the 
beginning,” humankind has always faced the challenge to discern, test, and construe how 
powerful sources of wisdom and our abilities to interact with them are the ever-active 
epicenters of tov vara’—good and bad/evil.  
 There are other potential hazards associated with a second naïveté interpretation. 
First, in ecclesial settings where biblical language is often used without extensive 
interpretation, congregants and outsiders alike may mistake an informed teacher’s post-
critical (second naïveté) understanding for pre-critical (first naïveté) belief. The danger in 
this example is to mistake interpretation for univocation. This interpretive pitfall goes by 
names like “literalism” or “fundamentalism.” Second, and because of this first danger, 
hearers or readers who are critically-minded may suspect a misleading sleight of hand in 
                                                 
24
 Wallace, The Second Naiveté, 124.  
25
 Ibid., 112.  
16 
the post-critical reappropriation of biblical language. Would it not be more prudent for 
scholars and preachers to exchange loaded symbols like image of God and knowledge of 
good and evil for something more precise and unambiguous like Hefner’s created co-
creator? The danger in this case is to view interpretation as mere equivocation and, in 
reaction, to exclude a potentially fruitful dialogue with and through the tradition’s ancient 
and perennial symbols of self-understanding. Making good on Ricoeur’s wager means 
avoiding both of these dangers by stating one’s hermeneutical procedure and tracing the 
development of meaning through the garden of the first naïveté, the wilderness of the 
critical consciousness, and into the co-created symbolic world of the second, post-critical 
naïveté. 
Convicting preaching and convincing scholarship share another commonality—
they often prompt new modes of thinking and action. One can hear echoes of Hefner’s 
intellectual and ethical “challenge”26 to the theologian in the work of theological ethicist 
James Gustafson, as he issues the following hermeneutical and meta-ethical claim in his 
monograph exploring the “intersections” of science, theology, and ethics. While 
Gustafson argues that the natural sciences and theology share criteria for truthfulness that 
“are basically coherent in [their] internal structures,” theological anthropology and ethics 
bear an additional burden of truthfulness beyond the coherence and comprehensiveness 
provided by empirical consistency, predictability, and theoretical adequacy.
27
 In 
comparing the relative procedures and approaches of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr with 
those of anthropologist Melvin Konner, Gustafson concludes that the “bottom-up” 
insights of the sciences can point to and inform—but not produce or reduce—the “top-
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down” explanations of ethics and theology—of ought-ness and of an ultimate reality to 
which human agency may be accountable.
28
 Thus, beyond the requirement of explanatory 
power, and along with Hefner, Gustafson appeals to a second criterion for the 
truthfulness of an anthropologically- and scientifically-based theological ethics that 
draws its explanatory power from a rejuvenation of myth-symbols.
29
 Hefner calls this 
second criterion “wholesomeness,” while Gustafson employs the term “moral outcome” 
in like manner: 
[Niebuhr’s] main resources for truth-bearing ideas and insights are the 
Bible and selected figures in Christian theology. Those on which he draws 
are used often for their mythic qualities, that is, their capacities to disclose 
fundamentally real and presumably universal aspects of human life and 
action. Thus, in a sense, they heuristically disclose the realities of 
experience. We get to the circularity I indicated earlier, namely that faith 
illumines experience and is in turn validated by experience. Thus 
“experience” also becomes “data” disclosed by Christian myths and 
concepts, and the data validate their use. The Bible makes no hard claims 
for special supernatural revelation, nor for what we might call “empirical 
studies” of experience. The objective seems to be clear; the persuasiveness 
of the account is confirmed by its disclosive power as it issues in a deeper 
understanding of the human and guides human action. A further test is the 
moral outcome—in political, economic, and other effects—of the actions 
that it guides.
30
  
 
While creating another avenue for intellectual honesty through critical reflection, 
this second criterion for truthfulness produces a second potentially vicious hermeneutical 
circle. The test of moral outcome begs the questions, “What counts as a positive moral 
outcome? And for whom?” “What is ‘our wholesome living’?” “And who is the ‘we’ of 
this ‘our’?” The sixth chapter of this study aims to tackle these very questions through a 
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second naïveté understanding of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil, 
described in terms of negative contrast experience, foundational moral experience, and 
mimetic desire. Additionally, the concept of “epistemological privilege” and criteria for 
ascribing it will guide responses to questions of who might provide the most adequate 
visions of wholesome living and the actions required to promote it equitably.    
Present status of the problem 
 
 
 While Hefner proposes “a theory of the created co-creator” aimed at satisfying 
both of these truth criteria, and while he explicates what he means by both “explanatory 
power” and “wholesomeness,” he does little more than 
suggest that the meaning of [certain] packets of [scientific] information 
can be understood only in myth. The reason for this state of hermeneutical 
affairs is clear: Trans-kin altruism is not simply a scientifically puzzling 
phenomenon, nor a regrettably neglected virtue; it is a central symbol and 
ritual of what human beings should be doing with their lives, the symbol 
and ritual which, above all others, governs the behavior of the created co-
creator.
31
 
 
In other words, the natural sciences reach the limits of their expertise when encountering 
the phenomenon that increasing the reproductive fitness of someone who is not a close 
genetic relative (i.e., a “genetic competitor”) garners social acceptance and admiration, 
while jealously looking out for the welfare of only oneself and one’s kin is often subject 
to social disapproval and sanction.
32
  
Natural scientists, within the limits of their disciplines, cannot offer evaluative or 
normative claims about human action. Yet for Hefner and Gustafson, both truth criteria 
of explanatory power and moral outcome are adapted from those operative in the current 
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sciences.
33
 Hefner patterns his theory of the created co-creator on a model for 
establishing scientific theories and paradigms gleaned from the works of Imre Lakatos, 
Nancey Murphy, Karl Popper, and Thomas Kuhn, offering primary and auxiliary 
hypotheses, data, and evidence to establish the plausibility of his theological theory and 
its commensurability with current science.
34
 Interdisciplinary scholar and Templeton 
Prize winner Ian G. Barbour summarizes the four criteria for evaluating scientific 
theories: (1) an agreement with the data which enables predictive success with novel 
data; (2) internal and external coherence strengthened by conceptual interconnection with 
other accepted theories; (3) comprehensiveness of scope or generality; and (4) fertility in 
providing a framework for ongoing research and practical application.
35
 Together, the 
first three of these distill into the criterion of explanatory power, the fourth is adapted to 
that of moral outcome, which Hefner terms “fruitfulness” or the ability to promote 
“wholesomeness.” The fertility or fruitfulness of created co-creator theory is not that of 
pure science leading to technological advancement, but of human self-understanding 
leading to cultural developments proffering and promoting humanizing visions of 
wholesomeness for all creation.  
Since such ethical visions are not self-evident, as “a basis for beginning to reflect 
upon values,” Hefner states what he calls a “teleonomic axiom,” holding that “[t]he 
structure of a thing, the processes by which it functions, the requirements for its 
functioning, and its relations with and impact upon its ecosystem form the most 
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reasonable basis for hypothesizing what the purpose and meaning of the thing are.”36 
Here is the gateway through which Hefner begins to “lay the groundwork for a pragmatic 
criterion of truth” for his theory in terms of present and future wholesomeness.37  
If “wholesomeness” is defined as that which is “empirically discernible as in 
some manner beneficial” to nature,38 and if Hefner is correct that working toward 
wholesomeness is intrinsically human and humanizing, there is arguably a “need for a 
second naiveté [sic] among contemporary men and women that can appropriate myth and 
ritual as the first naiveté [sic] did millennia ago.”39 This second naïveté would provide 
the cultural explanations, motivations, and justifications necessary for engendering 
ethical behavior, especially when such behavior defies that predicted by natural scientific 
accounts of human nature and the explanatory power these explanations provide. Further, 
if Hefner is right in surmising “that altruism beyond kin is transmitted culturally, not 
genetically, and that religious traditions are the chief carriers of this value,”40 then, he 
asks, are new intellectually and ethically credible myths required to accomplish the 
cultural functions that religious myth and ritual once did, “[o]r are the old myths to be 
appropriated through critical analysis and reinterpretation, as Ricoeur and others 
propose?”41   
According to the second truth criterion of moral outcome, a mythic human self-
understanding is falsified if it is unable to recognize, construe, and promote the 
wholesomeness of human persons and their natural and cultural environments in the 
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present and future.
42
 In competing for viability, myths or second naïveté understandings 
of them must be both intellectually and ethically satisfying to the greatest possible 
degree. A lack in intellectual viability implies a lack in ethical viability and vice versa. In 
theological terms, this requirement is the mutual entailment of orthodoxy and orthopraxy, 
involving a hermeneutical circle on which neither aspect is self-evident, and both require 
constant testing and self-critical assessment within a community of religious adherents—
i.e., faith seeking understanding. I share Hefner’s thesis that the Christian myth and some 
of its most integral symbols are able to produce a theological anthropology and ethics 
able to satisfy both truth criteria with integrity, plausibility, and commensurability among 
secular and other religious perspectives alike.  
However, Hefner’s created co-creator theory is not, strictly speaking, a second 
naïveté interpretation of the image of God. While Hefner incorporates an understanding 
of the image of God into his created co-creator theory, he does so as a kind of variation 
on a broader anthropological theme.
43
 He mentions that his understanding of the human 
person as created co-creator is an “interpretation of the image of God,” but he does not 
rely on biblical scholarship to the same extent or in the same way as this study.
44
 
Hefner’s relative lack of engagement with exegetical sources may be due in part to the 
limited aims of his research and in part to the interpretive difficulties presented by Gen. 
1:28 and the anthropocentric spirit in which it has traditionally been read.
45
 This verse 
describes humankind’s God-imaging purpose in terms of “filling,” “subduing,” and 
“ruling over” the earth, which now faces a state of ecological crisis due mainly to human 
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proliferation, pollution, and consumption. Ironically, by taking little time to reframe these 
biblical commands, Hefner neglects to clarify how his created co-creator theory avoids 
their seemingly anthropocentric and paternalistic thrust. I engage both of these issues in 
chapters 4 through 6, arguing that these commands do not support human activity leading 
to ecological degradation and that the God-imaging co-creation to which Hefner refers is 
best understood as humankind’s non-coercive co-operation with the nonhuman world and 
one another for the benefit of all people, all other species, and the planet on which we 
have co-evolved. 
While Hefner holds that his understanding of the image of God must incorporate the 
notion that moral knowledge and responsibility, in all their ambivalence, are intrinsic to 
and co-emergent with this image, my analysis goes further, integrating of the myth-
symbols of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil within a second-naïveté 
interpretation based as much in biblical scholarship as scientific understandings of human 
uniqueness.
46
 Additionally, though Hefner hypothesizes that a “concept of 
‘wholesomeness’ is both unavoidable and useful as criterion governing the behavior of 
human beings within their natural ambiance, as they consider what their contribution to 
nature should be,” he goes little past the point of acknowledging that the concept of 
wholesomeness is an “ambiguous criterion,” “open to scrutiny,” which “must be forged 
through consensus.”47 Beyond this word of caution, but keeping it ever in mind, I construct 
an interpretation of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil that portrays 
these concepts as conditions of possibility for constructing and evaluating such a consensus 
within Christian ethical discourse and among religious and secular ethical visions. 
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At the exegetical level, and for historical-critical, literary, philosophical, and 
sometimes scientific reasons, many biblical scholars and theologians relate the concepts 
of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil by construing the latter as a 
quintessential aspect of the former. These scholars include J. F. A. Sawyer, Andreas 
Schüle, Phyllis A. Bird, Douglas John Hall, J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Philip Hefner and, 
to a certain extent, William N. Wilder. For some Christian scholars, the knowledge of 
good and evil completes the image of God and/or presents a condition of possibility for 
its continuing completion in history, in anticipation of its eschatological completion in 
the person of Jesus Christ and the everlasting existence promised by and through him. 
Because an evolutionary view of humanity supports the inference that the knowledge of 
good and evil is a conditio sine qua non for bearing the imago Dei with freedom and 
responsibility, a biocultural understanding of the human condition and our dis-ease with 
it presents a significant development in the frameworks and frontiers for constructive 
work in Christian ethics. While much of the scholarship cited in this study acknowledges 
this trajectory, it does not venture far beyond this point, leaving a waypoint for future 
explorers.  
 Many scholars have dealt masterfully with some aspects of this problem, but none 
yet have ventured to fulfill Hefner’s call in his terms or along the trajectory proposed 
here. For instance, Hefner, biblical scholar John Baker,
48
 and theologians Edward 
Farley,
49
 Jerry D. Korsmeyer,
50
 and F. LeRon Shults,
51
 all suggests ways in which the 
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doctrines of fall and original sin ought to be reformulated in light of both exegetical and 
scientifically-informed notions of the knowledge of good and evil. Yet none of these 
scholars develops an understanding of the knowledge of good and evil as a fundamental 
starting point for theological ethics.  
Van Huyssteen interfaces theological exegesis pertaining to the image of God 
with contemporary paleoanthroplogical portraits of human uniqueness. However, he only 
hints at how the image of God relates to the knowledge of good and evil in historical-
critical exegesis and theological anthropology and does not relate these considerations to 
fundamental Christian ethics.
52
  
Contemporary biblical scholars Sawyer and Schüle have argued convincingly that 
the knowledge of good and evil mentioned in Genesis 3:5, 22 is part and parcel of the 
image and likeness of God first mentioned in 1:26-28, but they have not brought their 
exegetical findings into the realm of contemporary theological understanding or 
interfaced their insights with scientific scholarship.
53
  
None of these scholars mentioned constructs systematic theological portraits of 
the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil in terms of second naiveté 
understanding. Hefner, Van Huyssteen, and Hall produce articles, chapters, or books that 
fulfill the basic function of developing a second naïveté understanding, but none adopt 
the term as a guiding hermeneutical principle or fully share or develop the hermeneutical 
procedure proposed here. Further, these thinkers give relatively little, if any, attention to 
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the knowledge of good and evil, which precludes a systematic integration of this concepts 
with that of the image of God. Responding to Hefner’s challenge in the manner indicated 
adds both new structure and content to constructive theological scholarship addressing 
the interrelated, pressing, and perennial questions of human uniqueness and how such 
considerations inform ethics, how the descriptive affects the prescriptive, how our “is” 
informs our “ought.”    
Hermeneutics of emergent meaning 
 
 
 This attempt to traverse the thorny path from “is” to “ought” via a second naïveté 
understanding the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil takes hermeneutical 
direction from the field of cognitive linguistics, particularly from the concept of “double-
scope conceptual integration” or “blending” found in the works of Gilles Fauconnier and 
Mark Turner. The integration of natural scientific, biblical-critical, and theological 
concepts blended to produce a second naïveté interpretation of the image of God and the 
knowledge of good and evil can be modeled as a broad-spectrum example of double-
scope conceptual integration, in which the conceptual domains of non-reductive 
evolutionary science and biblically-based theological understanding frame one another 
“to provide genuine knowledge of reality, for the sake of our wholesome living.”54  
Notably, Hefner also calls this intra- and interdisciplinary connectivity 
“conceptual integration” or “vertical integration,” borrowing these terms from 
evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby.
55
 Hefner’s reliance on the 
work of these scientists is significant for three reasons. First, standing at the forefront of 
evolutionary psychological research, Cosmides and Tooby’s work plays a significant role 
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in the following chapter. Second, the notion of “conceptual integration” is a key term in 
the hermeneutical procedure adopted here and the uniquely human abilities that make it 
possible, as theorized by Fauconnier, Turner, and other cognitive linguists.
56
 Third, 
according to these scientists, the cognitive-linguistic capacity for conceptual integration 
contributes to the creation of new meanings, allowing for new modes of free and 
responsible human action—the same host of capacities and activities I argue to be central 
to any current understanding of the image of God. 
By weaving careful and intricate interdisciplinary connections of this type, this 
study represents an “integration” of theological and natural scientific thought tantamount 
to what Barbour calls a “theology of nature.”57 Barbour explains a theology of nature 
“starts from a religious tradition based on religious experience and historical revelation. 
But it holds that some traditional doctrines need to be reformulated in the light of current 
science,” where theological and scientific concerns overlap.58 A theology of nature 
dovetails the disciplines of science and theology, while maintaining a relationship of 
nonreciprocal dependence. Science is able to inform—though not circumscribe—the 
course and content of theological scholarship, while divine agency is not a causal 
factor—a “God of the gaps”—in any scientific explanation of natural phenomena. This 
interdisciplinary procedure involves consulting non-reductive sources of scientific 
knowledge as resources for theological and ethical discourse. Yet, the theological 
concepts that emerge from the synthesis of sacred and secular sources are not reducible to 
their scientific meanings. The flipside of gaining a second naïveté interpretation of 
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biblical symbols is gaining a theological understanding of scientific data. Here again, 
interpretation must distinguish itself from both univocation and equivocation. The image 
of God is no mere cipher for the epigenetic outcomes of biocultural evolution. The 
knowledge of good and evil is not just another term for the conscientious awareness that 
many circumstances and behaviors contravene the flourishing or wholesomeness of 
oneself, other persons, other species, and their environments.
59
  
At the same time, the nonreciprocal dependence of theology and ethics upon 
science in their integration does not preclude the possibility of reciprocal influence. Like 
mentality emerging from the metabolic activity of the human brain-body, and through this 
causally efficacious dynamic, values-laden cultural meanings emerge from the “bottom-
up” to supervene upon thought and action from the “top-down.” Through blending, novel 
concepts emerge to constrain behavior.  Ethical and sometimes even religious concerns 
guide the course and conduct of pure and applied scientists and their academic 
communities who depend on these supervening cultural considerations to give their work 
purpose, meaning, direction, and accountability. For Cosmides and Tooby, herein lies the 
reason that conceptual integration among disciplines is “vertical integration.” Information 
is often only relevant or usable in one direction between disciplines or specialties. Biology 
depends on chemistry, which depends upon quantum physics, which depends upon 
mathematics. Similarly, when integrated with scientific understandings of human 
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uniqueness, new ethical and theological meanings emerge from the bottom-up, changing 
the landscape and horizons of thought and action for people of faith.  
More technically speaking, conceptual integration or blending projects and 
merges meanings from two or more packets of conceptual information Fauconnier and 
Turner call “mental spaces,” in order to frame and fill a new mental space called a 
“blend.”60 This cognitive activity is creative, in that blended mental spaces often display 
emergent structure—conceptual relations, and thus meanings, which are not available in 
any of the input mental spaces, and are not predictable from them.
61
 The creation of new 
meanings is a dynamic mental process of composing, completing, and elaborating blends. 
According to Fauconnier and Turner, “composition” is the result of projecting conceptual 
meanings from input mental spaces, “completion” is the act of structuring and 
constraining conceptual relations through “independently recruited frames and scenarios” 
extrinsic to the input spaces, and “elaboration” is the result of “running [the blend] 
imaginatively according to the principles that have been established for the blend.”62 At 
the cognitive level, the emergent structure of conceptual blends is the neurologically-
based dynamic domain of all semantic meanings, including the generative grammar 
which relates them. Meaning is a dynamic mental process which words serve to prompt, 
not a property of words, symbols, sentences, or objects themselves.  
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Fauconnier and Turner have identified four types of blending capacity which 
yield the conceptual integration networks that transform the material universe into our 
symbolic universe: “simplex,”63 “mirror,”64 “single-scope,”65 and “double-scope.”   
Because complex single-scope and double-scope blends often project meanings 
from very different kinds of behavioral domains, the act of conceptual integration often 
involves various levels of compatibility and clash among projected meanings. 
Remarkably, however, our brain-minds accomplish a smooth running of these blends by 
deleting or even modifying ill-fitting elements, usually without any conscious effort.
66
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For example, the metaphor, “We’re getting over a hurdle” represents a single-scope blend 
in which two people’s relational difficulties and their efforts to surmount them are framed 
by a track and field domain. In making sense of this deceptively simple metaphor, one 
generally negates the aspect of competition from the framing material and disregards that 
fact that racers do not clear hurdles in pairs. Without realizing it, we compress the 
identities of the partners into a single hurdler intent on reaching a goal quickly, though 
not necessarily before others do.  
Conceptual clashes occur even more frequently in double-scope blending, which 
involves two or more “inputs with different (and often clashing) organizing frames as 
well as an organizing frame for the blend that includes parts of each of those frames and 
has emergent structure of its own.”67 An example of double-scope conceptual integration 
operates in the metaphor, “This surgeon is a butcher.” As Fauconnier and Turner note, to 
make the inference that this is a pejorative statement, one must be able to blend 
automatically the neuro-cognitive structures involved in the conceptual frames of both 
surgery and meat-carving. The metaphor “underscores the clumsiness of the surgeon and 
its undesirable effects.”68 However, neither clumsiness nor undesirable effects are found 
the conceptual frames of either meat-carving or surgery. Both butchers and surgeons can 
be quite skillful, organized, and sanitary, producing desirable results through their efforts. 
Both professions involve the cutting of body tissue in precise ways, implementing sharp 
steel instruments, and wearing similar clothing when doing so. Yet when the blended 
space of the metaphor is framed by the setting, characters, and purposes of surgery along 
with the tools, methods, and purposes of butchery, clumsiness and its detrimental 
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(perhaps even fatal) consequences emerge in this double-scope blend.
69
 This integration 
of concepts creates meaning that is distinct from and not reducible to any meaning 
contained in or predictable from the originating conceptual frames.  
At the same time, emergent meanings like these are dependent upon pre-blended 
meanings and do not negate or re-signify these concepts within their original cognitive 
domains. By analogy, theologians are able to reframe scientific and theological concepts 
by means of one another, though not in a manner which projects theological meanings 
into scientific discourse (or natural scientific meanings into biblical narrative). A 
theology of nature perspective which introduces second naïveté understandings of 
theological formulae reframes doctrinal concepts scientifically and scientific concepts 
theologically. Another way of describing the relationship of nonreciprocal dependence in 
this kind of large-scale double-scope blending is that natural scientific understandings 
gain theological significance within theological discourse, not scientific discourse.  
Double-scope blending is a powerful hermeneutical tool in the present case for at 
least three reasons: (1) its explanatory power for analyzing the creation of new meanings 
at the cognitive-linguistic level;
70
 (2) its ability to facilitate this analysis across vastly 
different conceptual domains such as the natural sciences, biblical studies, and Christian 
theology, anthropology, and ethics; and (3) its ability to locate an empirically testable 
locus of human uniqueness with potentially monumental implications for biblically-based 
Christian anthropology and ethics. If double-scope conceptual integration is vital to the 
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human ability to create new meanings, and if there is any viability to Hefner’s insight that 
human beings image God as free and responsible creators of meanings, this way of 
accounting for Homo sapiens’ meaning-making capacities may also be a very fruitful 
way of understanding the origins and development of the image of God and the 
knowledge of good and evil as our shared human condition and the myth-symbols aimed 
at helping us to understand it.  
Furthermore, a hermeneutical procedure for constructing second naïveté 
understanding of myth-symbols that is grounded in conceptual integration theory is well-
suited for both the synchronic and diachronic aspects of such an endeavor. Hermeneutical 
analysis in terms of (double-scope) conceptual integration can locate and evaluate ways 
of bringing together sources from multiple contemporary disciplines and the findings of 
historical-critical scholarship in order to construct a second naïveté understanding of the 
image of God and the knowledge of good and evil as an anthropological framework with 
the ability to reframe ethical discourse, as well.  
The following illustration is adapted from Fauconnier and Turner’s “basic 
diagram” for visualizing the cognitive process of conceptual integration.71 I have added 
explanatory notes in parentheses to label the elements of Fauconnier and Turner’s 
diagram on the left. On the right I have filled out conceptual integration diagram to show 
in simple terms how Hefner’s created co-creator theory may be interpreted as a blended, 
second naïveté understanding of Homo sapiens’ bioculturally-constituted uniqueness. 
Chapter 4 below contains more detailed diagrams illustrating some of the salient 
conceptual elements that go into explaining what it might mean to emerge in the image of 
God with a knowledge of good and evil.  
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Figure 1: (Double-Scope) Conceptual Integration "Basic Diagram" 
 
In a sense, the hermeneutical procedure illustrated in figure 1 has been around as 
long as language itself and is just as transparent—and opaque—as linguistic ability. 
Though double-scope conceptual integration is the most complex form of blending 
Fauconnier and Turner have identified, they propose that without this mental capacity, 
our species would never have developed language, not even a “simple” language utilizing 
only less complex forms of blending capacity. By extension, they hypothesize that the 
related cultural singularities of “art, music, science, fashions of dress, dance, 
mathematics,” ethics, politics, economics, religion, etc. would never have emerged, 
because these all “precipitate as products of Double-Scope conceptual integration.”72 
With these behaviors emerge everything considered to be unique about human-being. 
Because the concepts of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are, in 
part, statements about human uniqueness, a relatively detailed cognitive linguistic 
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account of the origin, evolution, and operation of  linguistic ability over the next several 
pages is warranted for several reasons. 
First, an evolutionary account of the emergence of blending capacity situates 
human uniqueness within the developmental continuum shared by all life on earth, 
implying that the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are of a piece with 
the rest of the creation. Second, as an explanation of how language and its meanings 
emerge and evolve, conceptual integration theory constitutes a general hermeneutic 
applicable across disciplines, including the natural sciences, biblical studies, theology, 
and ethics. Third, the biblical concepts of the image of God and the knowledge of good 
and evil and any interpretation of them are the results of conceptual integration. And 
fourth, as I argue in various way throughout each of the following chapters, the human 
ability and necessity to create and live together responsibly within a symbolic world of 
meanings resides at the heart of what it means and has always meant for Homo sapiens to 
bear the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil.  
Evolutionarily speaking, the emergence of these self-defining and self-directing 
capabilities that would come to be associated with bearing the image of God developed 
rather suddenly and recently. According to Fauconnier and Turner, double-scope 
blending capacity accounts for why language is “an all-or-nothing” behavior, why it is 
not present in any other species, why if it is present at all it is present in abundance:  
If the species has not reached the stage of Double-Scope blending, it will 
not develop language at all, since the least aspects of grammar require it. 
But if it has reached the stage of Double-Scope blending, it can very 
rapidly develop a full language in cultural time because it has all the 
necessary prerequisites for a full set of grammatical integrations.
73
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The rapid development of linguistic ability in toddlers may illustrate this very 
phenomenon in the evolution or our species on a microcosmic scale. In their hypothesis 
for the origin of language, Fauconnier and Turner argue that double-scope conceptual 
integration is uniquely and constitutively human in that the emergence of this cognitive 
ability is intrinsic to the advent of behaviorally modern Homo sapiens.
74
 If this cognitive 
ability is not afforded by the neurological infrastructure of the brain, the capacity for 
other forms of conceptual integration will not simply produce truncated systems of 
symbolization such as language. Why not? In Fauconnier and Turner’s understanding:  
There is every reason to think that some species are able to operate 
efficiently in separate domains of, say, tool use, mating, and eating 
without being able to perform these abstractions and integrations. If that is 
so, then grammar would be of no use to them, because they cannot 
perform the conceptual integrations that grammar serves to prompt. But 
couldn’t they just have a simpler grammar? The only way they could have 
a simpler grammar and yet have descriptions in language for what happens 
would be by having separate forms and words for everything that happens 
in all the different domains. But the world is infinitely too rich for that to 
be of any use. Trying to carry around ‘language’ of that size would be 
crippling.
75
 
 
The ability to apply a relatively small vocabulary to a potentially limitless number of 
situations has a great deal to do with what is so astoundingly unique about human beings, 
especially because nearly all of us do it so effortlessly. This effortlessness can be 
illustrated in rereading the final sentence of the above quotation. Its eleven words prompt 
an efficient blending of many concepts from very different behavioral domains—
language and carrying and object. Framing this blend requires projecting an imagined 
attempt to carry around a large, heavy object, which results in the “crippling” of the 
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would-be carrier—an inability to either bear the object or move with it. Yet the object at 
issue is not a physical object at all, but “language.”  
Another salient feature of this blend is that the framing cluster of concepts 
belongs to the domain of a physical activity. Conceptual thought and language are 
functions of the embodied human brain. Cognitive linguist George Lakoff even defines 
conceptual blends as “neural bindings across distinct structures.”76 The most basic 
concepts, as the raw materials for forming conceptual blends, refer to commonplace 
sensory-motor phenomena that span all cultures. For Lakoff, certain blends belong to a 
class he calls “primary metaphors,” which are able to appertain to a number of more 
abstract and complex situations and expressions. One such primary metaphor is that 
“Difficulties are Impediments to Motion” toward a “destination,” which is the purpose or 
goal of the motion.
77
 For Fauconnier and Turner, without double-scope blending, it 
would impossible to compose and comprehend the statement, “Trying to carry around 
‘language’ of that size would be crippling.” Containing an example of single-scope 
conceptual integration, this concise and clever turn of phrase makes a powerful case in 
point for the hypothesis that myriad concepts supposed to have literal or univocal 
significance in verbal representation are actually metaphors stemming from more basic 
sensory-motor experiences.  
Lakoff and colleague Mark Johnson argue persuasively that from the most basic 
and intimate of human interactions to the most intellectual of discourses, many 
irreducible speech forms do not have domain-specific meanings, or their contextual 
meanings are unavailable apart from a projection of meaning from more basic domains of 
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experience and behavior. Much of human thought and language is made possible by 
broad-spectrum metaphors like “more is up,” “love is a journey,” and “affection is 
warmth.”78 While many of these “metaphors we live by” could be described as single-
scope blends, Fauconnier and Turner argue convincingly that the capacity for double-
scope conceptual integration is a kind of top-down requirement for developing language 
and its regulatory grammar.  
In double-scope blends, multiple input spaces play a role in framing the blend, 
giving shape and structure to new conceptual relations within the blended mental space. 
While not all blends are as complex as those involving double-scope conceptual 
integration, the criteria for assessing the truth value of any blend are the same. The 
meaning generated by its concepts and their relations must be found to be semantically 
proper, logically valid, and in accord with what is understood to be the case.
79
 The new 
conceptual relations seeming to make sense of the reality construed by the conceptual 
integration are preserved in the blend. Those that do not are discarded or ignored. For 
Fauconnier and Turner, these conceptual relations constitute the grammar of the blend.
80
  
 The reasons for depicting grammar in this way are many. For one, the definition 
of grammar as the in vivo cognitive relations among meanings in brain-based conceptual 
integration networks is testable by the four criteria of theoretical adequacy—explanatory 
and predictive power, internal and external coherence, comprehensiveness, and fertility 
or fruitfulness. That is, one can test (1) whether this construal of grammar fits and 
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extends the data characterizing linguistic performance as an embodied cognitive function; 
(2) whether it coherently describes (within and among scientific disciplines) ways in 
which meanings arise and gain their structure, flexibility, and strength in the synaptic 
interconnections of the brain’s neurons and neuronal regions, as in Lakoff’s neural theory 
of metaphor;
81
 (3) whether conceptual integration theory and its typology of networks are 
able to apply this cognitive-linguistic definition of grammar to the simplest grammatical 
constructions as well as the most complex instances of analogy, metaphor, and 
metonymy, including those in science, art, and religion; and (4) whether conceptual 
integration theory is ripe for application in hermeneutics, interdisciplinary dialogue, and 
ethical and theological discourse.  
The hermeneutics of constructing a second naïveté understanding of the image of 
God and the knowledge of good and evil developed here are designed to test these 
possibilities heuristically, by engaging in large-scale double-scope conceptual integration 
across disciplinary and historical-cultural distances and exploring the novel 
anthropological, ethical, and theological meanings and inferences that emerge from these 
efforts. To speak of human uniqueness in terms of bearing the image of God with a 
knowledge of good and evil as a natural result of biocultural evolution is to frame the 
findings of evolutionary sciences and related disciplines by the theological concepts of 
createdness, purpose, and wholesomeness. To speak of the myth-symbols of Genesis 1-3 
as a fruitful interpretation of the results of biocultural evolution is to frame the concepts 
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of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil by concepts such as genetics, 
indeterminacy, emergence, natural selection, and adaptation.  
In Fauconnier and Turner’s conceptual integration theory, the projected and 
emergent meanings brought about by blending these conceptual frames do not result in 
mere equivocation or the erasure of original meanings. In this exercise of 
interdisciplinary conceptual integration toward a second naïveté understanding of biblical 
myth-symbols, scientific meanings remain, while gaining novel, organically related, and 
irreducible emergent meanings in theological anthropology and ethics. Likewise, ancient 
near eastern meanings remain, while gaining novel, organically related, and irreducible 
emergent meanings in contemporary Christian anthropology and ethics. As emergent, 
these new meanings are able to exert a whole-part or top-down influence, not in the sense 
of interdisciplinary conflation or anachronism, but to the extent that they present new 
conceptual frames for the perennial Christian symbols of human self-understanding and 
the beliefs and actions—the faith, hope, and love—that follow suit. The novel meanings 
that emerge from these newly-integrated conceptual frames open up new conceptual 
horizons for several areas of systematic theology—not only Christian anthropology and 
ethics, but also interrelated theological loci to which this study can only allude, such as 
doctrines of creation and divine action, Christology, “fall” and original sin, soteriology, 
and eschatology.  
 Whether in the creation of new meanings or the advent of new and more complex 
living structures and capacities, creation through “emergence” is integral to 
understanding what it means to have emerged in the image of God with a knowledge of 
good and evil. This statement resonates harmoniously with Hefner’s suggestion that 
40 
“what is at the core of this analogy [of the image of God] today is the character of Homo 
sapiens as a free creator of meanings, one who takes action based on those meanings and 
is also responsible for those meanings and actions.”82 Amplifying this harmony means 
applying the concept of emergence to theological anthropology and ethics in both its 
ontological and epistemological-hermeneutical forms. Relating these two types of 
emergence through a biocultural model of human development means highlighting the 
additional point that these emergent realities are coadaptive. That is, the evolutionary 
emergence of the human brain-mind itself emerges into a conditioned but open-ended 
world of uniquely human meanings, invigorated by the willful creation of linguistic 
concepts and other forms of symbolic understanding, including scientific and religious 
understandings.
83
 Imaging God is ontological and/because it is performative, involving 
the creation of new meanings that allow and call for genuinely novel, unpredictable, and 
irreducible forms of knowledge and agency. As a species of defined self-definers, human 
creatures are blessed and cursed with the task of deciding what our role in the world is 
and what its future will hold. For better or worse, constructing a second-naïveté 
understanding of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil as mutually 
entailed symbols which frame what it means to exist and act as a free and responsible 
person is an exercise of created co-creation—of God-imaging agency and its dynamic, 
open-ended, and participatory nature. Homo sapiens have emerged with the unique 
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ability to construe, and thereby constitute reality for themselves, in conditioned yet free 
and responsible ways. 
 This interconnection of human ontology, epistemology, and agency comes into 
clearer focus through juxtaposing the works of Fauconnier and Turner and emergentist 
Philip Clayton. For the former, conceptual blends gain emergent structure “in three 
(interrelated) ways:” 
Composition: taken together, the projections from the Inputs make new 
relations available which didn’t exist in the separate inputs.  
 
Completion: knowledge of background frames and cognitive and cultural 
models allows the composite structure projected in to the Blend from the 
Inputs to be viewed as part of a larger self-contained structure in the 
Blend. The pattern in the Blend triggered by the inherited structures is 
‘completed’ into the larger, emergent structure.  
 
Elaboration: the structure in the Blend can then be elaborated. This is 
“running the Blend.” It consists in cognitive work performed within the 
Blend, according to its own emergent logic.
84
 
 
This definition of emergent neuro-cognitive structures is parallel to Clayton’s outline of 
the features that define emergent physical and biological structures and the properties 
they display:  
1) Ontological physicalism: All that exists in the space-time world are the 
basic particles recognized by physics and their aggregates. 
2) Property emergence: When aggregates of material particles attain an 
appropriate level of organizational complexity, genuinely novel 
properties emerge in these complex systems. 
3) The irreducibility of the emergence: Emergent properties are 
irreducible to, and unpredictable from, the lower-level phenomena 
from which they emerge. 
4) Downward causation: Higher-level entities causally affect their lower-
level constituents.
85
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According to this fourfold definition, emergent phenomena bear a supervenient 
causal influence upon the constituent parts, processes, and properties which constitute 
them. In complex systems, supervenient emergent dynamics like life and consciousness 
are the causally efficacious properties of the whole which are distinct from the simple 
sum of the properties of the parts. Irreducible realities require irreducible modes of 
explanation. Biological explanations transcend those of physics. Cultural explanations 
transcend those of biology. Theological explanations transcend those of purely empirical 
inquiry. These ascents in scale require new kinds of meanings to emerge.     
In this vein Fauconnier and Turner’s theory for the origin of language connects 
these two types of emergence, as does neuroscientist Terrence Deacon’s recent work 
showcased in chapter 3 below. For these scientists, the creation of new meanings is an 
emergent phenomenon, a functional “singularity” made possible by the stepwise 
evolution of the human brain.
86
 New kinds of meanings can emerge because a new kind 
of being has emerged—human-being.  
 Behaviorally modern human-being is a result of biocultural evolution. Homo 
sapiens are constituted, remarks Hefner, by two confluent streams of information: “The 
one streams is inherited genetic information, the other is cultural information. Both of 
these streams come together in the central nervous system. Since they have coevolved and 
coadapted together, they are one reality, not two.”87 In more general terms, traditional 
arguments over the relative influence of “nature” vs. “nurture” cast a false dichotomy. The 
emergence of behaviorally modern humanity has afforded a kind of free and responsible 
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“nature” entailing unprecedented capacities for “nurture,” including the abilities to predict 
the consequences of human actions, form value judgments, and choose among various 
courses of action.
88
 Where the embodied and socially embedded human brain-mind is 
concerned, “More nature allows more nurture,” quip Cosmides and Tooby.89  
Evolutionary psychology (EP) is a natural-scientific research framework for 
analyzing the bioculturally evolved brain and its functioning. Much of what scientific and 
theological anthropology hold to be uniquely human relates directly to these aspects of 
human-being. For this reason, the following two chapters explicate how a biocultural 
model of human-being, colored by EP and framed by an emergentist perspective, is 
instrumental in developing a second naïveté understanding of the image of God and the 
knowledge of good and evil as a conceptual framework for guiding anthropological and 
ethical discourse and the actions they beget. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BIOCULTURAL EVOLUTION AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY:  
INTEGRATING CONCEPTS 
 
 
When evolutionary psychologists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides explain what they 
mean by their statement, “More nature allows more nurture,” they develop an argument 
for why and how to integrate the biological, cognitive, and social sciences. Addressing 
the “nature-nurture” discussion, they stress that the cognitive abilities generally 
associated with “nurture” are coadapted products or by-products of humanity’s 
underlying biological “nature” and its development. Evolutionary Psychology (EP) 
presents a powerful set of tools for relating biology and behavior in non-reductionistic 
ways, exposing the false dichotomy which many insert between nature and nurture, 
between biology and culture. Chance, necessity, and freedom, it turns out, are not 
mutually exclusive. Cosmides and Tooby are able to distinguish between biological and 
behavioral explanations without divorcing them. In their case, EP is a research 
framework espousing a nonreductive biocultural model of human evolution. I set out in 
this chapter to paint a biocultural portrait of human uniqueness able to emerge into a 
second naïveté understanding of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil. 
 To accomplish this goal, the first three sections of this chapter define the concept 
of biocultural evolution, highlight the significance of symbolization in a biocultural 
model of human uniqueness, and present a biocultural definition of “full” humanity. 
Explored subsequently are the notions of domain specificity in cognition and culture and 
the “symbolic threshold” as an indicator for the advent of the image of God. The final 
section delves into specific aspects of EP as a steadily advancing biocultural research 
45 
platform able to inform a second naïveté interpretation of the image of God and the 
knowledge of good and evil.  
Biocultural evolution defined 
 
 
 Defined most succinctly by theologian Philip Hefner:  
Biocultural evolution refers to (1) the emergence, within the physical 
realm, of biological processes of evolution that themselves generate the 
phenomenon of culture; and (2) to the distinctive, non-Darwinian, 
dynamic processes by which culture proceeds, while at the same time 
existing in a relationship of symbiosis with the physical-biological 
processes in which it emerged and in which it continues to operate.
90
 
 
Many cultural processes have Darwinian aims, in that they pertain, directly or indirectly, 
to assuring the survival of oneself and one’s offspring, thereby securing the passage of 
genetic material to subsequent generations. In addition, cultural information, like genetic 
information, is subject to principles of selection which test its ability to foster skills and 
behaviors suited to present ecological and social contexts. Socially and ecologically 
appropriate behaviors are more likely to propagate pedagogically across generations.  
At the same time, Hefner’s definition of culture implies the ways in which 
cultural processes are non-Darwinian. For him, “Culture is defined as learned and taught 
patterns of behavior, together with the symbol systems that contextualize and interpret 
the behavior.”91 These behaviors and symbolic systems of contextualization are non-
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Darwinian because even though human biology and culture are co-adaptive, co-emergent, 
and co-conditioning, they are not co-determined. As an integral aspect of the human 
phenotype in its phylogenetic (species-wide) and ontogenetic (individual) development, 
culture is an expression of the human genotype. Every human being’s genetic inheritance 
confers all the biological information needed to produce a culturally embedded person, 
but not the cultural information that makes personhood possible. For reasons that become 
clearer as this chapter progresses, culture and the uniquely human characteristics that 
make culture possible and necessary are emergent phenomena, involving the 
conscientious creation, implementation, and evaluation of emergent meanings. I contend 
that our species has been equipped and called to bear the image of God with a knowledge 
of good and evil through this unique form of creativity, emerging and evolving through 
biocultural processes.  
 Genetic and cultural information are two different kinds of information, each with 
distinct and irreducible dynamics governing their creation, replication, and evolution. The 
existence, scope, and malleability of cultural information are ontologically dependent on 
genetic information, but not vice versa, because phenotype arises from genotype. 
However, cultural information is able to exert a supervening influence on genetic 
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information, especially trans-generationally, by means of sexual (mate) selection that is 
influenced by cultural considerations.
92
  
Cultural information such as ethical values and religious beliefs also allows 
individuals and groups to interpret experiences critically and respond conscientiously. 
Culturally-informed actions may override biologically primed behavioral responses. 
Impulsive behaviors and knee-jerk reactions which may have evolved to serve an adaptive 
function in past environments may encounter social sanction where they conflict with 
values-laden understandings and the norms they generate. Proceeding according to their 
own set of rules for selection and expression, the content and course of culture are 
unpredictable, even in principle, from genetic information and its dynamics. 
Interdisciplinary theologian J. Wentzel van Huyssteen expresses certainty that “the 
emergence of culture has been propelled by organic forces, but, however crucial, the 
biological approach will not be sufficient to explain the complex and peculiar paths of 
cultural evolution.”93 As an outworking of emergent phenomena, “Cultural evolution 
exhibits its own characteristics and systems conditions,” notes van Huyssteen.94 It involves 
irreducible dynamic processes, requiring distinct forms of explanation and evaluation. 
According to Hefner’s definition, the emergence and development of culture 
require human forms of symbolization, including language. Cognitive linguists Gilles 
Fauconnier and Mark Turner present strong evidence that linguistic ability requires the 
emergence of double-scope conceptual integration and the capacity it affords to create 
novel meanings, making possible new forms of understanding and agency. These abilities 
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to construe the world and its significance symbolically, to evaluate and amend such 
construals, and to act accordingly entail what Hefner calls “freedom”—“the condition of 
existence in which humans unavoidably face the necessity of both making choices that 
govern their behavior and of constructing the stories that contextualize and hence justify 
those choices.”95  
Defined this way, freedom includes responsibility vis-à-vis the requirement that 
cultural meanings find fitness within their ecological and social settings. Generally, 
people hold one another accountable to those meanings which they and their communities 
understand to provide the greatest explanatory power and best moral outcomes for the 
individual and the group. What is more, and as implied in the above chapter, these two 
criteria for truthfulness—explanatory power and moral outcome—are mutually 
informative and mutually reinforcing. Wholesome living means thriving in light of 
(and/or in spite of) what really is (understood to be the case). Thus genuine knowledge of 
reality would seem to be a key component to promoting wholesomeness.
96
 The question 
at hand is whether (or at least how) concepts such as “creator” and “creation” might 
remain intellectually and morally helpful references, whether, as Hefner suggests, it is 
fruitful to transport the myth-symbols of the image of God and the knowledge of good 
and evil “into the realm of contemporary, second-naivete [sic] experience, and enable 
them to coalesce with our experience to provide genuine knowledge of reality, for the 
sake of our wholesome living.”97 What comes to light in the process of engaging these 
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questions is a proposal that when viewed from the “bottom-up,” the image of God and the 
knowledge of good and evil are biocultural products of the natural world, which are fully 
embedded within it, and which confer the response-ability to discern, construe, and enact 
God’s purposes for the world as the creation. This study aims to illumine an 
understanding of what it means to emerge in the image of God, to traverse a path from 
evolution to ethics through a second-naïveté understanding of Christian anthropology.  
While biocultural evolutionary models of human origins cannot generate a 
theological anthropology or fully participate in Christian ethical discourse, they can 
inform the latter by providing natural scientific explanations for how Homo sapiens 
became self-conscious and self-critical creators, receptors, and transmitters of symbolic 
meanings. Religious and theological meanings are among the cultural meanings that have 
emerged, developed, and come to bear a supervening influence on human self-
understandings and the actions they motivate and justify. Hefner reflects this biocultural 
state of affairs in characterizing the image of God as both myth-symbol and the onto-
epistemological conditions necessary to conceptualize and/or actualize this human 
condition. Once again, for Hefner, “at the core of this analogy [of the image of God] 
today is the character of Homo sapiens as a free creator of meanings, one who takes 
action based on those meanings and is also responsible for those meanings and actions.”98 
Hefner’s theory of the created co-creator is not a scientific theory. His is a theological 
theory dependent upon, but not reducible to, well-founded and ecumenically accessible 
scientific conceptions of Homo sapiens as an active participant in the creation through 
biocultural processes. According to this religious perspective, human beings and their 
cultures have emerged in and through the natural world to bear a creative influence upon 
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it in ways that reflect an ability to discern, construe, and enact what are understood to be 
the creator’s intentions for the human and nonhuman world.  
According to Hefner, “The appearance of culture is directly correlated to the 
central nervous system, and the dramatic increase in the significance of culture in the 
human species is correlated with the equally dramatic development of the human 
brain.”99 In this vein EP, is an integration of scientific data and disciplines that presents a 
paradigm for framing biocultural evolutionary theory. EP opens new avenues for 
systematic cultural analysis, by describing culture as a result of the physically embodied, 
socially embedded human mind, whose cognitive mechanisms for navigating its 
ecological and social environments are the adaptational outworkings of the human brain, 
an organ designed by natural selection “to extract information from the environment and 
use that information to generate behavior and regulate physiology.”100 For this reason, 
when framed by an emergentist perspective, EP can be a powerful hermeneutical tool for 
constructing a second naïveté interpretation of the image of God and the knowledge of 
good and evil. As myth-symbols, these theological concepts are (co-created) products of 
human cognition and culture, examined here for their potential to provide genuine 
knowledge of what constitutes human-being and how this self-understanding may serve 
as a starting point for conducting ethical discourse effecting positive moral outcomes.  
 The ethical results of human self-understanding are coveted and contested 
territory, because positive moral outcomes are not self-evident or self-producing in 
biocultural evolution. Yet, the stakes involved in the ongoing development of cultural 
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meanings could not be higher. Hefner notes with an air of warning that the confluent 
streams of genetic and cultural information that constitute what he calls the “two-natured 
character of the human” 
often appear to be quite different from each other and that they proceed 
with different sets of dynamics and principles. We also understand that 
they have been selected to mix sufficiently well to differentiate humanity 
from other forms of life and that, even though they flow in different 
channels, these channels merge in the human brain. The relation between 
them is at times a tense one at best. The cultural reality can easily put the 
biological to death, just as the latter can apparently withhold its 
cooperation with the former.
101
  
 
Yet without this tense relationship between nature and nurture, human-being would not 
be human. Hefner continues: 
It is the cultural agency that makes life interesting; culture lifts human 
existence to its heights, and it also plunges us into the depths. 
Nevertheless, for humans the genetic agent has both mandated the 
necessity and provided the possibility for the cultural reality, just as it 
holds the final cards in the game of life, and if those cards are played in a 
fatal manner, culture is obliterated. The cultural and the genetic have 
coadapted to each other and to their common environments so as to 
coevolve, in a relationship that may be termed symbiotic.
102
  
 
In provisional but plausible ways, EP provides a systemic natural scientific 
understanding of how the metaphorical symbionts of genes and culture, of nature and 
nurture, come to cooperate and conflict in the ways Hefner indicates, even if, as he 
admits, “[w]e are far from understanding adequately how these two dimensions of human 
life and its evolution are related.”103 EP can help explain, for example, how “[w]hat we 
call freedom is rooted in the genetically controlled adaptive plasticity of the human 
phenotype.”104 Within an emergentist perspective, EP can help to indicate the biological 
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roots of cultural values, including those infused with religious and theological 
significance. According to EP, the cognitive mechanisms involved in religious and 
theological knowledge are naturally selected, genetically controlled, brain-based mental 
adaptations or by-products thereof.
105
 Whatever the image of God and the knowledge of 
good and evil are conceived to be, this conception is a cultural product of these 
systemically integrated neuro-cognitive mechanisms. In various and sometimes disparate 
ways across the spectrum of Judeo-Christian traditions, all strands of exegetical and 
theological scholarship interpret these cognitive mechanisms to be involved in bearing 
the image and likeness of God with a knowledge of good and evil. A biocultural 
theological anthropology informed by EP and framed by an emergentist perspective 
facilitates the second naïveté understanding that, along with its systemically integrated, 
coevolved, and coadapted bodily counterparts and constituents, the emergent human 
mind and many of its cultural products are the loci of the image of God and the 
knowledge of good and evil.  
Biocultural evolution and symbolization 
 
  
The socially embedded human mind is a somatically-based conduit and creator of 
what Hefner terms “extrasomatic information,”106 what neuropsychologist Warren S. 
Brown calls “external scaffolding,”107 or what evolutionary psychologists Pascal Boyer 
and H. Clark Barrett call an “external database.”108 That this extrasomatic information is 
constitutive of human-being in general and human beings in particular is perhaps more 
                                                 
105
 See Tooby and Cosmides, “Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology,” 22, 25-28.  
106
 Hefner, The Human Factor, 29. 
107
 Warren S. Brown, “The Emergence of Causally Efficacious Mental Function,” in Evolution and 
Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons, edited by Nancey Murphy and William R. Stoeger, SJ (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 199, 213-16. 
108
 Pascal Boyer and H. Clark Barrett, “Domain Specificity and Intuitive Ontology,” in The Handbook of 
Evolutionary Psychology, edited by David M. Buss (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 99-100. 
53 
well known and less controversial than the claim that this symbolically-borne cultural 
information takes part in the divine image. Culture enables dynamic modes of being 
human capable of reflecting, representing, even extending the creator’s purposes for the 
creation beyond the results of biological evolution. The “distinctive, non-Darwinian, 
dynamic processes by which culture proceeds” have emerged to bear a non-Darwinian 
teleonomy (apparent purposefulness or end-directedness), through the trans-biological 
functions of ethics and religion among other behavioral domains.
109
 Theologically and 
eschatologically speaking, this non-Darwinian teleonomy might properly be called a 
trans-Darwinian teleology, a “goal” of the natural world intended, initiated, and 
facilitated by its creator to emerge through natural processes.   
As symbionts the biocultural streams information that constitute human existence 
have coevolved to subserve the survival of their host species and its individual members. 
The extreme degree and singular kinds of social contact that characterizes human life 
have come about in evolutionary time in order to solve the many evolutionary problems 
encountered recurrently in past environments—e.g., securing food and water, caring for 
young, protecting against predators and competitors, etc.  
At the same time, large-group dynamics create their own adaptive difficulties. 
Even if culture proceeds by non-Darwinian dynamic principles, it is, in part, demanded 
by them, because culture and the cognitive processes undergirding it have emerged and 
evolved to negotiate between biological and social demands. At bottom, as Hefner 
argues, cultural staples such as ethics, myth, and religion are necessitated in no small way 
by the fact that “[h]umans must live cooperatively in large communities of persons who 
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are not kin relatives—that is, who are genetic competitors.”110 In order to make the 
ecological and social environments conducive to human survival and wellbeing, 
psychosomatic mechanisms have evolved to facilitate the adaptive use of extrasomatic 
information that occurs naturally in these environments. These cognitive functions also 
enable us to create, utilize, and revise an open ended web of symbols and technological 
artifacts which become the external database or external scaffolding of culture. This 
external scaffolding helps us to navigate life’s demands with unparalleled efficiency.  
According to Brown, human beings rely so heavily “on external supports for 
augmenting mental processing” that “external scaffolding plays a critical role in the 
emergence of efficacious mental processes,” which in turn create and manipulate novel 
forms of external scaffolding.
111
 Quoting cognitive scientist and philosopher Andy Clark, 
Brown suggests, “‘We use intelligence to structure our environment so that we can 
succeed with less intelligence. Our brains make the world smart so that we can be dumb 
in peace!’”112 Because external scaffolding has catalyzed the formation of our brains and 
their mental functioning, and because this mental functioning is responsible for the 
human forms of external scaffolding comprising culture, Brown proposes with Clark that 
“‘[i]t is the human brain plus these chunks of external scaffolding that finally constitutes 
the smart, rational inference engine we call mind.’”113 Accordingly, Brown argues 
persuasively that “mind is a description of the brain and body operating as one in solving 
real problems in the field of action.”114 
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The human “mind” is not a possession of the individual in isolation. Neither is the 
mind a mere unidirectional expression of him or her ab intra ad extra. Homo sapiens are 
biocultural organisms, constituted as persons in vivo through the confluence of both 
streams of information—biological and cultural. Because these streams are coadapted 
and mutually inextricable, the human phenotype as a bearer of the image of God cannot 
have sprung from only one of these streams. 
As myth-symbols the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are able 
to play an irreducible role in structuring the cultural-linguistic scaffolding of the mind, 
the self, the person. The unique and characteristically human abilities and activities to 
which these symbols refer emerge with the ability to appreciate and live by the kinds of 
meanings they encode. As philosopher Charles Taylor explains:  
A fully competent human agent not only has some understanding (which 
may be also more or less misunderstanding) of [her- or] himself, but is 
partly constituted by this understanding. […T]o be a full human agent, to 
be a person or self in the ordinary meaning, is to exist in a space defined 
by distinctions of worth. A self is a being for whom certain questions of 
categoric value have arisen, and received at least partial answer.
115
  
 
As for the source of these distinctions and values, no one comes by them ex nihilo or 
even solo ex se. No person is a recipient or repository of clear and distinct ideas, as if 
some kind of pure notion could arise unfettered by the forms of life, to use Wittgenstein’s 
term, out of which all concepts emerge.
116
 Ironically, Descartes’ “ego” is only able to 
utter its skeptical and solipsistic “cogito ergo sum” because that which it doubts—the 
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cultural-linguistic world supposedly outside the self—has provided it with the symbolic 
world in which to make such claims.
117
 For Taylor: 
The community is not simply an aggregation of individuals; nor is there 
simply a causal interaction between the two. The community is also 
constitutive of the individual, in the sense that the self-interpretations 
which define him are drawn from the interchange which the community 
carries on. A human being alone is an impossibility, not just de facto, but 
as it were de jure. Outside of the continuing conversation of a community, 
which provides the language by which we draw our background 
distinctions, human agency […] would be not just impossible, but 
inconceivable. […] On our own, as Aristotle says, we would be either 
beasts or Gods.
118
 
 
Through this line of reasoning, Taylor acts as both philosopher of language and 
philosopher of science, concluding that reductionist models of human behavior set forth 
in some strands of natural scientific thought betray the irreducible kinds of agency 
required to create such self-definitions.
119
 Epistemologically and (thus) hermeneutically, 
reductionism and its cousin positivism have very little to contribute to discussions about 
human nature, according to Taylor, because a species of defined self-definers has no 
external perspective from which to gain this kind of objectivity: “A being who exists only 
in [communally-borne] self-interpretation cannot be understood absolutely.”120 In 
addition, the background distinctions and cultural impetuses behind any human self-
understanding are values-laden, or they would not be worth the effort it takes to 
formulate them. Reductive natural scientific explanations of human biology and behavior 
can be appropriate and complete, according to the methodological exigencies of their 
respective disciplines. However, these explanations cannot claim comprehensiveness 
                                                 
117
 Jason P. Roberts, “Emerging In the Image of God to Know Good and Evil,” Zygon: Journal of Religion 
and Science 46 (2011): 475; cf. Patricia McAuliffe, Fundamental Ethics: A Liberationist Approach 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1993), 87-88. 
118
Taylor, Human Agency and Language, 8.  
119
 Ibid., 1-4. 
120
 Ibid., 3. 
57 
where they cannot account for the supervening cultural values according to which they 
approach their objects of study.
121
  
Moving with and beyond Taylor’s integration of language, meaning, and human 
nature, this study argues that emergence and emergent meaning in biocultural evolution 
are constitutive of human being and agency, and as such, co-constitutive of the image of 
God and the knowledge of good and evil. Our “full” humanity is a function of our 
biology and its cultural expression.  
Biocultural evolution and “full” humanity 
 
 
So constitutive of humankind are its symbols-laden cultures that many scholars 
cite paleoanthropological evidence for the rapid buildup of this external scaffolding to 
date the evolutionary advent of “full” humanity. The term fully human encodes one of 
those person-defining “distinctions of worth” already slipped into Taylor’s definition of 
what it means “to be a full human agent, to be a person or self in the ordinary 
meaning.”122 Where the image of God is coterminous with this distinction, the concept of 
full humanity gains theological amplification. And where the knowledge of good and evil 
finds its way into the semantic range of this conceptual cluster, there is a word of warning 
                                                 
121
 Taylor attempts to account for this irreducible, supervenient level of reality and explanation by 
exploring three hierarchic and mutually inclusive theories of meaning as a way of elucidating the 
relationship between language and human nature (Human Agency and Language, 215-47, 248-92). In sum, 
he argues convincingly that language is in part designative and able to support a truth-conditional theory of 
meaning for certain propositions (218, 248-55, 274-75, 279, 282-85). In creating interpersonal rapport—the 
public space in which meanings and meaningfulness are shared—language articulates personal thoughts 
and emotions and is thereby able to support an expressive theory of meaning (218-19, 255-70). At the same 
time, and enabling distinctly human forms of these other kinds of meanings, Taylor avers that language 
“makes things manifest, and in so doing helps shape our form of life” (10; cf. 233-238, 270-92). In 
Hefner’s terms, there is no conscientious created co-creator without this constitutive-invocative dimension 
of language and requisite theory of meaning. In Fauconnier and Turner’s terms, as a sine qua non of 
language, double-scope conceptual blending and its capacity to yield the kinds of meanings that “make 
things manifest” enable less complex forms of human expression and designation from the top-down, as it 
were.  
122
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that these distinctions of worth might arise to foster positive and/or negative moral 
outcomes. For these reasons van Huyssteen cautions “that whatever we define as our true 
‘humanness,’ or even our human uniqueness, ultimately reveals a deeply ambivalent 
moral choice, for we are not just biological creatures, but as cultural creatures we have 
the ability to determine whom we are going to include, or not, as part of ‘us.’”123  
Paleoanthropologist Ian Tattersall and archeologist Steven Mithen date the advent 
of behaviorally modern human beings (Homo sapiens sapiens
124
) to about 50,000 years 
ago, in contrast to the arrival of anatomically modern human species (Homo sapiens) 
200,000 to 100,000 years ago in Africa. Relying on these findings, van Huyssteen, 
Fauconnier, and Turner present their own takes on how our species took this biocultural 
evolutionary step and why it was so significant.
125
 For Fauconnier and Turner the 
suggestion of this relatively late date for the birth of full humanity stems largely from the 
choice to define behavioral modernness in terms of the capacity for double-scope 
conceptual integration and the paleoanthropological evidence for its inception. That is, 
the designation of behavioral modernness rests on the rare but reliable evidence for a 
symbol- and language-based external scaffolding of cultural information, revealing the 
socially-embedded creation, transmission, and evolution of values-laden distinctions—
personal, social, moral, and even proto-religious concepts. Van Huyssteen presents the 
same argument in a more detailed form, citing reasons for calling the behaviorally 
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modern Homo sapiens of the Upper Paleolithic era (ca. 45,000 to 10,000 years ago) 
“fully human.” As direct descendents of these Cro-Magnon people, this means “us.”126  
During this time, “we” left evidence of several sudden and interrelated cultural 
innovations, including the abilities to diversify, complexify, and standardize stone tool 
making; to carve detailed objects made of bone, antler, and ivory; to manufacture tools by 
means of others (i.e., compound tool use); to develop technologies much more quickly 
and with regional diversity; to ornament ourselves, our dwellings, and our dead; to 
compose pieces of representational and ritual-based art; to specialize and systematize 
animal exploitation; to increase the size and density of the total and local human 
populations; and to form organized settlements with well-defined habitable structures.
127
  
This period of rapid behavioral advancement coincides with what 
paleoanthropologists call the “Upper Paleolithic Revolution or the ‘Creative Explosion’” 
evidenced in the artifacts and images dated to this time, such as those immortalized in the 
cave “art” discovered in the Iberian Peninsula and adjacent regions.128 What these people 
left behind indicates the presence of a unique form of consciousness emerging from a 
host of integrated neuro-cognitive and motor operations and their external scaffolding.  
This species-defining period in biocultural evolution may indeed signal a kind of 
creative explosion—the “big bang” of Homo sapiens’ symbolic universe (or multiverse). 
Nestled within the unbounded and ever-expanding symbolic universe of the socially and 
ecologically embedded human mind lies the lesser infinity of language, comprising many 
of the most concrete and therefore manipulable objects within this world. This mind-
over-symbolic-matter dynamic translates into a qualitatively distinct—though always 
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conditioned—creative capacity for construing, crafting, and thereby constituting the self 
and its environment. Van Huyssteen’s poignant characterization of this biocultural 
evolutionary development bears repeating:  
In a sense we are not simply more intelligent than other species, we are 
also differently intelligent: intelligent in a manner that allows us not only 
to view ourselves and thus be self-aware, but also to manipulate the 
environment around us in a qualitatively unique way. In both of these 
forms of self-reflection our linguistic abilities are crucially important, and 
almost all the literature in [the] field [of paleoanthropology] acknowledges 
the central role that language plays in human intelligence. As far as we 
humans go, language is intimately tied up with our complex symbolical 
capacities, and is in fact the medium through which we explain those 
capacities to ourselves. […] Naturally, all this ties in with that most 
mysterious of organs, the human brain, an organ with its own evolutionary 
history, which is directly linked with the dramatic evidence for art, music, 
and symbol very early on in the history of our species. It is precisely this 
symbolism that lies at the very heart of what it means to be human. In fact, 
if there is one single thing that distinguishes humans form all other life-
forms, living or extinct, it is the capacity for symbolic thought, the ability 
to generate complex mental symbols and to manipulate them into new 
combinations. Tattersall correctly argues that this is the very foundation of 
imagination and creativity, of the unique ability of humans to create a 
world in the mind and then re-create it in the real world outside 
themselves.
129
 
 
Following Mithen, van Huyssteen calls this novel and humanizing form of 
symbolic intelligence “cognitive fluidity,” signifying humankind’s open-ended ability to 
combine various behavioral and cognitive domains conceptually through symbolization, 
yielding qualitatively distinct meanings and myriad cultural artifacts of a potentially 
limitless variety.
130
 Mithen hypothesizes that the advent of language predates and feeds 
into the cognitive fluidity that resulted in the Creative Explosion. Also indebted to 
Mithen, but disagreeing with this facet of his theory, Fauconnier and Turner’s argue more 
coherently that both language and the Creative Explosion of the Upper Paleolithic “came 
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about once the continuous improvement of blending capacity reached the critical level of 
Double-Scope blending.”131 This aspect of Fauconnier and Turner’s hypothesis for the 
origin of language makes sense of the lack of evidence for rudimentary or grammatically 
simple languages in early humans, isolated tribal groups, or other animal species. While 
the capacity for double-scope conceptual integration is a result of a gradual, step-wise 
succession of cognitive developments that were each adaptive in themselves, language 
emerges explosively as a functional singularity made possible by this critical mass of 
neuro-cognitive complexity.
132
 Cognitively fluid minds are, to revise Mithen’s 
hypothesis, the result of the capacity for double-scope conceptual integration.  
From the standpoint of evolutionary biology and EP, Fauconnier and Turner’s 
theory for the origin of language arguably provides the greatest explanatory power, while 
supporting an emergentist biocultural evolutionary perspective. In broad strokes, by 
proposing their theory for “the origin of language as a product of the evolution of modern 
cognition,” Fauconnier and Turner take on the roles of both evolutionary psychologists 
and emergentists. They preface their theory by indicating that the human “brain is [an] 
organ” created through natural selection, while “language is a function subserved by it, 
with the help of various other organs. Language is the surface manifestation of a capacity. 
It is a singularity of function, and so nothing prevents it from having arisen from a 
basically continuous and adaptive process of evolution.”133 In the terminology of EP, 
treated more fully below, perhaps language is not an adaptation, but is a by-product of the 
neuro-cognitive adaptations for double-scope conceptual integration across behavioral 
domains. Fauconnier and Turner’s theory is that brain-based double-scope conceptual 
                                                 
131
 Fauconnier and Turner, “The Origin of Language,” 147; cf. 139. 
132
 Ibid., 142, 146. 
133
 Ibid., 141.  
62 
integration is adaptive in a Darwinian sense, allowing language and culture to emerge 
from this systemically integrated (emergent) capacity and its constituent properties and 
parts. This line of argument places human symbolization and interrelated functional 
singularities characterizing “full” humanity within a fully biocultural schema. This 
hypothesis also addresses lingering questions left by other theorists, such as Mithen and 
neuroscientist Terrence W. Deacon.  
Engaging Mithen, Fauconnier and Turner have extended his thesis by providing 
terminological precision and a better causal logic for his concept of cognitive fluidity in 
terms of conceptual integration theory. Turning to Deacon, they argue that his theory of 
the co-evolution of language and the brain provides fuel for a false dichotomy that 
sometimes arises when interpreting paleoanthropological data.
134
 This false dichotomy is 
a seeming impasse between “gradualist” and “punctuated equilibrium” models of 
evolution, surfacing in the face of peculiar or puzzling data. This false dichotomy arises 
because of two analytical fallacies, which Fauconnier and Turner call “Cause-Effect 
Isomorphism” and “Function-Organ Isomorphism.”135 The first of these holds that if one 
encounters a sudden, dramatic effect, one should expect to find a correlatively dramatic 
or punctuated causal event. The second of these fallacies holds that where a capacity is 
found to be the function of an organ or organs, the continuous and gradual development 
of the function(s) and supporting organ(s) proceed at similar rates.  
If one characterizes language and cognate forms of human symbolization as an 
anomalous singularity, cause-effect isomorphism is the interpretive temptation. A 
seeming leap in brain function might imply a similarly sudden leap in brain size or 
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complexity, indicating an extreme instance of punctuated equilibrium. However, such a 
leap may not be biologically possible, given the genetic jumps necessary to support such 
a dramatic evolutionary event. Evolutionary biologists generally agree that gradualist 
models of genetic change account better for the vast majority of the data. And, according 
to Fauconnier and Turner, “[e]ven ‘punctuated equilibrium’ theories propose only 
relatively minor jumps—not jumps that produce an eye or language out of nothing.”136 
The theological implication of gradualism is that human abilities associated with the 
imago Dei may emerge suddenly but not incongruously through evolutionary processes. 
However, if the human brain and its complexity developed by a gradual process 
of accretion and regional arrangement and interconnection, one might expect brain 
functions like language to develop gradually and leave evidence of primordial and 
transitional forms. In Deacon’s co-evolution theory of language and the brain, language 
would have first taken the form of a crude system of symbolic gestures invented to ensure 
survival and create and maintain social cohesion. With Deacon, Fauconnier and Turner 
point out that this early kind of symbol system would not have been recognizable as 
language, except as its germinal form. This means of communication would have been 
“fragile, difficult to learn, inefficient, slow, inflexible, and tied to ritual representation of 
social contracts like marriage.”137 From here, linguistic forms supposedly became more 
efficient as ecological and social selection pressures “favored genetic variations that 
rendered brains more adept at language. Language began as a cognitive adaptation and 
genetic assimilation then eased some of the burden.”138 For Fauconnier and Turner, 
however, the insurmountable difficulty left by Deacon’s earlier theory is that it demands 
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a gradual accumulation of both vocabulary and grammar. This type of development 
would demand the “crippling” kind of language mentioned in chapter 1, because a simple 
grammar can only support a language bearing “separate forms and words for everything 
that happens in all the different domains.”139 Conceptual integration theory explains how 
a biological step can facilitate a functional leap.  
The theological take-away here is that the emergence of the image of God is 
nothing unique in terms of genetic and physiological development, even though the 
advent of “full” humanity represents a relatively sudden qualitative shift in terms of 
functional capability. By extension, (1) the imago Dei and the knowledge of good and 
evil are borne through the same kinds of processes constituting the bio-cognitive 
activities of other animal species to which we are genetically related; and (2) there is 
nothing to rule out the possibility that other species could evolve to bear the image of 
God in a manner that is supposedly unique to Homo sapiens.  
Animal research with primates and birds has shown that humans are not the only 
ones able to invent, teach, and learn meaningful signals useful in multiple behavioral 
domains. For example, many animals have distinct and identifiable vocal and visual 
signals for mating, warning, and finding food. However, these “vocabularies” remain 
restricted because, among other things, they remain relatively domain-specific. Yet, 
according to Boyer and Barrett, the domain specificity of mental adaptations and the 
meanings they support are not the issue. The issue is the ability to integrate meanings 
across domains with what Fauconnier and Turner call “equipotentiality”—the ability to 
employ a finite number of combinable language forms in literally any situation.
140
 Boyer 
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and Barrett note that the “lexicon of a natural language” contains between 15,000 and 
100,000 items. However, they insist that “this external database is available only to a 
mind with complex phonological and syntactic predispositions.”141 In other words, for 
language to develop at all, it would seem that all its cognitive conditions of possibility 
and anatomical infrastructure must be in place at the outset. And, according to 
Fauconnier and Turner’s hypothesis for the origin of language, if a species “has reached 
the stage of Double-Scope blending, it can very rapidly develop a full language in 
cultural time because it has all the necessary prerequisites for a full set of grammatical 
integrations.”142  
Deacon’s co-evolution theory, with its implied function-organ isomorphism, is 
unable to surmount the theoretical difficulty of explaining how everything human 
language is and does could evolve in a gradual, step-wise manner. A further problem of 
the gradualist theory is the lack of empirical evidence for rudimentary or transitional 
languages among paleoanthropological data, indigenous peoples today, or any other 
species.
143
 Interestingly, Deacon’s later work on emergence, showcased in the following 
chapter, provides some of the most precise tools for explaining how “full” humanity and 
its symbolic capabilities might have co-emerged suddenly as functional singularities 
produced by the gradual, step-wise evolution of blending capacity in humanity’s 
biocultural history.
144
 In a biocultural conception of theological anthropology, these 
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functional singularities and their operation in cognition and culture together constitute the 
epicenter of the image of God.   
Biocultural evolution, domain specificity, and conceptual integration 
 
  
One of the hallmarks of EP is the concept of domain specificity. The domain-
specific brain-mind is not a blank slate, but a computational system capable of storing 
and running multiple programs, each designed by natural selection for a specific 
application or adaptive function. Evolution by natural selection produces specialized 
cognitive competencies, based in specific neural structures which have evolved in 
response to recurrent evolutionary problems, such as food acquisition, territory 
                                                                                                                                                 
punctuated equilibrium model, in which “the emergence of human uniqueness was achieved in one 
quantum leap” (187-88; cf. Tattersall, Becoming Human, 68, 225-33). And this leap is energized by none 
other than the emergence of Mithen’s cognitively fluid mind.  
One avenue for updating and qualifying Mithen’s cognitive fluidity hypothesis via Fauconnier and 
Turner’s conceptual integration theory is through making van Huyssteen’s understanding of Mithen’s 
metaphor characterizing “the mind as a cathedral” more consistent with his emergentist interpretation of it. 
According to this metaphor, the biocultural evolution of the human mind entered an initial phase of 
construction focused on a foundational “nave” around and above which more specialized cognitive 
domains or “chapels” of “language, social intelligence, technical intelligence, and natural history 
intelligence” are constructed in a second building phase (Alone in the World, 195-96). Finally, phase three 
sees the opening of these spaces to one another with doors and windows, facilitating unobstructed (i.e., 
cognitively fluid) movement among them (196).  
However, this three-stage building metaphor needs a different set of blueprints if the cathedral of 
the mind is to get off the ground, as it were. The problem arises in phase two, where “language” for Mithen 
is one “chapel” among others gradually taking shape from the bottom up. How could language be its own 
cognitive domain if its use is integral to the construction of uniquely human forms of behaviors like social 
and technical intelligence, which many other species display in their own ways? A cathedral may have to 
be built from the bottom-up, but its significance as a cathedral is constituted from the top-down. A 
cathedral is distinguishable by its majestic height, interior expansiveness, unique floor plan, and exquisite 
decoration, all reflecting and facilitating specifically cultural functions transcending the Darwinian goal of 
reproductive fitness—the survival of oneself, one’s offspring, and so forth. Revising and extending the 
cathedral metaphor, it would appear that language is not itself a cognitive domain, but a precipitous result 
of the double-scope conceptual integration that buttresses the human mind with this external scaffolding. If 
the mind is a cathedral, double-scope blending and the symbolic intelligence it prompts construct the flying 
buttresses making possible the expansive, grandiose, and intricately interconnected mental spaces within, 
through which we move with such fluidity. With its stained glass windows, vaulted ceilings, and ornate 
walls, a cathedral is more complexly open—and closed—to the world outside than perhaps any other 
structure. It lets in light through a painstakingly wrought translucent array of information-laden images and 
symbols, while guarding its implements and artifacts against decay. It is a place of memory, speech, self-
transcendence, moral instruction, accountability, symbol, and ritual. It is a place where creatures encounter 
one another and their creator. The cathedral of the “fully” human mind is the mental space where the 
physical world actualizes its spirituality, its self-understanding, its understanding of other selves.  
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maintenance, predator avoidance, mate selection, child rearing, etc. However, even these 
cognitive domains are relatively general. An example of a more domain-specific 
cognitive adaptation would be the capability of a frog to distinguish visually between the 
motion of a leafy branch blowing in the wind, a tasty insect on one of its leaves, and the 
hungry heron behind the bush. Natural selection makes sure that frogs will only evolve to 
find and fill an ecological niche if they develop this efficient cognitive mechanism, where 
opportunities and dangers like these remain common.  
To give a more human-like example, certain primate species have developed 
different vocalizations for conveying various meanings. Some signals are specific enough 
to indicate that a certain kind of predator is approaching. To a vervet monkey, a “leopard” 
signal means scurry up and look down; an “eagle” signal means the opposite.145 These 
vocalizations manifest a host of domain-specific cognitive adaptations capable of 
generating more than one kind of output. The presence of these adaptations indicates their 
evolutionary relevance to vervet monkeys and points to the genotypic and phenotypic 
foundations upon which they had to build over many generations. EP predicts that the 
brain’s “hardware” and “software” are not installed all at once, and that these components 
will come to interact in some surprising ways as they compile and coadapt. According to 
Tooby and Cosmides, “natural selection will ensure that the brain is composed of many 
different programs, many (or all) of which will be specialized for solving their own 
corresponding adaptive problems. That is, the evolutionary process will not produce a 
predominantly general-purpose, equipotential, domain-general architecture.”146 However, 
domain specificity does not necessarily compartmentalize cognition. 
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Homo sapiens and other species are capable of various kinds of complex and 
abstract thought, not because their cognitive architectures are domain-general, but 
because they are domain-integral. That is, certain kinds of brains are capable of complex 
conceptual integrations across specific behavioral domains. The equipotentiality language 
affords in not a matter of Homo sapiens being conceptually open to the world in general 
and parsing out little bits of it. Rather, the human mind is open to specific and 
evolutionarily relevant aspects of the world and is able to combine or blend them into 
qualitatively unique symbolic forms, which in turn open up distinctly human behavioral 
domains like art, science, ethics, and religion. As van Huyssteen suggests, “instead of 
asking what kind of mind is required to know the world, we should rather ask what kind 
of world the world must have been to produce the sort of mind we have.”147 
The primate warning signal illustration provides an example of simplex blending 
capacity (value-role projection) and its adaptive value for promoting survival. Two bits of 
information are involved—first, that a predator has been detected, and second, what kind 
of predator it is. The first piece of information indicates a need for alertness and perhaps 
evasion; the second helps to focus those efforts. This process traverses the cognitive 
domains of predator detection, vocalization, and danger avoidance in a socially 
meaningful way. Fauconnier and Turner note that paleoanthropological evidence and 
studies of other animal species suggest that blending capacity is evolutionarily 
advantageous and adaptive in and of itself and that ever-more complex forms of blending 
capacity can accrue in a continuous, gradual manner.
148
 According to their hypothesis, 
that which distinguishes humanity cognitively from other species—linguistic ability, 
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morality, religiosity, etc.—co-emerges with the capacity for double-scope conceptual 
integration across domain-specific, neurologically-based centers of semantic information. 
Another implication of this theory is that the evolutionary steps along the path to 
language were taken “not for the function of language itself but for the cognitive abilities 
that finally led to the precipitation of language as a product.”149 From the standpoint of 
EP, language and culture are not adaptations, but the by-products of adaptations. In 
Fauconnier and Turner’s hypothesis for the origin of language, “Language arose as a 
singularity. It was a new behavior that emerged naturally once the capacity of blending 
had developed to the critical level of Double-Scope blending.”150 The data suggest to 
Fauconnier and Turner that language and other “human singularities: art, music, science, 
fashions of dress, dance, mathematics […] precipitate as products of Double-Scope 
conceptual integration.”151  
Similarly, for evolutionary biologist Francisco Ayala, cultural behaviors like 
language and ethics display a kind of pleiotropy. Pleiotropy occurs when a single gene is 
expressed in multiple phenotypic traits. Consequently, the epigenetic consequences of 
genotypic change can be many and diverse. In cognitive linguistic terms, language and 
the host of other cultural capabilities of which it is inextricable was not the foreseeable 
target of blending capacity and its development. Rather, in Ayala’s estimation:  
Literature, art, science, and technology are among the behavioral features 
that may have come about not because they were adaptively favored in 
human evolution but because they are expressions of the high intellectual 
abilities present in modern humans: what may have been favored by 
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natural selection (its “target”) was an increase in intellectual ability rather 
than each one of those particular activities.
152
  
 
With this principle in mind, Fauconnier and Turner conclude that when provided 
with the tools to rid itself of an implicit function-organ isomorphism, Deacon’s 
theoretical framework for the co-evolution of language and the brain is basically right. 
They note simply that “his theory is missing an explanation of the mental operations 
underlying [the] relational ability” behind the biocultural emergence of behaviorally 
modern Homo sapiens through a novel but not evolutionarily unprecedented 
development.
153
 For Fauconnier and Turner, “conceptual blending is a good candidate for 
a continually evolving mental ability that could produce the singularity of language. This 
opens up new possibilities that Deacon could not have considered” when he developed 
his theory in The Symbolic Species (1997).
154
 More recently, however, Deacon has 
incorporated blending theory into his understanding of the emergence of uniquely human 
cultural behaviors and the meanings they convey.
155
 Conceptual integration theory may 
therefore hold the key to what Deacon calls “the symbolic threshold.” This functional 
threshold is arguably indicative of the image of God, in part, because the image of God 
and the knowledge of good and evil are themselves myth-symbols indicating heuristically 
the realities to which they refer.  
 Following philosopher Charles Sanders Pierce, Deacon differentiates three 
hierarchical categories of referential associations: iconicity, indication, and 
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symbolization. Each association is a type of mental interpretation. An icon is a sign 
interpreted to resemble an object; an index is interpreted to indicate or point to a physical 
and/or temporal connection, contiguity, or correlation between sign and object; a symbol 
references an object or concept, not by any perceived resemblance or spatio-temporal 
contiguity, but in relation to other symbols, indices, and icons.
156
 For example, a 
rattlesnake is iconic of its surroundings to the extent it blends in with them; its vibrating 
rattle is indicative of the snake’s proximity and the danger it poses; and its image is 
symbolic of the “don’t tread on me” spirit of the American Revolution.  
Contributing much of the architectural support for humanity’s external 
scaffolding, symbolic relationships among words and concepts allow inferential and 
imaginative creativity. This kind of cognitive competence supports unique 
understandings of those things which reach our senses and, perhaps more importantly, 
those things which do not or cannot, like “angels, unicorns, and quarks,” not to mention 
God, image of God, and knowledge of good and evil.
157
 All symbolic associations and 
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their grammatical regulations are made possible, according to Fauconnier and Turner’s 
hypothesis, by the evolutionary emergence of double-scope blending.  
 Seeming to anticipate this theoretical development, Deacon argues that symbolic 
interpretation 
is one kind of competence that grows out of and depends upon a very 
different kind of competence. What constitutes competence in this sense is 
the ability to produce an interpretive response that provides the necessary 
infrastructure of more basic iconic and/or indexical interpretations. To 
explain the basis of symbolic communication, then we must describe what 
constitutes a symbolical interpretant, but to do this we need first to explain 
the predication of iconic and indexical interpretants and then to explain 
how these are each recoded in turn to produce the higher-order forms. […] 
What one knows in one way gets recoded in another way. It gets re-
presented. We know the same associations, but we know them also in a 
different way. You might say we know them both from the bottom up, 
indexically, and from the top down, symbolically.
158
 
 
This “bottom-up,” “top-down” language is common in emergence scholarship, including 
Deacon’s later work in this field. In terms that gain more clarity in the following chapter, 
symbolic ability dynamically supervenes on indexical and iconic awareness. These 
competencies develop and accumulate from the bottom-up, from part to whole. In turn, 
these mental abilities are causally efficacious from the top-down, from whole to part. As 
Hefner has alluded, this uniquely human form of psycho-somatic causality and others with 
which it is systemically integrated embody those “distinctive, non-Darwinian, dynamic 
processes by which culture proceeds” as an outworking of humanity’s biological nature.159 
This emergentist schema of the accumulation of competencies and the 
precipitation of singularities coincides with Fauconnier and Turner’s conceptual 
integration theory for the origin of language. The gradual evolution of double-scope 
conceptual integration might have yielded an explosive propensity for symbolic 
                                                 
158
 Ibid., 74, 89; emphasis original. 
159
 Hefner, “Biocultural Evolution and the Created Co-Creator,” 197. 
73 
association when blending capacity reached this critical mass of complexity. If there is 
but one species who has evolved this cognitive capacity, such an anomaly would explain 
why other species may show rudimentary symbolic ability, but none develop language, 
and why humans are, in van Huyssteen’s terms, “alone in the world,” with the ability to 
define ourselves as be(ar)ing the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil.  
Biocultural evolution, the “symbolic threshold,” and the image of God 
 
 
The most biologically similar species to Homo sapiens seems to be on the cusp of 
the symbolic threshold. Under controlled experimental conditions, chimpanzees have 
demonstrated the ability to interpret non-iconic lexigrams symbolically, according to 
simple adjective-noun-verb rules of association. When the chimps entered the appropriate 
lexigrams in a particular sequence, they obtained a reward associated with that specific 
sequence. Over thousands of trials, indexical associations formed, some of which were 
also symbolic. Experimenters changed the relative positions of lexigrams, their colors, 
and shapes, ruling out these variables as indexical cues. Next, when the experimenters 
added more lexigrams, the chimps were able to incorporate the new “vocabulary” items 
by the same semantic logic known to govern the others, sometimes in a single try.
160
 As 
Deacon explains, “They had discovered that the relationship that a lexigrams has to an 
object is a function of the relationship it has to other lexigrams, not just a function of the 
correlated appearance of both lexigrams and object. This is the essence of a symbolic 
relationship.”161 In Fauconnier and Turner’s terms, this behavior is a relatively complex 
display of blending capacity or conceptual integration.  
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 This accomplishment is truly remarkable. However, there is a qualitative 
cognitive break between these highly contrived, rudimentary instances of symbolic 
behavior among chimps and human symbolization and language. According to Brown, 
the symbolic threshold reached by our species and its children at a young age presents 
“one exception” to the general correlation between the gradual development of nervous 
system complexity and the presence and sophistication of mental properties.
162
  
 
 
Figure 2: Warren S. Brown, “A Phylogenetic Model of Mental Causation”163 
 
In the image provided above, Brown illustrates the emergence of human mentality 
as a cone. The width of the cone represents nervous system complexity among species. 
The density of shading within the cone represents the presence or absence of cognitive 
function. At its point of origination, the cone lacks any shading, and the width of the cone 
and its shading increase constantly and gradually from this point. The cone bells slightly 
at a line designating the symbolic threshold, and its shading quickly grows darker.  
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Brown’s illustration represents another way of reconciling Deacon’s gradualist 
co-evolution theory with the rapid precipitation of uniquely human singularities as 
functions of the cognitive adaptations underlying them. This simple figure also implies 
the need and ability to integrate evolutionary biology and developmental psychology 
among other disciplines, which is one of EP’s purposes. Incidentally, and in a manner 
similar to Fauconnier and Turner’s theory for the evolutionary origins of language, 
Brown’s insights avoid the fallacies of cause-effect isomorphism and function-organ 
isomorphism. In his emergentist model, the advent of behaviorally modern Homo sapiens 
required no unprecedented genetic/physiological leaps or a simple/stepwise accretion of 
cognitive functionality. One small step for biology; one giant leap for behavior.  
 At the level of Christian anthropology, this biocultural evolutionary perspective 
means that whatever the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are taken to 
be, they have emerged from the natural world and are fully embedded within it. As 
concepts and as the constitutive elements of the human condition to which these terms 
refer, the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil may in turn point beyond the 
world of nature. However, to suggest that certain aspects of human life intimate the 
supernatural is not to say that these existential-behavioral structures and capabilities have 
an immediate supernatural origin or cause. Likewise, Hefner concludes “that since 
humans emerged within the processes of nature’s evolutionary history, nature itself 
participates in the image of God.”164 Hefner is correct that “[t]his is a novel 
interpretation” of this myth-symbol, one which supports the second naïveté interpretation 
proposed here.
165
 Van Huyssteen shares Hefner’s inference, suggesting: 
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Theologians are now challenged to rethink what human uniqueness might 
mean for the human person, a being that has emerged biologically as a 
center of embodied self-awareness, identity, and moral responsibility. This 
notion of personhood, when reconceived in terms of embodied 
imagination, symbolic propensities, and cognitive fluidity, will now 
enable theology to revision its own notion of the imago Dei as emerging 
from nature itself, an idea that does not imply superiority or greater value 
over other animals or earlier hominids, but might express, from a 
theological point of view, a specific task and purpose to set forth the 
presence of God in this world.
166
   
 
Interpreting the image of God as a reality which has emerged through natural 
processes, van Huyssteen argues that belief in the supernatural is natural. That is, a 
propensity for mythic and religious belief finds its origins and purposes in the biocultural 
evolution of humankind.
167
 Again citing Hefner, he proposes that the images left in caves 
by our Paleolithic ancestors almost certainly reveal that “ancient myths and rituals must 
have organized the kind of information that was necessary for survival through elaborate 
cultural systems.”168 Van Huyssteen infers that in the course of confronting the 
ecological, social, and existential crises of human life and death, “[n]ot just the use of 
myth, but also the contents and messages of particular myths must have greatly 
influenced the behavior of the our ancestors, as they still do for us today.”169  
While biocultural utility is no guarantor of a myth’s truth value, the cultural 
necessity to contextualize and justify behavior means that the human central nervous 
system has evolved what Hefner and sociobiologist E. O. Wilson call “mythopoetic 
requirements.”170 For Hefner, these mythopoetic requirements are an entailment of the 
human condition of freedom, “of both making choices that govern […] behavior and of 
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constructing the stories that contextualize and hence justify those choices.”171 While this 
is not to say that Homo sapiens are somehow hardwired for religious or theological 
beliefs, one can justifiably borrow a principle from theologian Paul Tillich to support the 
claim that trans-humanistic or trans-naturalistic conceptions of being or reality are able to 
provide efficient and perhaps insuperable visions of humankind’s ultimate concern.  
Yet the endurance of theological beliefs is no more a guarantor of their truth value 
than their biocultural utility. Therefore, well short of performing impossible apologetic 
(proof-oriented) and ecumenical (unity-oriented) tasks on behalf of “Christianity” or 
“Christian beliefs,” this study makes the relatively modest proposal that a second naïveté 
reinterpretation and reappropriation of some Judeo-Christian myth-symbols is able to 
provide increased explanatory power and positive moral outcomes from a particular faith 
perspective informed by current science. While the human central nervous system may 
display something like mythopoetic requirements, the narratives by which human beings 
frame their actions need not be explicitly religious or theological. Nonetheless, by 
enabling and requiring qualitatively distinct and irreducible characterizations of reality as 
guides for human behavior, a myth-based theological anthropology is able to support 
what Paul Ricoeur calls “a qualitative transformation of reflexive consciousness”—an 
otherwise unavailable orientation or end-directedness of human-being.
172
 
If, as Ricoeur argues, myth really “has the purpose of providing grounds for the 
ritual actions of [people] today and, in a general manner, establishing all the forms of 
action and thought by which [humanity] understands [itself] in [its] world,”173 then, “in 
this broadest sense of the word,” as van Huyssteen explains, “religion co-emerged with 
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humanity itself.”174 Myth, ritual, and the actions they require and enable are constitutive 
of human-being because they provide the “distinctions of worth” without which the 
genetic and cultural symbionts comprising Homo sapiens might perish. According to 
Hefner’s definition, culture provides the information required to accomplish “the three 
tasks of interpreting the world in which humans live, guiding human behavior, and 
interfacing with the physical-biogenetic-cultural systems that constitute the environment 
in which we live.”175 In serving its cultural functions, religion and myth provide an 
understanding of reality itself and as a whole—of “what really is” or “how things really 
are.” Religious visions of what really is may always remain underdetermined by our 
experience of/in the world, but they may also provide plausible and fruitful conceptions 
of human significance and purpose vis-à-vis the rest of the world and a reality beyond 
it.
176
 The background concepts belonging to the symbolic universe of what really is—
including theological concepts—provide and infuse those distinctions of value which 
intimate, motivate, interrogate, and justify actions that lead to our wholesome living or 
lack thereof. Presenting a comprehensive vision of the way things really are, myth and 
religion are able to propose the is designed to inform the ought.  
 Hefner calls this dynamic process of religious and ethical discourse and action the 
“myth-ritual-praxis complex.”177 This complex is a way of relating the indicative to the 
imperative, of moving from how things really are to what ought to be done in response. 
In light of Ricoeur’s phenomenological and hermeneutical insights, paleoanthropological 
interpretations of Paleolithic cave images, along with biblical scholarship concerning the 
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communal function (Sitz im Leben) and historical-cultural context (Sitz im Welt) of the 
creation account(s) in Genesis, Hefner infers that ritual translates “myth into symbolic 
action, which in turn is to be expressed in the praxis of ordinary life. The ritual serves as 
a means of approaching the central realities of the world and also as a resource and norm 
for daily behavior.”178  
This hermeneutical circle coincides with Ricoeur’s “essentially Anselmian 
schema” of theology—of lived faith seeking understanding.179 Conceiving theological 
discourse in terms of a myth-ritual-praxis complex makes of theology and ethics what 
liberationist scholars since Gustavo Gutiérrez have called them for more than half a 
century—critical reflection on historical praxis. The circularity of this complex is a 
function of its self-critical component, irrupting when the conceptual premises and/or 
practical outcomes of myth-ritual-praxis are no longer intellectually and/or morally 
satisfying. In other words, if Christian anthropology is to retain the myth-symbols of 
image of God and the knowledge of good and evil as indispensable data of self-
understanding and behavioral motivation/justification, Hefner cautions that 
we may recognize the wisdom of the myths, but we cannot believe them 
naively. We are critical; we can entertain the myths only as proposals, as 
hypotheses. We can believe only through what Ricoeur terms the second 
naiveté [sic], which requires critical philosophical analysis and 
interpretation.
180
   
 
Hefner’s own hermeneutical endeavor of “revitalizing” or “revivifying” a given myth-
ritual-praxis complex follows a three-stage process, which he describes generally as 
“retrieval, testing, and restatement.”181 He claims that this kind of effort has become the 
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task of theologians today—“presenting the resources from their own work of 
reinterpreting the tradition, offering them up as potential contributions for the 
overwhelming task of cultural revitalization that faces us.”182 Hefner takes up this task in 
proposing his theory of the created co-creator.  
For the purposes of this study, retrieval of the tradition involves historical- and 
literary-critical analysis of the Judeo-Christian myth of origins and the kinds of symbolic 
actions it likely supported. Testing means developing a faithful interpretation of this 
tradition with the potential to satisfy the criteria of explanatory power and moral outcome 
in today’s intellectual and cultural climate. Restatement synthesizes the results of 
retrieval and testing by constructing a second naïveté understanding of the image of God 
and the knowledge of good and evil that is both intellectually and morally fruitful, while 
also presenting some of the first fruits of this effort.   
  Another way to describe this second naïveté reinterpretation and reappropriation 
of these myth-symbols is through Fauconnier and Turner’s concepts describing the 
“construction,” “completion,” and “elaboration” of conceptual blends. The natural 
scientific and theological findings explored and integrated in these opening chapters 
contribute a hermeneutic of emergent meaning tying together the neuro-cognitive 
emergence of new meanings with the biocultural emergence of “full” humanity. In a 
theology of nature perspective, this association adds precision and credibility to the claim 
that the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are evolved and evolving 
avenues of biocultural evolution.  
In a 21
st
 century symbolic universe, the conceptual constellations of evolutionary 
psychology and emergence help to reframe and inform the concepts belonging to these 
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biblical myth-symbols of Christian anthropology. Together, they help to explain how 
mind and culture emerge dynamically from their physiological and biological 
constituents; how these systems of information are able to exert the dynamic “top-down” 
or “whole-part” causal influence which amounts to human freedom and responsibility; 
how symbolic meanings are able to transcend the givens of their empirical contexts; how 
retrieval, testing, and restatement of these kinds of meanings are possible; and how these 
uniquely human capacities and activities can be as humanizing as they can be 
dehumanizing.  
In theological parlance, emerging in the image of God through biocultural 
evolution means that as free and responsible creators of meanings, human persons are 
able to discern, construe, and enact the purposes of God, for the continued goodness of 
creation. Because it emerges through natural processes, this free and responsible co-
creativity is neither absolute nor autonomous, but conditioned by an original and 
ambivalent knowledge of fulfillment and frustration, cooperation and conflict, good and 
bad/evil. This contemporary self-interpretation is potentially fruitful for ongoing 
theological and ethical discourse, commensurable with historical- and literary-critical 
biblical scholarship, and made possible by a biocultural model of humanity’s origins and 
ongoing evolution.  The interrelated fields of cognitive linguistics, EP, and emergence 
supply the hermeneutical tools and materials for constructing this self-reinterpretation. 
Evolutionary psychology, the image of God, and the knowledge of good and evil 
 
 
 On its own, EP does not have the resources to conceive of humanity in terms of 
the image of God or Hefner’s created co-creator. Yet EP is well equipped to depict Homo 
sapiens as the culturally-constituted creature. Viewed from the bottom-up, the term 
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creature is not a theological designation but is a descriptor of an animal constituted by 
(and contributing to) a self-transcending dynamic, namely culture. EP aims to understand 
how this state of affairs comes about as a result of natural processes and as a function of 
the physically embodied and socially embedded human central nervous system. At the 
natural scientific level, EP is a window to human spirituality—the biocultural dynamics 
through which Homo sapiens bear the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil. 
 EP’s potential to inform a renewed understanding of Christianity’s 
anthropological myth-symbols lies in what it is and what it is not. Evolutionary 
anthropologist John Tooby and psychologist Leda Cosmides have been at the forefront of 
the metatheoretical subdiscipline of EP since they helped establish it in the latter half of 
the 1980s. There is perhaps no surer primary source for gaining an accurate description of 
EP, its conceptual foundations, methodological procedures, and research outcomes and 
prospects than these scientists. This listing of credentials is necessary because EP is often 
mistaken for one or more of those disciplines from which it expressly differentiates 
itself—sociobiology, behavioral ecology, or evolutionary ecology.183 While findings 
from these earlier attempts at integrating biological and behavioral sciences have 
provided vast amounts of data for EP, especially in its formational years, EP has 
developed a new theoretical framework by which to interpret these data. Understandably, 
this new conceptual framework and its corresponding shifts in focus and method have led 
to hypotheses and conclusions which sociobiology and its cognate disciplines could not 
attain, anticipate, or even allow. EP overturns many of the assumptions and conclusions 
of sociobiology, especially the reductionistic, deterministic tenets which made it the 
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object of so much scientific, philosophical, political, and religious controversy. Thus, 
according to Tooby and Cosmides: 
Evolutionary psychology is the long-forestalled scientific attempt to 
assemble out of the disjointed, fragmentary, and mutually contradictory 
human disciplines a single, logically integrated research framework for the 
psychological, social, and behavioral sciences—a framework that not only 
incorporates the evolutionary sciences on a full and equal basis, but that 
systematically works out all of the revisions in existing belief and research 
practice that such a synthesis requires.
184
 
 
The ultimate goal of EP is nothing short of “the mapping of our universal human 
nature,” i.e., “the construction of a set of empirically validated, high-resolution models of 
the evolved mechanisms that collectively constitute universal human nature,” which 
finally ought to “include the neural, developmental, and genetic bases of these 
mechanisms, and encompass the designs of other species as well.”185 Such an 
achievement, while far off, is not out of the question and would constitute a 
comprehensive biocognitive conception of Homo sapiens and its ongoing evolution. 
Reaching this goal would also establish a comprehensive conceptual basis from which to 
conduct biocultural analysis able to inform theological anthropology and ethics. 
 EP’s value for a contemporary discussion on what it might mean to bear the 
imago Dei is encapsulated in Tooby and Cosmides’s comment that “[m]ore nature allows 
more nurture.”186 Our biological and psycho-somatic makeup—nature—emerges into our 
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self-defining, self-directing cognitive and cultural activity—nurture. Human creatures 
bear (and determine what it is to bear) the image of God with a knowledge of good and 
evil within the dynamic confluence of the co-constraining biocultural dynamics here 
abbreviated as “nature” and “nurture.”  
 I hold that the findings of many evolutionary psychologists are able to operate 
within an emergentist philosophical framework because they are able to differentiate 
between biological and cultural dynamics in ways that do not reduce the latter to the 
former. Evolutionary psychologists are able to provide conceptual content to the intuition 
that Homo sapiens and their actions amount to something more and other than the 
epiphenomenal sum of the information contained in their DNA and the seeming 
                                                                                                                                                 
social selection pressures in ancestral environments (EEA). Because this process is slow, the brain’s current 
evolved programs are designed to respond to the adaptive problems of our hunter-gatherer ancestors of the 
Upper Paleolithic era and earlier (17). In order for a given aspect of an organism’s phenotype to qualify as 
an adaptation, it must show that  
(1) it has many design features that are improbably well suited to solving an ancestral 
adaptive problem, (2) these phenotypic properties are unlikely to have arisen by chance 
alone, and (3) they are not better explained as the by-products of mechanisms designed to 
solve some alternative adaptive problem or some more inclusive class of adaptive 
problem (28). 
For example, that blood carries oxygen to body cells is an adaptation; the redness of blood due to the color 
of oxygenated hemoglobin is a by-product of this adaptation. A “noise” feature that is uncoordinated with 
any selection pressures is the location of color flecks in the iris (ibid.). Fourth, because of the evolutionary 
time between the evolution of adaptive function and new problems posed to the brain in later contexts, 
there is no guarantee that the behaviors it has been primed to produce will continue to be adaptive. This 
principle is especially true of social behavior. At the same time, this principle cuts two ways. The host of 
integrated mental programs responsible for the creation of rapidly evolving social contexts also afford the 
abilities to respond in new ways to these changes, though not by deleting the evolved programs that must in 
some ways be overridden to produce these new behaviors (17). Fifth, natural selection has produced many 
specialized mental functions, each responding to a small number of recurring adaptive problems. The 
specificity of selection pressures is not conducive to the evolution of a domain-general cognitive 
architecture applicable to more specialized problems, but a domain-specific architecture supporting 
complex interactions and integrations among specialized programs. These dynamic integrations produce 
behaviors in domains abstracted from and unanticipated by the brain’s individual cognitive mechanisms 
(17-18; cf. 41-63). Sixth, because the evolved functioning of the brain has created and continues to shape 
human culture, “descriptions of the computational architecture of our evolved mechanisms allows [sic] a 
systematic understanding of cultural and social phenomena” (18). EP predicts these descriptions to include 
“cross-culturally universal frames of meaning that allow us to understand the actions and intentions of 
others” (ibid.). In this sense, EP constructs species-specific and species-wide tools for analyzing and 
commensurating diverse human cultures at the level of natural scientific research, in a manner suited to 
postmodern discourse. These kinds of tools are vital to the one planning to venture beyond what is 
descriptively human to what might be normatively humanizing, daring to blaze new trails on the endless 
journey from our is to our ought.  
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imperative to pass it on. The significance of human evaluations of self, other persons, and 
their environments, along with the capacity to construct such values with freedom and 
responsibility, cannot be circumscribed by any understanding, however valid, of the 
biological ends they serve (e.g., survival and reproductive fitness).  “Organisms are 
adaptation executors, not fitness pursuers,” emphasize Tooby and Cosmides.187  
Through natural selection, on average, adaptive cognitive mechanisms will 
include an evolutionary (i.e., reproductive) advantage, because those genotypic and 
phenotypic variations that do not regularly result in greater environmental fitness will be 
eliminated over generations. However, evolutionarily beneficial adaptations may serve 
other, wholly unrelated, even counterintuitive functions in the actual life of an organism. 
Additionally, values-laden social preferences for new modes of behavior are able to exert 
their own selection pressures. On the one hand, Darwinian dynamics often demand 
increased cognitive command over evolutionarily relevant environmental information.  
On the other hand, in order to meet these Darwinian demands effectively, psychological 
programs must be able to generate consistent and predictable responses to a great number 
of situations. Given such predictability, how does EP leave room for a theological 
conception of Homo sapiens as conscientious creatures who bear the divine image in 
their freedom and responsibility? Does EP lead to the conclusion that biology determines 
behavior? Tooby and Cosmides argue that humankind’s neuro-cognitive  
programs and the databases they create can be called on in different 
combinations to elicit a dazzling variety of behavioral responses. These 
responses are themselves information, subsequently ingested by the same 
evolved programs, in endless cycles that produce complex eddies, 
currents, and even singularities in cultural life. To get a genuine purchase 
on human behavior and society, researchers need to know the architecture 
of these evolved programs. Knowing the selection pressures will not be 
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enough. Our behavior is not a direct response to selection pressures or to a 
“need” to increase our reproduction.188 
 
In view of Tooby and Cosmides’s argument as a whole, the implication of the 
italicized phrase in this excerpt is that any number of the human brain’s integrated 
cognitive mechanisms “can be called on” at will, to a greater or lesser degree, because the 
recurrent dynamics of the brain’s “endless cycles” of cognition are not reducible to the 
sum of the  underlying “functionally specialized learning systems, domain-specialized 
rules of inference, default preferences that are adjusted by experience, complex decision 
rules, concepts that organize our experiences and databases of knowledge, and vast 
databases of acquired information stored in specialized memory systems.”189  
Ironic as it may appear, EP allows and informs a theological discussion of human 
nature and nurture built upon the seemingly reductionistic principle that the genetic 
heritage of every organism is determined for it. No one can pick and choose the genes 
that express themselves in the development of the brains responsible for regulating all 
behavior and physiology. At the same time, Hefner finds ample reason to argue that 
“[w]ithin this deterministic evolutionary process, freedom has emerged,” and that “[w]hat 
we call freedom is rooted in the genetically controlled adaptive plasticity of the human 
phenotype.”190 This plasticity does not negate the predictive and explanatory power of EP 
any more than it represents a subterfuge for a reductionistic research platform.  
EP provides predictive (not circumscriptive) explanations (not justifications) for 
human behavior, because the discipline’s vast amounts of empirical data show that all 
human thoughts, meanings, values, and actions are conditioned (not determined) by the 
                                                 
188
 Ibid; emphasis added. 
189
 Ibid. 
190
 Hefner, The Human Factor, 30.  
87 
interaction of naturally selected, domain-specific, and cognitively biased psychological 
mechanisms following the circuit logic of the malleable (not amorphous) human brain-
mind.
191
 Evolution by natural selection primes our primate brains to interact with the 
world in species-specific ways. The mind is not a blank slate, contra Locke. It operates 
according to something like Descartes’ innate ideas or Kant’s a priori categories of 
reasoning. Yet the brain’s genetically controlled array of cognitive programs is not a 
mental donum supernadditum. Cognitive adaptations do not present evidence for a 
creator God—not in any immediate sense. Rather, they intimate the specific selection 
pressures present in what scientists call a species’ environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness (EEA). In this sense, EP is a fully natural scientific critique of pure reason, 
because whatever “reason” is held to be, it is not the domain-general musing of the 
unfettered human intellect, but a bioculturally embedded psychosomatic function of 
human personhood.   
Out of this functioning emerge humankind’s symbolic worlds and the symbols, 
concepts, values, norms, technologies, theologies, anthropologies, ethics, etc. they 
produce. Therefore, van Huyssteen infers that epistemological-hermeneutical discourse in 
theology must face the “question [of] whether the nature of this process of complex 
cognitive evolution, revealed as interactive and epigenetic […] tells us anything about the 
realist claims of some religions.”192  
EP and the biocultural model of human development it supports cannot venture so 
far as to confirm or falsify “the realist claims of some religions,” such as the Judeo-
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Christian understanding that we bear the image of God with a knowledge of good and 
evil. However, EP and cognitive linguistics can offer natural scientific explanations of 
how these kinds of claims arise and operate on a neuro-cognitive level to generate 
culture. In this way the natural sciences synthesized in EP equip other disciplines with 
tools for understanding how human beings construct cognitively and culturally “what 
really is” and how this symbolic world guides perception, cognition, and action in vivo.  
I mention in chapters 5 and 6 below some evolutionary psychologists’ findings 
about distinctly human forms of competitive and cooperative behaviors and their 
relationship to the emergence of cultural singularities like ethics, mythology, religion, 
and theology. These scientists are discovering how complex and abstract forms of 
semantic knowledge emerge from our biocultural inheritance to generate the ever-
evolving ambit of human behavior, including humanity’s conditioned but conscientious 
influence over it. 
 Conclusion 
 
 
The sections of this chapter have described the emergence of the image of God as 
a biocultural development marking the advent of “full” humanity in terms of its unique 
functional capabilities. The natural scientific disciplines of cognitive linguistics and 
evolutionary psychology help to locate the symbolic threshold launching behaviorally 
modern Homo sapiens’ biocultural evolution. As myth-symbols and the human condition 
to which they point, the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil emerge in no 
small part through our species’ singular capacity to integrate bits of semantic information 
across diverse behavioral domains. Because “more nature allows more nurture,” our 
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biocultural nature generates a condition of freedom through which we are responsible to 
discern, decide, and define what really is and ought to be. 
 As discussed in chapter 1, cognitive linguist George Lakoff’s neural theory of 
language and metaphor presents a fruitful framework for describing how the symbolic 
associations which encode what really is or how things really are are culturally 
constituted bits of semantic information, emerging from the bottom-up and giving shape 
to every human apperception and action, from the most limbic of emotions to the most 
lyric of poems to the most logical of discourses.
193
 This conception of the emergence of 
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of neurons can fire across one another without conscious effort. Neural pathways which fire together across 
conceptual domains in ways that “make sense” are maintained and reinforced autopoietically, while ill-
fitting neuro-cognitive connections remain minimal and unstimulated or become actively inhibited.  
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meanings implies that even theological understandings of what really is begin in domain-
specialized neuro-cognitive mechanisms and physical structures for knowing, which 
ought therefore to be taken into consideration when formulating and articulating the 
meanings of religious symbols today.   
 According to Fauconnier and Turner, double-scope blending or conceptual 
integration is what makes singularly human forms of semantic knowledge possible. 
Through these somatically-based biocultural processes, Homo sapiens construe any and 
every understanding of what really is—that conception of reality for which we are 
responsible and to which we are accountable. In our symbolization is constituted the 
semantic knowledge that makes us who we are as those who play a conscientious role in 
determining what really is and ought to be for us. Within these non-Darwinian dynamic 
processes beats the heart of what it means to emerge as a culturally constituted creature, a 
created co-creator, a bearer of the image of God. The following chapter presents a 
detailed analysis of how these novel realities emerge.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EMERGENCE: CREATING CAUSES, CREATURES, MEANINGS, MINDS 
 
 
At the heart of the endeavor to discover what it might mean to emerge in the image of 
God through biocultural evolution lies the concept of emergence. Among the many cross-
disciplinary concepts giving shape to scientific understanding and research today, 
emergence has both a relatively long history and a newly enthusiastic following, 
especially among those engaging in discourse between scientific and religious 
disciplines. Emergentism has quickly become an attractive and well-established option 
for scholars dissatisfied with reductionistic perspectives in science and/or dualist 
perspectives in religion. Among other things, emergence seeks to expose and escape the 
false dichotomy between reducing mentality to physics and attributing cognitive function 
to the activity of an immaterial substance called “soul” or “spirit.” In this chapter I seek 
to show how emergence dismantles this false dichotomy and provides a great deal of 
constructive material for Christian anthropology and ethics. Arguably, emergentism is a 
fruitful framework for gaining a renewed understanding of the myth-symbols of the 
image of God and the knowledge of good and evil, for constructing an intellectually 
honest and thoroughly Christian conception of what really is in order to better discern 
and decide what ought to be.  
  The following sections of this chapter represent the next steps in constructing an 
understanding of what it is to emerge in the image of God with a knowledge of good and 
evil. The first section raises the notion that emergence is mainly about how to account for 
different kinds of causes in the cosmos. The second section introduces neuroscientist 
Terrence W. Deacon’s three-tiered taxonomy for understanding every kind of emergent 
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causal power. The third section sets about the task of comparing, contrasting, and 
constructing Deacon’s emergentist schema. This section includes three subsections, 
which explore the false dichotomy of “weak” vs. “strong” emergence, the false equation 
of reductive and nonreductive physicalism, and the confusion over Deacon and 
emergentist Philip Clayton’s “orders” vs. “levels” of emergence. The fourth section 
builds upon the crux of Deacon’s argument that emerging into something other—like a 
God-imaging person—does not entail the introduction of something more in the cosmos, 
like a new type of force, substance, or law of physics. Included in this fourth section are 
three subsections delving into Deacon’s three cumulative and hierarchic orders of 
emergence—homeodynamics, morphodynamics, and teleodynamics. The final section 
addresses anthropologically, ethically, and theologically relevant forms of non-Darwinian 
teleodynamics and concludes with two subsections on how the emergent dynamics of 
sentience and consciousness inform what it means to emerge in the image of God with a 
knowledge of good and evil.  
Counting the (emergent) cause 
 
 
 The emergence of person-defining symbolic meanings is a result of the 
underlying emergence of life and mind. Theologian John F. Haught has observed that the 
concept “of emergence now holds an increasingly prominent place” in framing “the many 
scientific ideas that seem to support the naturalist worldview.”194 What Haught means by 
naturalism is the suspension or rejection of the appeal to any reality distinct from the 
natural world as necessary for understanding the existence of the cosmos or any 
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phenomenon within it.
195
 Haught’s overarching question in his critical embrace of 
naturalism is whether this perspective “is enough” to provide responses to ultimate 
questions of purpose and meaning in the cosmos or whether such questions are even 
meaningful so as to have any purpose.  
In terms of Aristotle’s classic taxonomy of causality, Haught argues that the 
natural sciences, especially in their more reductionistic strands, confine themselves 
methodologically to what could be construed as questions of material, formal, and 
efficient causality—the atoms that make up everything and everyone (material), their 
intrinsic causal properties in isolation and interaction (formal), and the ways in which 
they interact to make things happen (efficient).  
Haught contends that scientific scholarship ought to restrict itself in most cases to 
these levels or “layers” of explanation and always avoid appealing to divine activity. 
These relatively objective kinds of explanation are valid and valuable in themselves, and 
their impact on other disciples should not be ignored. The explanatory power and 
fruitfulness of a naturalist perspective has helped to reframe theological inquiry regarding 
the nature of all divine activity ad extra—creation, providence, revelation, redemption, 
etc. Differentiating and reintegrating distinct but commensurable levels or kinds of 
explanation among scientific and religious forms of discourse reshapes what it means to 
be a part of “the creation,” what it might mean “to create,” and therefore what it can 
mean to speak of “a creator.” Where natural scientific explanations satisfy the criteria for 
truthfulness, they can challenge and inform the entire framework of the believer’s 
conception of reality, from gluons to God.  
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 Yet for Haught, despite this potential for dialogue, the sciences still seem to 
display a methodological lacuna for questions of ultimacy, purpose, and meaning in the 
realm of what Aristotle termed final causality—the end or goal for the sake of which 
something exists and/or (inter)acts. Haught argues convincingly that this teleological 
layer of explanation is largely inaccessible and irrelevant to many natural scientists 
because of their underlying (and often unexplored) ontological presuppositions.  
Some ontologically reductionistic presuppositions entail the implicit or explicit 
claim that intentionality and the meanings and values often accompanying it are seeming 
surds in the natural world or convenient, if illusory, explanatory glosses for causal 
interactions that are fully explicable in epiphenomenal terms. All modes of causation, in 
other words, are reducible to the interactions of variously sized bits of matter-energy via 
the four known fundamental forces.
196
 There is nothing going on at the level of biology or 
psychology for which physics cannot theoretically provide a comprehensive explanation. 
Haught calls this perspective “scientific” or “evolutionary naturalism.”197 Perhaps more 
descriptively, Deacon calls this perspective “eliminative reductionism” or “eliminative 
materialism.”198 Another oft-used, though less precise, synonym for this eliminative 
paradigm is “reductive physicalism.” All of these terms have been generated in order to 
contrast with nonreductive—yet still fundamentally naturalist, materialist, physicalist—
emergentist perspectives. 
According to eliminative materialism, appeals to divine agency are doubly 
redundant because appeals to the human agency through which such notions arise are 
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also redundant. The supposedly misguided appeal to personal causal “agents” lies behind 
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins’s so called “God delusion.”199 Sociobiologist E. 
O. Wilson also holds that the projection of intention within and beyond the natural world 
is meaningful and valuable only in terms of its sociobiological utility in securing a 
reproductive advantage.
200
 For Wilson religious faith and ritual are genetically primed 
and “adaptive in a Darwinian sense” as means of enhancing individual and group 
survival, ecological control, and social conformity.
201
  
 As a counterexample to this kind of thinking, Haught highlights how 
reductionistic scientists betray their own phenomenological common sense. They are able 
to give more or less complete accounts of phenomena at some levels of explanation, but 
in ways which cut them off from other kinds of explanation implied in all forms of 
human activity, including the pursuit of knowledge through natural scientific methods. 
These scholarly pursuits imply the causal relevance of irreducible “things” like meanings, 
interests, intentions, values, and persons.  
As a test case, Haught draws an analogy using Aristotle’s four forms of causality, 
supposing that if someone sees a pot of water boiling on a stove and asks why it is 
boiling, one could respond in a number of equally valid ways. One could accurately say 
that the water is boiling because the relative velocities of the H2O molecules in the pot 
have increased enough to reach a temperature of 100 degrees centigrade, causing them to 
make their transition from a liquid to a gaseous state (material and formal cause). One 
could explain that the water is boiling because the burner beneath the pot is alight 
(efficient cause). However, the answer which one might expect in most circumstances is 
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also the answer which reductive forms of natural scientific scholarship cannot 
countenance without reducing and therefore eliminating what is meant by it—“because I 
want tea” (final cause).202  
From an eliminative perspective the subject “I” and verb “want” in this sentence 
refer to a causal power that is epiphenomenal of the physics underlying it. Notions of 
subjects and their intentions are an adaptive, but superfluous, epistemic shorthand or 
placeholder for more eliminative explanations. The appearance of agency can be 
understood without remainder as the entailed effects of ultimately unguided material 
interactions. Only bottom-up or part-whole interactions are really real or causally 
efficacious; top-down or whole-part explanations are illusory, heuristic, and 
epiphenomenal. Consequently, so are intention, freedom, meaning, and value.   
 If this kind of reductionism were valid or complete, its effects on ethics and 
religion, among other pursuits, would be devastating. These potential effects are among 
the reasons that “emergence now holds an increasingly prominent place” in scientific 
scholarship and discourse between natural scientific and theological disciplines.
203
 While 
scholars like evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby are implicitly 
non-reductionistic, emergence is explicitly anti-reductionistic in its ability to frame the 
findings of evolutionary psychology (EP) and other scientific disciplines. Emergentism 
does not result in theology or theological anthropology and ethics. However, proponents 
of emergence are able to locate and analyze both quantitative and qualitative distinctions 
within the natural world. These distinctions give rise to credible, systematic, empirically-
based ways of describing human uniqueness that open up scientific modes of explanation 
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to conceptual integration with theological ones.
204
 With their goal of substantiating final 
(causality) analyses, many emergentists hold that eliminative materialism misses 
something, because the something it misses is not a materially or energetically present 
“thing” at all, but the dynamical, diachronic self-organization of that which is materially 
and energetically present and quantifiable.  
According to Deacon, the emergence of life and mentality are among the kinds of 
(id)entity constituting dynamics which are not only absent in terms of an empirically 
observable and quantifiable material-energetic cause or sum of causes, but which, in 
being end-directed and consequence-organized, emerge and employ energy for the sake 
of a reality—a goal, a telos—which is no less absent in terms of its incompleteness, 
intangibility, or spatio-temporal distance.  
In these terms, there is perhaps little wonder so many in the natural sciences have 
been missing the forest for the trees, so to speak. Though cliché, this turn of phrase might 
help illuminate key concepts in the emergence conversation. Ecologically speaking, a 
forest is not just a dense localized grouping of arboreal life; it is an ecosystem, which is 
only present as a function of the interactive dynamics of its geological, climatic, 
microbial, plant, and animal constituents. These dynamic processes and others like them 
are something other than the simple addition of constituent parts and their interactions, 
though they are not exactly something more than this—a superaddition of new physical 
laws, forces, or “spirits.” What is missing is a way to account for the generation, 
preservation, and propagation of energetic physical interactions which involve a degree 
and kind of causal power “located” in an indissoluble interaction of constituent parts, not 
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in the parts themselves.
205
 Mereological analysis
206
 does not overlook any of the material-
energetic components present in emergent dynamics, but it does “throw away information 
about the basis of higher-order causal powers.”207 “There is nothing left out,” Deacon 
argues, “because there are no components to what is absent. […] We can summarize the 
source of irreducibility in such cases in a simple slogan: Absence has no components, and 
so it cannot be reduced or eliminated.”208 Speaking perhaps less enigmatically, Deacon 
grants that 
[t]here can be little doubt that reductionistic science is fundamentally 
sound. It has provided unparalleled predictive power for explaining 
physical-chemical processes across unimaginable ranges of scale and 
diversity of phenomena. It would be pointless to even imagine that it is 
somehow misguided.
209
 
 
At the same time, he points out that where it concerns living organisms, this kind of 
science 
also precisely brackets from analysis what is most relevant: the “organic 
wholeness.” The life of an organism is not resident in its parts. It is 
embodied in the global organization of living processes. Moreover, the so-
called parts that analysis produces—the individual molecules, organelles, 
cells, tissues, types, and organs—are not parts in the sense that machine 
parts are.
210
  
 
Without delving into Deacon’s extensive argument over what qualities 
differentiate machine parts and the (co)evolved body parts of organisms,
211
 one might 
accomplish the same effect by denoting the concept of fusion he gleans from American 
philosopher Paul Humphreys. Fusion means that inclusion within an emergent whole can 
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affect the constitutional properties of a given part. The coadaptation of organs or 
organisms is one such effect. Summarizing the concept of fusion, Deacon explains that 
“[b]y virtue of their systemic involvement with each other, [dynamically integrated body 
‘parts’] are not longer entirely distinguishable. As a result, reductionist decomposition 
cannot be competed because what were once independently identifiable parts no longer 
exist.”212  
(Id)entity-defining dynamics emerge as the self-orchestration and mutual direction 
of the pieces in the ensemble. The performance of the ensemble is not merely the sum of 
each part being played simultaneously. Likewise, life, evolution, information, 
significance, sentience, consciousness, and personhood all happen because of—and for the 
sake of—something which for all reductionistic intents and purposes is not there. An 
ability to account for emergent causes might be instrumental in “locating” human 
spirituality, the image of God, and the ethical and theological horizons toward which they 
point.  
Three orders of emergent causality 
 
 
Like Haught, Deacon is interested in reformulating and reappropriating the 
Aristotelian notion of final causality for the natural sciences today, which he attempts to 
achieve through the concept of teleodynamics. Where some scholars seem to understand 
emergence very generally as an escalating result of self-organizing principles in the 
natural world, and where others are able to cite nearly thirty distinct levels or types of 
emergence, Deacon locates three cumulative and hierarchically supervenient213 orders of 
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scale for analyzing all instances of emergent dynamics. Deacon now refers to these orders 
as homeodynamics, morphodynamics, and teleodynamics.  
This nomenclature reflects that of Deacon’s most recent monograph on 
emergence, Incomplete Nature: How the Mind Emerged from Matter (2012). He has, 
however, employed various parallel terminologies to denote the same three orders of 
emergence. Discussions of these three emergent orders and their potential impact on 
Christian anthropology and ethics occupy the remainder of this chapter:  
(1) First-order = non-recurrent  supervenient   thermodynamic (homeo-)214 
(2) Second-order = simple-recurrent self-organizing morphodynamic 
(3) Third-order = hyper-recurrent evolutionary  teleodynamic 
 
Deacon’s three-tiered schema of emergent phenomena is arguably more 
terminologically precise, comprehensive, and internally and externally coherent than any 
other framework for emergence scholarship. His decade-long work on the topic of 
emergence has proven influential and fruitful for a number of scholars in the 
philosophical and theological disciplines who are working to bring current science into 
dialogue with their respective fields. Thinkers like Christian Philosopher Nancey 
Murphy, psychologist Warren S. Brown, Philip Clayton, J. W. van Huyssteen, John 
Haught, and Philip Hefner are just a few who consider the concept of emergence to 
present a viable alternative to the seeming dichotomy between reductive physicalism and 
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substance dualism in anthropology, especially as it reaches into the realms of ethics and 
theology. These scholars are not looking for any available dialogue partner who “plays 
nice” with theology. Rather, they, like Deacon, find eliminative explanations of natural 
phenomena to be incomplete and inaccurate.  
Still, the greater attraction to emergence among theologians might well be the 
implication that if free and responsible intentionality is able to emerge through natural 
processes, the emergent dynamics resulting in human personhood might intimate the 
existence and character of a personal, intelligent, dynamic, creative reality transcending 
the cosmos as a whole. In short, the search for the ultimate conditions of possibility 
behind such perennial questions as “Why does anything exist?” “Why this reality and not 
another?” and “Why am I able to ask these questions?” may still point plausibly in the 
direction of religious faith, theological reflection, and the kinds of meanings and values 
they enable and require. Emergence has become a promising path down which 
interdisciplinary scholars are pursuing these kinds of questions today.  
Along this path, emergence also promises to be a fruitful hermeneutical tool by 
which Ricoeur’s “wager” that a second naïveté retrieval of religious myth-symbols might 
yet pay off in terms of Hefner’s twofold task of “provid[ing] genuine knowledge of 
reality, for the sake of our wholesome living.”215 Theological meanings may be able to 
retain an integral and plausible space in the symbolic universe of what really is, bearing 
implications for human visions of what ought to be.
216
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Comparing, contrasting, and constructing Deacon’s emergentist schema 
 
 
One of the star players on the stage of emergence scholarship and its theological 
application is Philip Clayton, whose concise listing of the general tenets of emergence are 
rehearsed at the end of chapter 1 above: (1) ontological physicalism, (2) property 
emergence, (3) the irreducibility of emergence, and (4) downward causation.
217
 As an 
emergentist Clayton contributes careful philosophical and historical scholarship, firsthand 
contributions to dialogue between the natural sciences and theology, and accessible 
explanations of emergence. However, he no more represents a standardized conception of 
emergentism than Deacon.  
Though Deacon is less concerned with theological application than Clayton, one 
could argue that these scholars’ respective characterizations of emergence are ultimately 
compatible, plausible, and profitable for theological discourse.
218
 At the same time, 
neither thinker is currently working to commensurate or coordinate their efforts. Both 
place a premium on terminological precision, but they pursue clarity in ways that are 
prima facie incompatible.
219
 Because they have not done much talking with one another, 
they seem to do an unfortunate amount of talking past one another.  
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Three potential areas of contention between Clayton and Deacon are (1) the 
relative significance each assigns to the distinction between “weak” and “strong” 
emergence, (2) the manner in which each understands the term “physicalism,” and (3) 
whether Deacon’s three orders of emergent phenomena are precise enough to make the 
same qualitative distinctions as Clayton’s multiple “levels” of emergence, especially 
among third-order emergent dynamics.  
The following three subsections help to construct and defend Deacon’s 
emergentist schema by tackling these issues. This analysis makes it possible to describe 
precisely (1) how the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil belong to the 
dynamic psychosomatic life of the human person ever in the process of becoming, (2) 
how these theologically oriented realities emerge as natural, physically-based dynamics, 
and (3) how these uniquely human emergent realities are qualitatively distinct from other 
types of naturally-occurring phenomena.  
The false dichotomy of “weak” vs. “strong” emergence 
 
 
Clayton contrasts weak and strong conceptions of emergence as follows:  
 
Strong emergentists maintain that evolution in the cosmos produces new, 
ontologically distinct levels, which are characterized by their own distinct 
laws or regularities and causal forces. By contrast, weak emergentists 
insist that, as new patterns emerge, the fundamental causal processes 
remain those of physics. As emergentists, these thinkers believe that it 
may be essential to scientific success to explain causal processes using 
emergent categories such as protein synthesis, hunger, kin selection, or the 
desire to be loved. But, although such emergent structures may essentially 
constrain the behaviour [sic] of lower-level structures, they should not be 
viewed as active causal influences in their own right.
220
  
 
He labels this understanding of weak emergence “epistemological emergence,” in that the 
emergent wholes it identifies embody “the same fundamental causal processes” at every 
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level of organization, though in ways that might currently escape our notice or grasp. 
Strong, or “ontological emergence,” by contrast, refers to causal properties that are not 
reducible to any belonging to the constituent parts of an emergent whole or any sum of 
the interactions among them.
221
 While Clayton admits that weak emergentism does 
constitute a break with canonical strains of reductive physicalism, he appeals to 
contemporary American philosopher Jaegwon Kim in order to propose that weak 
emergentism stands or falls on its ability to distinguish between reductive and 
nonreductive physicalism. However, because of the way Clayton and Kim define 
physicalism, they find the reductive-nonreductive classification to be a distinction 
without a difference, or at least an untenable distinction. They hold that nonreductive 
physicalism ultimately collapses into either reductive physicalism or some form of 
ontological dualism.
222
 Thus, Clayton argues, weak emergence is left “saddled with the 
same old dichotomy between physicalism and dualism, despite its best efforts to the 
contrary.”223 If Clayton is correct about physicalism, then perhaps Deacon, as a 
physicalist, cannot help the theologian give a robust account of the emergence of the 
image of God.   
According to Clayton, weak emergentism accepts “the causal closure of the world 
and a lawlike, even necessary entailment relationship between supervenient and 
subvenient levels,” which he calls a “token-token relationship.”224 Causal closure, 
especially as Deacon employs the principle, refers mainly to the first law of 
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thermodynamics, which states that matter and energy cannot be created or destroyed.
225
 
The second law of thermodynamics—the law of entropy—states, however, that matter 
and energy can be converted into other forms (including one another). When left to 
themselves, energetic interactions tend to diffuse as much as possible into their 
surroundings, becoming more randomized, or in Deacon’s terminology, less 
constrained.
226
 Deacon holds that the laws of thermodynamics entail “a causal closure 
principle, which is to say that the basic causal laws of the universe also form a closed 
system—all changes come from within.”227 Causal closure, couched solely in 
thermodynamic terms, implies the “bottom-up” determination of emergent phenomena at 
every level or order. Deacon, however, claims that there are two kinds of dynamics within 
the causally closed cosmos, which are not reducible to the thermodynamic activity 
through which they emerge, namely morphodynamics and teleodynamics. By this route, 
explored more fully below, Deacon celebrates the causal closure principle and 
successfully avoids reducing all forms of causation to their quantum level constituents.  
In the process, Deacon, like Clayton, sings the praises of multiple realizability. 
For Deacon multiple realizability means that complex emergent phenomena defy 
reductive token-token analyses because they “can all be embodied in highly diverse kinds 
of physical-chemical processes and substrates.”228 The same adaptive function might be 
realized in very different ways by different species or individuals.
229
 Two identical brain 
events may be associated with very different mental events; just as two identical mental 
events may be associated with very different brain events. Avoiding the 
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epiphenomenalism of token-token entailment presents another way in which Deacon may 
not fit the bill of the weak emergentism Clayton expects to find in physicalism.  
Deacon argues that metabolism does not equal mentality. He holds that while 
there may be an identifiable micro-physical-chemical correlate to every mental 
phenomenon, lower-level explanations do not preclude robust accounts of mental 
causation according to which mind states (emergent mental dynamics) and brain states 
(subvenient neuro-chemical-physical dynamics) are co-constraining, yet qualitatively 
distinct. Mental phenomena are causally dependent upon brain physiology from the 
“bottom-up,” and emergent mental dynamics are able to affect/effect these brain states 
from the “top-down.” Deacon’s dynamical emergentist schema is able to justify the 
phenomenological intuition characteristic of so much of human experience—that the 
mind knows what the brain is telling it; and the brain-body does what the mind tells it to 
do. Emergentism both confirms and qualifies the old adage, “mind over matter.” 
Despite these potential inroads to consensus, Clayton remains skeptical of what he 
is willing to admit “is perhaps the most sophisticated scientific theory of emergence 
currently available,” because he still finds Deacon’s version to be “weak” in the sense 
denoted above.
230
 What is more, for Clayton, “weak emergence is the position to beat.”231  
Deacon, however, denies both claims—that he is a weak emergentist in Clayton’s 
terms, and that the contest comes down to one between weak and strong emergence. 
Deacon acknowledges that his own scholarship “might be described as a sort of ‘weak 
emergence’ or ‘soft reductionism.’” Yet he immediately qualifies this confession by 
arguing that a “more careful analysis of emergence forces an abandonment of both 
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caricatures of explanation as simplistic abstractions.”232 Making only an indirect 
reference to Clayton, Deacon notes in his latest monograph that 
theorists are often distinguished as either being “weak” or “strong” 
emergentists, referring to their stance on the question of causal 
discontinuity and whether emergence is compatible or incompatible with 
reductionism. Strong emergentism argues that emergent transitions 
involve a fundamental discontinuity of physical laws; weak emergentism 
argues that although there may be a superficially radical reorganization, 
the properties of higher and lower levels form a continuum, with no new 
laws of causality emerging. However, this distinction does not capture 
many more subtle differences, and the perspective developed in this book 
is not easily categorized in these terms.
233
 
 
Though the way out of this seeming dichotomy is complex, Christian philosopher 
Nancey Murphy has developed several terminological distinctions which she finds to 
operate within Deacon’s work. First, Murphy defines five interrelated types of 
reductionism: (1) methodological reductionism, (2) epistemological reductionism, (3) 
logical or definitional reductionism, (4) causal reductionism, and (5) (two types of) 
ontological reductionism.
234
 When denoting and relating these terms, she takes issue with 
the concept of causal reductionism: “The view that the behavior of the parts of a system 
(ultimately, the parts studied by subatomic physics) is determinative of the behavior of all 
higher-level entities; all causation is ‘bottom-up.’”235 Supplementing her findings with 
Deacon’s, Murphy distinguishes between “causal forces” and “causal powers.”236 She 
prefers the latter term, which follows neatly the etymology of the Greek dunamis, most 
readily recognized in the noun and adjective forms of the English dynamic. Even more 
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interesting is that Deacon has begun to make ample and consistent use of the term “causal 
power” in the way Murphy describes it.237  
With this distinction between forces and powers, Murphy and Deacon conclude 
that emergent phenomena of any type do not involve the creation of new physical “laws,” 
even though they may introduce irreducible causal “dynamics.” Likewise, emergent 
phenomena do not create new physical “forces,” even though they may constitute the 
creation of a dynamically supervenient “causal power,” system, or entity, such as an 
organism. Life and causally efficacious mental function do not add to or subtract from the 
four fundamental cosmic forces. Yet life and mentality are not located in the metabolic 
activity of the body, but in the causal dynamics orchestrating metabolism from part to 
whole and whole to part. The “parts” are materially-energetically present; their “fusion” 
is not.  
Consequently, the causal closure principle cannot chase the image of God or even 
God out of the physical universe. Even if “all changes come from within,” as Deacon 
asserts, “causal powers” and their dynamically supervening influence are not “in” the 
cosmos in the same manner as “causal forces.” Deacon is not forced to choose between 
ontological physicalism and causal dualism, as Clayton and Kim presume. Thus, while 
every aspect of human personhood is wholly immanent to the cosmos, bearing the image 
of God can neither be reduced to physics nor relegated to the inaccessible realm of the 
supernatural. Theological descriptors like the image of God remain defensible because 
the causal closure principle cannot exclude a priori a dynamically supervening causal 
power acting from within—but not circumscribed by—created reality as a whole. With 
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emergence there is room for God, even “in” a closed universe. While in-depth discussion 
of divine action in a causally closed universe is beyond the scope of this study, this topic 
is very likely to play a role in my future research and bears further mention in chapter 7. 
The false equation of reductive and nonreductive physicalism 
 
  
Because the image of God must at some level be a physically-borne reality, a 
second area of potential disagreement between Clayton and Deacon worth analyzing is 
the manner in which each understands the term “physicalism.” As mentioned above, this 
second issue relates to the first, in that Clayton draws a correspondence between weak 
emergentism and physicalism. Citing Kim, Clayton attempts to discredit the supposed 
“nonreductive physicalism” of Deacon and his supporters, voicing his “serious doubts 
whether any version of physicalism other than reductivist physicalism is in the end 
coherent.”238 However, Deacon “evades Kim’s critique” by exposing a problematic 
assumption underlying Kim’s understanding of ontological (strong) emergence versus 
epistemological (weak) emergence—the false dichotomy Deacon seeks to overcome.239 
The difficulty in Kim’s position for Deacon lies in the assumption that one can 
separate the synchronic and diachronic aspects of emergent phenomena.
240
 For Deacon, 
“at least for higher-order forms of emergence, the part/whole distinction and the 
synchrony/diachrony distinction are intertwined.”241 The diachronic dynamics of causal 
powers “contains” the information reductive analysis irretrievably throws away. 
Emergence is a process, not just a product, and the process is not reducible, because it has 
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no components.
242
 At the same time, these dynamic processes bear ontological 
implications for the materially-energetically present “components” involved in emergent 
phenomena. Referring again to Humphrey’s concept of fusion, Deacon argues that Kim’s 
conflation of all forms of physicalism rests on the atomistic assumption that “parts” are 
fully understandable in isolation from the wholes in which they are dynamically 
embedded.
243
  
Deacon’s self-termed “softened reductionism” does not preclude a robust 
conception of whole-part supervenience, because he maintains that “a synchronic 
understanding of this relationship is an insufficient basis for the concept of emergence.”244 
This is not to say that mereological analysis is useless or unnecessary, only that it cannot 
avail itself of all information relevant for “locating” personal subjects or the image of God 
they bear in vivo. Analogously, differentiation in calculus is useful for finding 
instantaneous slopes of nonlinear equations, making available moment-to-moment 
information such as the velocity or acceleration of an object, but only by reducing time 
and distance (i.e., space-time) to nothing—to zero.245 This kind of synchronic analysis is 
important, but the methodological reductionism of finding the instantaneous slope of a 
zero-dimensional point on a curve yields a quantity that is only identifiable and significant 
because it is in flux—a “part” of dynamic, diachronic function. 
As a proponent of Deacon’s emergentist perspective, Murphy argues convincingly 
that the first type of ontological reductionism she defines is a key ingredient of 
nonreductive physicalism, because it does not entail causal reductionism. The form of 
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ontological reductionism conducive to emergentism “is the view that as one goes up the 
hierarchy of levels, no new kinds of metaphysical ‘ingredients’ need to be added to 
produce higher-level entities from lower.” According to Murphy, for higher-order forms 
of complexity to emerge, “No ‘vital force’ or ‘entelechy’ must be added to get living 
beings from non-living materials; no immaterial mind or soul needed to get 
consciousness; no Zeitgeist to form individuals into a society.”246 Murphy then defines a 
second kind of ontological reductionism in terms of the “much stronger thesis […] that 
only the entities at the lowest level are really real; higher-level entities—molecules, cells, 
organisms, are only composites made of atoms.”247 She calls this position “atomist 
reductionism,” and elsewhere, “reductive materialism.”248  
In nonreductive physicalism, Murphy argues, “It is possible to hold a physicalist 
ontology without subscribing to atomist reductionism.”249 With the emergence of novel 
and irreducible causal powers, one is able to “say that higher-level entities are real—as 
real as the entities that compose them—and at the same time reject all sorts of vitalism 
and dualism.”250 By rejecting atomist reductionism, Murphy also rejects what she calls 
causal reductionism. Deacon accomplishes the same by differentiating morphodynamics 
and teleodynamics from their underlying thermodynamics.  
The theological significance of this principle is that from atom to “Adam,” 
emerging in the image of God is a natural process which is not reducible to physics. At 
the same time, the dynamical emergence of human uniqueness bears a traceable kinship 
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to all other life and the matter-energy out of which it emerges. In this light a 
contemporary interpretation of the image of God is a statement about humankind’s 
functional uniqueness among other species, not its metaphysical uniqueness above other 
species. A dynamical physicalist ontology allows for robust qualitative distinctions 
among species that do not mistakenly place Homo sapiens outside or above the rest of the 
natural world as the creation. 
Interestingly, Murphy’s position seems identical to the way in which Clayton 
defines the first general feature of emergence—“ontological physicalism: All that exists 
in the space-time world are the basic particles recognized by physics and their 
aggregates.”251 However, Clayton adds that for all its anti-dualistic accuracy, this basic 
tenet is not precise—it “is poorly formulated.” Rather than ontological physicalism he 
prefers the term ontological monism, according to which, “Reality is ultimately 
composed of one basic kind of stuff. Yet the concepts of physics are not sufficient to 
explain all the forms that this stuff takes—all the ways it comes to be structured, 
individuated, and causally efficacious.”252 Up to this point in the definition, Clayton 
proposes nothing at odds with the nonreductive physicalism advocated by Deacon and 
Murphy. He continues however, explaining:  
The one ‘stuff’ apparently takes forms for which the explanations of 
physics, and thus the ontology of physics (or ‘physicalism’ for short) are 
not adequate. We should not assume that the entities postulated by physics 
complete the inventory of what exists. Hence emergentists should be 
monists but not physicalists.
253
  
 
                                                 
251
 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 4.  
252
 Ibid. 
253
 Ibid.; cf. Arthur Peacocke, Paths from Science towards God: The End of All Our Exploring (New York: 
Oneworld Publications, 2001), 50. Peacocke’s suspicion, like Clayton’s, is that nonreductive physicalists 
“seem […] not to attribute causal powers to that to which higher level concepts refer.” I intend to show this 
concern to be misplaced where Deacon is concerned.  
113 
This distinction may provide a helpful working definition for Clayton’s treatment of 
emergence, but it also includes a misleading conception of physicalism. For Clayton “the 
ontology of physics” is necessarily that which Murphy defines as “atomistic 
reductionism,” in contrast with “ontological reductionism.” The atomism Murphy and 
Deacon readily avoid is the same atomism Clayton and Kim presume to be endemic of 
physicalism and “weak” emergentism.  
Clayton holds that “causality should be our primary guide to ontology.”254 Deacon 
does not disagree. Like Clayton, he finds “serious inadequacies in our conceptions of 
matter, order, life, work, information, representation, and even consciousness and 
conception of value.” Deacon’s way of remedying this situation “requires reframing the 
way we think about the physical world in thoroughly dynamical, that is to say, process, 
terms, and recasting our notions of causality in terms of something like the geometry of 
this dynamics, instead of thinking in terms of material objects in motion affected by 
contact and fields of force.”255 In the case of many higher-order emergent phenomena, 
“their causal power is not located in any ultimate stuff but in this dynamical organization 
itself.”256  
This concept is already a theological doctrine. In orthodox Christianity the one 
God is a dynamic Trinity of “persons.” To borrow a term from patristic theology, this 
emergentist conception of ontology-causality implies that the image of God and the 
knowledge of good and evil are borne out in the ongoing perichoresis—the mutual 
interpenetration—of everything that goes into forming a culturally-constituted creature, 
from the (dust of the) ground up. Given a trinitarian theology of the creator God, one 
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could contend that this creaturely perichoresis emerges in response to and in the image of 
the eternal, self-constituting emergent dynamic “in” which all created reality lives and 
moves and has its being. Perhaps creation though evolution produces this dynamical kind 
of analogy of the divine life—an analogia entis, an imago trinitatis. Chapter seven below 
notes the potential impact of this concept on my future research. 
“Orders” vs. “levels” of emergence 
 
 
 Finally, and to begin a more systematic treatment of Deacon’s three-tiered 
taxonomy of emergent phenomena and its implications for Christian anthropology and 
ethics, Clayton expresses doubts as to whether Deacon’s three “orders” of emergence are 
precise enough to include and distinguish all the phenomena Clayton identifies as the 
many different “levels” of emergence. Once again, with a little translation, this apparent 
terminological problem becomes a nonissue. Clayton even admits that there may be a 
way through the apparent difficulty.
257
 Expressing his ongoing reservations, however, 
Clayton recounts that Deacon 
describes thermo- [now “homeo-“], morpho-, and teleodynamics as three 
“orders” of emergence. Deacon and I agree that thermodynamics and the 
dynamics of form are necessary but not sufficient for explaining biological 
and psychological phenomena. Two main differences seem to divide us: 
exactly when teleodynamics first occurs and whether there are additional 
distinct orders of emergence in the natural world.
258
 
 
As a response (albeit indirect) to these two interrelated issues, Deacon has since 
coined a term to characterize all teleodynamic phenomena—ententional. Deacon coins 
the term “ententional” to convey the “lack a single term in the English language (and 
others that [he knows] of) that captures [the] more generic sense of existing with-respect-
                                                 
257
 Philip Clayton, “Emerging from Physics to Theology: Toward a Panoramic View,” Zygon: Journal of 
Religion and Science 41 (2006), 680.  
258
 Ibid.; cf. Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 46-48, 137. 
115 
to, for-the-sake-of, or in-order-to-generate something that is absent that also includes 
function at one extreme and value at the other.”259 Entention combines (or blends) the 
prefix en- (meaning “in” or “within”) with the adjectival form of intend to denote a state 
of being intrinsically and dynamically “inclined toward” something extrinsic or absent.260 
Maximally, teleodynamic structures and functions emerge through the indissoluble 
interaction of multiple teleodynamic processes. Minimally, teleodynamic structures and 
processes emerge through the “co-creation, complementary constraint, and reciprocal 
synergy of two or more strongly coupled morphodynamic processes,” which are 
propagated through their underlying homeodynamics.
261
 
For Clayton teleodynamics implies teleology, which implies life. The emergence 
of life from nonliving processes makes a very attractive candidate for locating the phase 
transition from form to function. Yet for Deacon, teleodynamics can and must occur pre-
life. The term ententional solves this first-occurrence problem and provides a common 
thread to all teleodynamic phenomena. The concept of ententionality differentiates 
teleodynamics from morphodynamics and homeodynamics, with great precision. By 
contrast, Clayton’s “family resemblances” between perhaps “more than two dozen 
levels” of emergent phenomena do not establish the same kinds of qualitative distinctions 
among emergent phenomena as Deacon’s three orders.262 Deacon’s orders are able to 
accommodate any of Clayton’s levels as occurring within them. These orders do not 
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ignore the qualitative distinctions of Clayton’s levels. They add another layer of 
distinction to them.
263
  
The significance of each of these interrelated terms—homeo-, morpho-, and 
teleodynamics—becomes clearer below. The present reason for highlighting the 
cumulative and hierarchic relationships among Deacon’s orders of emergence is to 
emphasize that teleodynamics describes from the bottom-up the emergence of the human 
body-brain-mind and its functioning from matter. From the top-down, this functioning is 
describable in terms of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil.  
The emergence of the imago Dei ex absentia via homeo-, morpho-, and teleodynamics 
 
 
In the Christian doctrine of creation, God creates ex nihilo—out of nothing. 
Integrating Christian and Deconian concepts, the imago Dei emerges ex absentia. The 
divine image is not located in any physical or immaterial substance but “in” what Deacon 
calls a “constitutive absence” dynamically fusing the matter-energy of the cosmos into a 
human person in vivo.
264
 From this perspective, whatever is uniquely and 
characteristically human, and thus whatever belongs to the image of God, is can be 
described—on a natural-scientific level—in terms of Deacon’s teleodynamics and the 
ententionality these dynamics entail.  
On a theological level, when divinity and divine intentionality are understood to 
be the ultimate concern and only necessary constituent of what really is, then entention in 
creation—existing with-respect-to, for-the-sake-of—takes on new, emergent meaning. 
Blending an emergentist understanding of end-directedness (i.e., teleodynamics) and the 
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theistic concept of creatio ex nihilo supports the inference that the cosmos as a whole and 
all creatures emerging within it exist with-respect-to the creator God who is distinct (and 
thus absent) from the physical universe, but in whom all creatures live, move, and have 
their being. Where ententional dynamics reach the complexity of conscientious 
intentionality through biocultural evolution, human beings are able to exist and act freely 
and responsibly with-respect-to and for-the-sake-of theologically motivated goals, values, 
and norms.  
Using Deacon’s terminology, emerging in the image of God is a teleodynamic 
development involving the interrelated and variously complex teleodynamic processes of 
consciousness (including religious awareness), selfhood, sentience, significance, value, 
evolution, and life. As an ententional development, the emergence of the image of God 
can be described as the natural process by which the creation evolves all the conditions of 
possibility to point beyond itself in faith, hope, and love.  
This naturalness of the image of God relates to van Huyssteen’s point concerning 
the naturalness of religion mentioned in the previous chapter. However, to point to this 
relationship is not to say that the embodiment of the image of God is contingent upon 
religious belief. Still, as van Huyssteen puts it, “in this broadest sense of the word, 
religion co-emerged with humanity itself.”265 According to van Huyssteen, Deacon also 
subscribes to this “emergence and naturalness of religious imagination” thesis, in the 
strong sense of being  
open toward the specific emergence not just of a propensity for religious 
belief, but of spirituality, [which seems] to leave room for the possibility 
that the symbolic human mind, because of its vast neural complexity, 
might be an emergence of newly integrated capacities for perception, 
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knowledge, and awareness that go beyond the biological nature of the 
brain.
266
 
 
“In fact,” van Huyssteen suggests, “for a scientist like Terrence Deacon the capacity for 
spiritual experience can be understood as an emergent consequence of the symbolic 
transfiguration of human cognition and emotions.”267  
Many EP scholars are also pursuing nonreductive scientific research about human 
uniqueness open to emergentist analysis. Turning to fields related to Deacon’s 
neuroscientific research, van Huyssteen notes that although EP cannot itself evaluate the 
rationality or irrationality of specific religious beliefs, it is among the many scientific 
disciplines making arguments “that support the emergence of the cognitive, fluid, 
symbolic human mind; of imagination and religious awareness; and of the crucial role of 
language in the process.”268 Van Huyssteen finds Deacon, paleoanthropologist Ian 
Tattersall, archeologist Stephen Mithen, and many evolutionary psychologists to be 
among the scientists who “see the cognitively fluid human mind as blending and 
recombining templates of understanding used for other purposes and domains of 
cognition” in order to beget cultural singularities like ethics and religion.269  
On this point, the interrelated constructs of a number of scholars converge and 
combine, indicating the range of fields fruitful for constructing a second naïveté 
interpretation of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil. According to this 
integration of sources, the evolutionary emergence of our symbolic species
270
 and its 
                                                 
266
 Ibid., 265.  
267
 Ibid., 267.  
268
 Ibid. 
269
 Ibid., 265.  
270
 See previous discussion of Terrence Deacon and Philip Clayton.  
119 
singular capacities for conceptual blending across diverse cognitive domains
271
 has 
marked the emergence of a created co-creator of person-constituting cultural meanings 
and values.
272
  
These person-constituting distinctions belong to a symbolic universe—an external 
scaffolding physically absent from the material universe, but instrumental to cultural, 
cognitive, and thus cosmic change. Anticipating the role this type of constitutive absence 
plays in Deacon’s description of teleodynamic-ententional phenomena like spirituality, 
van Huyssteen argues that 
the heights of all human imagination, the depths of depravity, moral 
awareness, and a sense of God also must depend on this human capacity 
for symbolic coding of the “nonvisible.” This “coding of the nonvisible” 
through abstract, symbolic thought enabled also our early human ancestors 
to argue and hold beliefs in abstract terms. In fact, the concept of God 
itself follows from the ability to abstract and conceive of “person.”273  
 
If Deacon’s dynamical conception of emergent causal powers is adequate, then 
“persons,” whether human or divine, are “not there” in the sense of being materially-
energetically present as the interactional sum of internal and external constituent parts. 
Rather, as mentioned above, the perichoresis of the “parts” is itself the person. In 
Christian parlance, this understanding of emergent dynamics might provide powerful 
tools for constructing the logic of how the tri-personal God must also be conceived as one 
“Person,” “personal,” or as theologian and biochemist Arthur Peacocke words it, “at least 
personal, or supra-personal.”274 
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This theological development, which cannot be explored here, is especially 
relevant for developing the theological and anthropological insights of scholars at the 
crossroads of theology and the natural sciences such as Karl Rahner, Ted Peters, Denis 
Edwards, John Polkinghorne, Arthur Peacocke, and Robert John Russell, to name a few.
275
  
While van Huyssteen is surely correct that a compound abstraction of the concept 
of person is what makes theistic awareness possible, Rahner, for example, follows 
generations of theologians when arguing that while the analogy of personhood must 
proceed epistemologically from human to divine, the analogy of personhood (the 
analogia entis) can only proceed ontologically from divine to human, from infinite to 
finite, from necessary to contingent, from (Ground of) Being to beings, from eternal to 
temporal, from creative (ex nihilo) to created (ex absentia), from intrinsic-immaterial 
person-constituting emergent dynamics to extrinsic-material person-constituting 
emergent dynamics.
276
 In this development of Rahner’s theology, God, as concept and as 
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“person,” is the constitutive absence or “mystery” which gives existence and significance 
to all of created reality, dynamically supervening on the material cosmos from within, 
albeit across the so-called infinite qualitative distinction between creator and creation. 
Homo sapiens are able to conceive of this physically absent, yet causally relevant 
condition for existence as a motivator of moral action and other behaviors and hopes 
oriented to/by a reality and a futurity transcending those of the material cosmos.  
From this type of vantage point, Christianity and other theistic faiths have come to 
construe a potentially valid concept pertaining to a qualitatively insuperable reality able 
to relate to the world—i.e., God. This religious awareness has become inextricably 
woven into the teleodynamic processes that constitute and individuate persons vis-à-vis 
one another and their environments. In other words, through human agency, whatever 
“God” is understood to be exerts a personal causal influence in the world. While the 
verdict of whether theological awareness has an actual referent is ultimately a matter of 
faith, from a Christian perspective, the emergent dynamics which make possible this self-
transcendence might be identified as those biocultural processes through which we bear 
the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil. 
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 To elucidate this theological point, however, requires a deeper understanding of 
the most humble beginnings of biocultural development. Homeodynamics, according to 
Deacon, is where it all begins. The following subsections provide detailed summaries of 
Deacon’s three orders of emergent phenomena, highlighting how the cosmos has co-
created the image of God with each ascent in scale. Borrowing a phrase from Peacocke, 
to explore the theological implications of homeodynamics, morphodynamics, and 
teleodynamics is to explore how the creator “makes things make themselves.”277 For 
Haught, Clayton, Deacon, and others wishing to reformulate and reappropriate Aristotle’s 
taxonomy of causality for contemporary ontology, to explore the dynamic supervenience 
of teleodynamics upon morphodynamics upon homeodynamics is to explore the ways in 
which final and formal causes emerge and direct the matter-energy (material and efficient 
causes) of the cosmos toward specific ends, including ethical and religious goals.   
Homeodynamics and efficient causality 
 
 
In one sense, homeodynamics refers to a class of emergent phenomena, but in 
another sense, argues Deacon, it “is the engine of emergence” of every kind.278 In a word, 
homeodynamics are the source of all efficient causality in the cosmos—the 
thermodynamic interactions by which higher-order morpho- and teleodynamics emerge 
(from the “bottom-up”) and effect change (from the “top-down”).  
Because Deacon’s three orders of emergent dynamics are cumulative and 
hierarchic, teleodynamics are also morphodynamic are also homeodynamic, but not 
necessarily the other way around. This taxonomy might seem reductionistic, since the 
concept of homeodynamics is no more or less than a reaffirmation and restatement of the 
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two laws of thermodynamics—(1) that matter-energy cannot be created or destroyed and 
(2) that it tends toward an equilibrium state which is organized as diffusely and 
randomly—entropically—as possible. Yet how could entropy fuel emergence? What does 
thermodynamics have to tell theologians about the image of God? How might 
homeodynamics take part in the divine image and likeness?  
At first glance, thermodynamics would seem to make the spontaneous emergence 
of high-order complex system dynamics about as likely as falling up. But as a “law,” 
entropy is not as iron-clad as, say, gravity. It is more a rule of thumb with built-in 
loopholes. The law of entropy is a statistical likelihood characteristic of matter in 
interaction, not a property of matter itself, like gravity. Thus, any intrinsic or extrinsic 
property which alters the nearly certain probability that physical interactions will reach a 
maximally randomized equilibrium state over time, can lead to otherwise unexpected 
organizational regularities among substrate particles. The particles do not “fall up” so 
much as they “fall in line,” by way of an attraction caused by some factor entailing new 
interactive probabilities. Deacon parses this notion of attraction with three other 
interrelated terms. The first is ubiquitous to the concept of emergence; the latter two are 
original to Deacon: constraint, orthograde, and contragrade. As “the expression of an 
asymmetric statistical tendency,” an attractor correlates to one or more constraints.279 
Deacon defines constraint and these other terms as follows: 
Constraint: The state of being restricted or confined within prescribed 
bounds. Constraints are what is not there but could have been. The concept 
of constraint is, in effect, a complementary concept to order, habit, and 
organization because something that is ordered or organized is restricted in 
its range and/or dimensions of variation, and consequently tends to exhibit 
redundant features or regularities. A dynamical system is constrained to 
the extent that it is restricted in degrees of freedom to change and exhibits 
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attractor tendencies. Constraints can originate intrinsic or extrinsic to the 
system that is thereby constrained.
280
 
 
Orthograde: Changes in the state of a system that are consistent with the 
spontaneous, “natural” tendency to change without external 
interference.
281
 
 
Contragrade: Changes in the state of a system that must be extrinsically 
forced because they run counter to orthograde (aka spontaneous) 
tendencies.
282
 
 
Some common examples of what Deacon would call homeodynamic emergent 
organization are the orthograde (entropic) properties of most liquids, such as laminar 
flow, surface tension, and viscosity.
283
 Liquid molecules display these properties when 
they are brought together in sufficient quantity within a certain range of temperature and 
pressure. These properties are emergent because they do not belong to the liquid 
molecules in isolation and they dynamically supervene upon—constrain—the motion of 
the constituent molecules. Yet, at this first order of emergence, Deacon notes, “Statistical 
dynamics and quantum theory have provided a remarkably complete theory of how” 
these properties arise. “Thus in one sense they are considered to be fully reducible to 
relational molecular properties.”284 In a minimal sense, these properties are “formally 
caused” by environmental factors—they are inherent relational properties of individual 
molecules interacting thermodynamically under certain boundary conditions.
285
  
However, this homeodynamic interaction of liquid molecules is far from the far-
from-equilibrium (i.e., contragrade) dynamics constraining a liquid serving the function 
of, say, blood, sweat, or tears; and there is no indication at this point of how to get to the 
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latter from the former. Homeodynamics of this first-order involve the bare minimum of 
constraint. In terms of thermodynamics, then, Deacon proposes, “We can thus describe 
the increase in entropy as a decrease in constraints, and the second law can be restated as 
follows. In any given interaction, the global level of constraint can only decrease.”286  
At the same time, as the engine of emergence, homeodynamics are no less 
integral to the emergence of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil than 
the teleodynamic biocultural processes they fuel.  
Morphodynamics and formal causality 
 
 
How, then, does a spontaneous transition from simple homeodynamics to 
morphodynamics take place? How do causally efficacious (id)entities or (w)holes begin 
to “take shape,” as it were?287 How does formal causality become an internal principle of 
constraint? How is it that every snow crystal is alike in certain macro aspects of 
configuration but unique in other macro aspects of form? In thermo-/homeodynamic 
terms, morphodynamics occurs when “contragrade dynamics at one level produce 
orthograde dynamics at the higher level.”288 Simply put, unlikely things can only happen 
at the lower organizational level if they play a constitutive role in the most likely things 
happening at the higher level. Technically speaking, “A contragrade change must 
therefore derive from two or more orthograde processes, each in some way undoing the 
other’s effects. […E]ach must constrain the other.”289 That is, the lower level process is 
only contragrade in appearance, because the overriding orthograde tendencies of the 
higher level “force” (i.e., constrain) the lower level dynamics to take on new, previously 
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improbable orthograde tendencies. Morphodynamics make interactions less likely to 
become more random.  
At the same time, in a morphodynamic transition, there is no decrease in energy 
dissipation. In fact, there is a net increase in entropy accompanying the net increase in 
dynamical order or complexity.
290
 Materially-energetically, everything taking place at the 
higher level is accounted for at the lowest level, except for the new (morpho)dynamics 
themselves. Mutual constraint means that these new dynamics are as bottom-up/part-
whole dependent as they are top-down/whole-part influential. The contragrade tendencies 
of lower-level interactions induced by constraint at the higher level require the constant 
homeo-/thermodynamic “work” of particles bumping into each other in chaotic ways.291 
In short, absolute zero is the end of emergence.  
Revisiting and reinterpreting Aristotle’s taxonomy of causation, Deacon 
characterizes thermodynamics as the only source of efficient causality.
292
 In a manner of 
speaking, E = mc
2
 is the only concept one must master to understand literally everything 
that happens in the universe. This lowest quantum-physical-chemical level is where all 
causal forces come from. Yet these are not the only real or efficacious causal powers. All 
efficient causation resides with the four fundamental forces. However, not all causally 
efficacious systems and their dynamics are reducible to one another. The 
morphodynamics constraining and harnessing these forces exerts a formal-causal 
influence, and in teleodynamics, a final-causal influence. In Murphy’s terms, this state of 
affairs is why ontological reductionism does not entail causal reductionism or atomist 
physicalism. In this sense, and contrary to the Clayton-Kim critique, nonreductive 
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physicalism is indeed tenable. The theological implication of this conclusion is that the 
imago Dei emerges from matter. The natural self-organization of matter bears the image 
of God. Morphodynamics helps explain how this image begins to take form through 
natural process.     
Deacon analyzes several illuminating examples of morphodynamics, including 
whirlpool formation, Bénard convection cell formation, directional heat transfer through 
a contained gas, and snow crystal formation.
293
 The final example of snow crystal 
formation presents a special case of morphodynamics. In this process constraints or 
boundary conditions are doubly significant over time, and they are the reasons why every 
snowflake is unique. Every snow crystal takes on a recognizable hexagonal form due to 
the angled “shape” of the electromagnetic field of the water molecules and the radial 
symmetry of heat dissipation. The varying temperature, pressure, and humidity 
conditions the snow crystal encounters as it falls influence the form of the crystal as it 
grows. Thus, the initial conditions of crystal seeding, in addition to atmospheric boundary 
conditions over time, have a cumulative effect on the form of the growing snow crystal. 
Even if two snow crystals share identical initial conditions, the diachronic effects of their 
divergent boundary conditions will create two very different snowflakes. Likewise, if two 
snow crystals share even slightly different initial conditions, the diachronic effects of 
identical boundary conditions can also create two very different snowflakes.
294
 Perhaps it 
is no wonder snowflakes have become symbolic of the delicate dance of conformity, 
divergence, and unpredictability that make realities like life so wondrous.  
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Teleodynamics and final causality 
 
 
In addition to variability, the characteristic of snow crystal formation most 
relevant to the qualitative transition from morphodynamics to teleodynamics is 
crystallization itself—the morphodynamic record-keeping of the diachronic effects of 
extrinsic boundary conditions, which become, in turn, intrinsic boundary conditions of 
subsequent growth or decay. In a very real sense, the history of the snow crystal becomes 
frozen within its form in a potentially preservable way. While semiotic “information” or 
“memory” might still be an emergent order away, this historical record-keeping of 
variable morphodynamic processes and products is a precursor to the information-laden 
teleodynamic processes of life, reproduction, evolution, sentience, consciousness, and 
culture.
295
 In these teleodynamic processes, according to Deacon:  
[T]hanks to memory, constraints derived from specific past higher-order 
states can get repeatedly re-entered into the lower-level dynamics which 
lead to future states. This is what makes the evolution of life both 
chaotically unpredictable on the one hand, and yet on the other hand also 
historically organized, with an unfolding quasi-directionality. […] This is 
because memory allows every prior morphodynamic relationship itself to 
become a potentially amplifiable initial condition contributing to any later 
relationship.
296
 
 
 In its first occurrence, however, the transition from form-creating emergent 
dynamics (morphodynamics) to end-directed, consequence-organized emergent dynamics 
(teleodynamics) does not entail semiotic information or memory as a constituent 
property. Rather, Deacon suggests, because information “is both about something and has 
normative characteristics,” it is best understood as a function of two or more mutually 
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constraining teleodynamic processes.
297
 In this sense, information involves a compound 
end-directedness. Information directs (constrains, supervenes upon) subvenient end-
directed processes and their morpho- and homeodynamic substrates, which may 
themselves be the physical bearers of the information. In life as we know it, for example, 
reproduction is a teleodynamic process which depends upon the information-bearing 
morphodynamic substrate polymer DNA and its teleodynamic effects under certain 
(thermodynamically rich) conditions.  
Yet the first teleodynamic systems from which life in this form likely emerged 
were what Deacon terms “autogens.” An autogen is “[a] self generating system at the 
phase transition between morphodynamics and teleodynamics; any form of self-
generating, self-repairing, self-replicating system that is constituted by reciprocal 
morphodynamic processes.”298 Deacon goes to greater lengths than space permits in order 
to theorize how autogens might emerge, and with them the rudiments of reproduction, 
evolution, and genetic information.
299
 The emergence of the first autogens is a watershed 
moment in biocultural prehistory because their “[t]eleodynamics is the dynamical 
realization of final causality, in which a given dynamical organization exists because of 
the consequences of its continuance, and therefore can be described as being self-
generating.”300 A teleodynamic process is thus “a consequence-organized dynamic that is 
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its own consequence.”301 In rudimentary form, such a system would not be conscious or 
living. At the same time, life, consciousness, and concepts—including theological self-
definitions—necessarily build upon these first teleodynamic foundations.  
Non-Darwinian teleodynamics 
 
 
What, then, of the more than three billion year transition from autogenic evolution 
to the emergence of the image of God? Whence the emergence of a personhood capable 
of formulating this kind of values-laden distinction? According to Deacon, “Beyond 
explaining the linked contribution of self-organization and Darwinian selection to 
phylogenetic evolution, [teleodynamic] analysis may also shed light on their interaction 
in other biological and even non-biological processes, such as epigenesist, neural signal 
processing, and language evolution.”302  
The emergence of teleodynamics also brings with it the emergence of 
normativity—the possibility of success or failure in achieving the ententional end(s) of 
complex system dynamics. In a very real sense, benefit and harm—good and evil—
emerge with teleodynamics. For Deacon, “even these simple molecular systems [i.e., 
autogens] have crossed a threshold in which we can say that a very basic form of value 
has emerged.”303 Deacon, much in the same vein as Hefner, proposes a thoroughly 
bottom-up account of the emergence of values.  
Recall Hefner’s teleonomic axiom discussed in chapter 1: “The structure of a 
thing, the processes by which it functions, the requirements for its functioning, and its 
relations with and impact upon its ecosystem form the most reasonable basis for 
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hypothesizing what the purpose and meaning of the thing are.”304 Interestingly, Deacon 
finds the term teleonomic to be too modest or reductionistic when applied to living 
functions, coining a new term to get beyond these mechanistic connotations.
305
 In light of 
Deacon’s recent work, perhaps Hefner would not object to redubbing his principle the 
teleodynamic axiom. Such an axiom might better preface Hefner’s hypotheses concerning 
the emergence of freedom—the condition of having to make and contextualize choices 
based on the wholesomeness (or lack thereof) those choices might produce.  
Theologically speaking, emerging in the image of God with a knowledge of good 
and evil is the arrival in natural history of the conditions of possibility for the emergence 
of mythology, religion, and consequently, theological anthropology and ethics. Emerging 
in the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil means gaining the ability to 
discern and define—to co-create—the constellation of values-laden, person-constituting 
cultural distinctions and symbols which (teleo)dynamically supervene on our actions.  
Citing Hefner, Murphy and coauthor George F. R. Ellis find grounds to critique 
this thoroughgoing bottom-up account of moral values and theological ethics. However, 
they do qualify their comments with the caveat that “[t]he differences between Hefner’s 
system and [theirs] are more a matter of focus than direct disagreement.”306 Hefner 
argues persuasively that there are valid visions of wholesomeness to be inferred directly 
from natural scientific study. In Murphy and Ellis’s approach, by contrast, “What is 
needed is a concept of the good for humankind drawn from an account of ultimate reality 
                                                 
304
 Hefner, The Human Factor, 40.  
305
 See Deacon, “Emergence, The Hole at the Wheel’s Hub,” 112-13; Incomplete Nature, 107-42. 
306
 Nancey Murphy and George F. R. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology, Cosmology, 
and Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 239.  
132 
and thus from theology rather than from science.”307 In Hefner’s account the is which 
informs our ought is not necessarily “ultimate” in the sense of being insuperable. The 
symbolic universe of what really is may include theology or it may not. Theology is not 
necessary for the emergence of valid moral values and norms. At the same time, theology 
can qualitatively transform ethics in terms of that-for-the-sake-of-which persons and 
cultures pursue wholesomeness. In Deacon’s terms, theology is a qualitatively distinct set 
of potential constraints on culturally embedded ententional phenomena. Theology and 
theological developments open up novel ways of thinking, being, and acting in the world.  
This form of religious awareness has emerged recently in humanity’s biocultural 
history from the mental phenomena of sentience, which many other animal species 
display in diverse ways. The following two subsections discuss briefly how various forms 
of normativity, ethical value, and moral freedom and responsibility have emerged in the 
cosmos, mentioning that when the capacity emerges for ethical norms and values to take 
on theological and eschatological significance so emerges the images of God.  
Sentience and value 
 
 
The evolution of nervous systems is a higher-order realization of the high-stakes 
calculus of teleodynamic success or failure. Emergent neuro-cognitive adaptations persist 
because they serve an adaptive function vis-à-vis the generation, preservation, and 
propagation of teleodynamic constraints and their material-energetic substrates. 
Sentience—“the background ‘feeling of being here’”—is a compound system of 
teleodynamic constraint generators designed to serve the functions of maintaining and 
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reproducing the organism.
308
 Although sentience may allow organisms to pursue various 
kinds of activity, the Darwinian necessities of survival and reproduction ensure that 
mental adaptations will only persist in a given lineage if they do not greatly hinder these 
most basic teleodynamic ends.  
Built upon autonomic nervous system functions, sentience is a centralized 
awareness of whether or not an organism’s internal and external conditions are conducive 
to maintaining system dynamics and procuring the ends (and correlative means) toward 
which they are oriented. An organism feels hungry, so it seeks food, thirsty, so it seeks 
water. It senses danger, so it seeks refuge, pain, so it seeks escape or relief. In this way 
Deacon argues that the emergence of sentience is “the emergence of ethical value,” 
because it is the emergence of the ambivalent form of life which includes the possibilities 
of flourishing and suffering.
309
 Thus, as Hefner hypothesizes through his created co-
creator theory, Deacon proposes that through understanding the emergence of sentience, 
“we will discover new ways of asking old questions about the relationship between minds 
and brains, and perhaps even find ways to reintegrate issues of subjective value into the 
natural sciences.”310   
The compound teleodynamic emergence of sentience is the bridge from entension 
to intention. In this transition, Deacon reiterates, “sentience is constituted by the 
dynamical organization, not the stuff (signals, chemistry) or even the neuronal cellular-
level sentience that constitutes the substrate of that dynamics.”311 The causal power of 
efficacious mental function is not located in (i.e., reducible to) the thermodynamic 
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activity on which it depends, but “in” the (teleo)dynamics themselves. The brain imaging 
technology of fMRI, PET, and MEG can locate the thermodynamics fueling the 
supervening teleodynamics at work.
312
 Yet this kind of analysis, as Clayton would agree, 
is not the same thing as pinpointing the physical “tokens” of mental phenomena, let alone 
the cultural or religious concepts and values they embody.
313
  
Consciousness and morality 
 
 
According to Deacon, human mentality emerges from “a form of sentience built 
upon sentience” known as consciousness.314 In emergentist terms, the hyper-recurrent 
teleodynamics of wakeful human brain function results in a compound sentience framed 
by a virtual “world of should and shouldn’t, kindness and abuse, love and hate, joy and 
suffering.”315 To fuse Deacon’s and Hefner’s assessments of the emergence of 
conscientious thought and action, the values- and symbol-laden world of biocultural 
normativity generates the condition of freedom lived out by created co-creators. The 
ongoing creation of humankind’s symbolic universe and its historical consequences are 
those biocultural dynamics through which the image of God emerge.  
At every level of teleodynamic emergence arises a corresponding level of value 
and normativity, from the pre-living “self-concern” for structural integrity of autogens to 
the moral concerns of human persons. Illustrated in chapter 2, Brown’s shaded cone 
depiction of mentality, with its (Deacon-inspired) symbolic threshold, may help to 
illumine some of Deacon’s concluding remarks about consciousness:  
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Although each is discontinuous from the other by virtue of dynamical 
closure, neuronal-level sentience is nevertheless causally entangled with 
brain-level sentience, which is entangled in a virtual-self-level of 
sentience. And human symbolic abilities add a further, yet-higher-order 
variant on this logical type-violating entanglement. This latter involves the 
incorporation of an abstract representation of the self into the 
teleodynamic loop of sentience. Thus we humans can even suffer from 
existential despair.
316
 
  
With the emergence of a symbolically constituted phenomenology arrives the 
condition of freedom through which Homo sapiens (co-)create the meanings which make 
manifest what really is and ought to be for us. The free and responsible creation of 
meanings is the wellspring of the person-constituting distinctions of value which give 
shape and strength to concepts like “good” and “evil” and the norms which precipitate 
from them.  
In an environment harboring myriad threats to wholesomeness, despair and hope 
often form the poles of the ambivalent symbolic world we traverse with freedom and 
responsibility. As the condition of freedom has emerged within humanity’s biocultural 
history from the bottom-up, it has also gained a top-down influence on humanity’s 
biocultural future. In part the human condition means not having to settle for its 
givenness. As Peacocke words it, “we are capable of forms of happiness and misery quite 
unknown to other creatures, thereby evidencing a ‘dis-ease’ with our evolved state, a lack 
of fit which calls for explanation and, if possible, cure.”317 At the theological level, these 
capabilities for experiencing qualitatively unique “forms of happiness and misery” are 
part and parcel of the emergence of the image of God.  
                                                 
316
 Ibid., 533.  
317
 Peacocke, Paths from Science towards God, 172-73; cf. Roberts, “Emerging in the Image of God to 
Know Good and Evil,” 497. 
136 
When “God” is experienced or understood to be the ultimate supervening 
dynamic of how things are or what really is, “happiness and misery,” “dis-ease,” 
“explanation,” and “cure” take on new kinds of significance. As Fauconnier and Turner 
would suggest, these concepts’ theologically blended meanings have emergent structure. 
What emerges with these new meanings is the implication that perhaps our biocultural 
capacities and efforts could never accomplish the ethical and existential ends toward 
which they point. Theology and eschatology may be fruitful guides toward these ultimate 
teleodynamic horizons. In Ricoeurian terms reframing the biblical myth-symbols of the 
image of God and the knowledge of good and evil by means of this emergentist 
biocultural perspective demands and allows a “qualitative transformation of reflexive 
consciousness”—a second naïveté understanding of these anthropological, (meta-) 
ethical, and eschatological symbols of Christian theology.
318
  
Conclusion 
 
 
 From “Counting the (Emergent) Cause” to discussing the “Non-Darwinian 
Teleodynamics” of sentience and consciousness, emergentism paves promising avenues 
for understanding how qualitatively new causal powers come to bear a dynamically 
supervening influence in the cosmos. In their respective ways, John Haught and Terrence 
Deacon argue that the natural sciences ought to open themselves to the idea of distinct 
and irreducible forms of causality, each requiring its own layer of explanation. From the 
material and efficient causality of (thermo-) homeodynamics, to the formal causality of 
morphodynamics, to the final causality of teleodynamics, emergence makes room for a 
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robust account of conscientious human-being that may yet be open to a theological layer 
of explanation.    
Framed by these conceptual foundations, the following two chapters employ 
careful biblical scholarship in the construction of a second naïveté understanding of the 
image of God and the knowledge of good and evil. The goal of these chapters is to 
facilitate the emergence of historical-critically “constrained” yet novel meanings of these 
myth-symbols and renew their ability to inform human-being and action in intellectually 
honest and humanizing ways.   
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CHAPTER 4 
THE IMAGO DEI: WITHIN A BIBLICAL AND EVOLUIONARY VIEW OF THE WORLD 
 
 
By establishing a set of construction techniques, tools, and framing materials, the 
preceding chapters have been building upon a hermeneutical foundation at least as deep 
as the earliest strands of the biblical tradition. Constructing a second naïveté 
understanding of biblical myth-symbols in which current science reframes and informs 
what it means to emerge in the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil involves 
recapitulating in a post-critical way the general hermeneutical process which resulted in 
relevant biblical texts and their meanings in context. The primary reference for the image 
of God is Genesis 1:26-27, a passage which has proven as important for Christian 
anthropology as it is brief and enigmatic. In the face this exegetical ambiguity, the tasks 
of theological interpretation and reappropriation are made less daunting by Paul Ricoeur 
and André LaCoque’s insight that Genesis 1 follows the “trajectory” (trajectoire) of 
temporally earlier creation tradition, especially Genesis 2-3.
319
 While Genesis 1:1-2:4a 
may open the biblical canon, this Priestly creation narrative is the culmination and 
prologue of a written faith tradition in which “the very idea of Creation emerges enriched 
from [a] proliferation of originary events.”320  
This chapter continues the hermeneutical trajectory of Genesis 1, by constructing 
a second naïveté understanding of the image of God, reframed by an emergentist 
biocultural evolutionary perspective. The hermeneutical lens ground and polished in 
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previous chapters now brings into focus several guidelines for interpreting the meaning of 
the image of God already present in the original text. Through this lens first- and second 
naïveté formulations of the image and likeness of God represent parallel, commensurate, 
and complementary modes of understanding this human condition. In the following 
sections of this chapter, I argue that in these pre-critical and post-critical conceptions of 
the image of God (1) the emergence of this understanding and the human condition to 
which it refers involve double-scope blending—a unique cognitive fluidity evident in 
linguistic ability; (2) the image of God is a product of nature, wrought of the creation and 
embedded within it to the same extent as non-human creatures; (3) the image of God is 
neither a spiritual nor corporeal reality, as if these could be separated, but a function—a 
vocation—of the living person as a psycho-somatic unity; and (4) the image of God 
involves a condition of freedom, a conscientious response-ability to discern and respond 
to God’s invitation to co-create a “very good” world in cooperation with one another and 
the rest of the creation.  
Illustrating the hermeneutical procedure described in chapter 1, each of these four 
sections begins with a diagram of the (double-scope) conceptual integration at work in 
generating a second naïveté understanding of the image of God and the knowledge of 
good and evil. A fifth diagram in the concluding section combines the other four. These 
diagrams’ increasing intricacy is not meant to confuse but to draw attention to the 
developmental nature of interpretation and the wondrous complexity of the meaning-
making process.   
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The emergent meaning of the image of God in Genesis and contemporary interpretation 
 
 
 As a way to visualize the argument of this section, figure 3 below employs the 
components of the conceptual integration diagram modeled in chapter 1. Fauconnier and 
Turner’s illustration is instrumental in picturing parallel processes of meaning-making in 
ancient and contemporary contexts. The small diagram to the left of the main diagram 
depicts the emergence of the image of God concept in the primeval history as an example  
 
 
Figure 3: Image, Knowledge, and Blending Capacity 
141 
of double-scope blending. In this complex confluence and clash of ancient ideologies, 
Israelite and Neo-Babylonian concepts frame one another to generate a biblical 
conception of the image of God.  
Following Gerhard von Rad’s exegesis, Ricoeur argues that the theological 
cosmology of Genesis 1:1-2:4a, in which (Yahweh) Elohim has no celestial rivals and is 
the sole creator of the cosmos, emerges from the conviction that Yahweh is the God of 
Abraham and Moses, of the promises of place, people, and provision. Beginning in the 
Patriarchal sagas, the continuum of biblical Heilsgeschichte (salvation history) shifts 
thematic focus from redemption to creation “in a concentric fashion,” proceeding through 
hymnic passages such Psalm 136 and 148; Isa. 40:27-28; 44:24-28, then through passages 
about the act of creation as types or precursors to acts of redemption (Isa. 44:5; Psalm 89 
and 74), to the notion that creation as a whole bears witness to divine wisdom (Psalm 8, 
19, and 104; cf. Prov. 3:19; 8:22; 14:31; 20:12; Job 38).
321
 For von Rad and Ricoeur, 
Israel infers that (Yahweh) Elohim is the one who separates the primordial waters 
because “[t]he One who opened a way in the Red Sea is the same One who cut Rahab in 
pieces (Isa. 51:9f.).”322 In the end, and thus “in the beginning,” the concepts of creator 
and creation emerging through Genesis relativize even these canonical vestiges of the 
Chaoskampf motif so prevalent in Enuma Elish and other ancient Near Eastern 
parallels.
323
 Within the symbolic universe of the text, the center of gravity around which 
the Genesis cosmology maintains its orbital trajectory is the religious experience and 
theological inference that creation can only be understood fully as the realm, and 
                                                 
321
 Ricoeur, “on the Exegesis of Genesis 1:1-2:4a,” 130-32. 
322
 Ibid., 131; cf. Neil B. MacDonald, Metaphysics and the God of Israel: Systematic Theology of the Old 
and New Testaments (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 118. 
323
 See J. Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids: Brazos 
Press, 2005), 263-69. 
142 
therefore product, of God’s loving, gratuitous, and redemptive action. By implication, to 
be a God-imaging creature is to reenact God’s beneficent creativity. 
 To the extent this exegetical reasoning is tenable, it strengthens Philip Hefner’s 
hypothesis that Homo sapiens image God as conscientious created co-creators of 
meanings, called to discern, construe, and enact God’s intentions for the creation and its 
wholesomeness. Yet even without subscribing fully to von Rad and Ricoeur’s exegesis, 
there is overwhelming scholarly consensus that the theological cosmology and 
anthropology of Genesis 1 belongs to a late—perhaps the latest—textual and ideological 
strand of the Hebrew Bible’s primary history (i.e., Genesis to 2 Kings), which takes a 
critical stance toward other ancient Near Eastern ideologies.
324
  
 However, the polemical nature of Genesis 1 takes on a form of myth, ritual, and 
praxis much more subtle than overt counter-argument. Rather than discrediting 
competing cosmologies, theologies, and anthropologies directly, the Priestly creation 
narrative makes a Ricoeur-like “wager” that its mythology provides greater 
“intelligibility,” “power of reflection,” “coherent discourse,” and “power to raise up, to 
illuminate, to give order to […] human experience,” despite any historical 
contraindications.
325
  
In cognitive linguistic terms, Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner could argue that 
the emergent meaning of the Genesis cosmology is the product of blending Israelite 
religious experience and tradition with common but contrary ancient Near Eastern 
mythology. Through what could be understood as an act of double-scope conceptual 
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integration, these symbolic worlds clash and reframe one another in the primeval history 
of Genesis. While Genesis 1 bears striking similarities to Enuma Elish and the Atrahasis 
and Gilgemesh epics, its re-signification of Mesopotamian mythology is just as dramatic. 
This new understanding of what really is extends to the concepts of creator, creation, and 
creaturehood, thereby generating a novel conceptual framework through which to 
describe and prescribe what it is to bear the image of God.  
The biblical myth-symbol of the image of God did not emerge in a vacuum; 
neither is the concept of human beings bearing an image or likeness to a deity unique to 
biblical literature. Rather, the consensus among exegetes today is that the biblical 
understanding of what it means to bear a divine image and likeness is likely a complex 
(double-scope) clash and integration of Neo-Babylonian concepts and uniquely Israelite 
understandings of divine identity and agency. Through the inferences emerging from this 
conceptual integration, Genesis 1 is able to convey something qualitatively different 
about divinity and humanity than its ancient Near Eastern parallels. The 
writer(s)/redactor(s) of Genesis 1 reframed these concepts in ways that monotheize the 
concept of deity and democratize the idea that human beings can image or represent 
divine power and will. These conceptual shifts relativize the power and authority of 
earthly despots and their heavenly counterparts, elevating the status and function of the 
ordinary and oppressed vis-à-vis their earthly rulers and human creatures vis-à-vis their 
creator. The creator God of Genesis 1 has no divine rivals from whom to wrest power and 
authority. The Lord God—Yahweh Elohim—is not a despotic ruler who creates through 
violence against other gods, implying a radical restatement of ancient Near Eastern royal 
ideology. In this new symbolic worldview, the clearest human reflection of divinity may 
144 
not be monarchy, its tyranny, or its ability to conquer and subdue other peoples as a god 
vanquishing a rival.  
Biblical scholars like J. Richard Middleton and Richard J. Clifford note that in the 
royal ideology of the ancient Near East, rulers represented (imaged) their gods by waging 
holy war against other peoples as a god whose enemies’ defeat made way for the 
establishment of the earth and civilization. Although the idea of creation through struggle 
against primordial forces of chaos (i.e., Chaoskampf) is not fully excised from the 
cosmology of Genesis (vis-à-vis other textual traditions within and without the emerging 
primary history of the Hebrew Bible), Yahweh Elohim’s lack of personal rivals in 
Genesis 1 may be interpreted as disclosing an anti-violent ideological trajectory 
reframing the concepts of creation and the divine image.
326
 This study’s second naïveté 
retrieval of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil trace this theological, 
anthropological, and ethical trajectory beyond the symbolic world of the text, seeking to 
follow its anti-violent thrust as far as a biocultural understanding of the human condition 
will allow.     
From another angle supplementing this nonviolent interpretation, some scholars 
suggest that Genesis 1 anthropomorphizes the concept of cultic images while de-
anthropomorphizing the God imaged. Yahweh Elohim has no physical form to represent 
or restrict with an idol. While the prohibition to worship images predates Genesis 1 and 
does not bear explicit mention in the text, there may be some merit to Walter 
Brueggemann’s suggestion that in order to assert the freedom of their God, the Hebrews 
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insisted that “God is not imaged in anything fixed but in the freedom of human persons to 
be faithful and gracious.”327 While there is little doubt that specific ancient Near Eastern 
parallel texts frame the theology, cosmology, and anthropology of Genesis 1, the 
religious experience and understanding of the Priestly writer(s)/redactor(s) radically 
reframes the symbolic universe from which the biblical text derives so many of its 
background distinctions.  
While there are no definitive data linking the image of God in Genesis 1 to a 
specific body of source material, geographical location, or historical time period, 
Middleton defends the “reasonable assumption” that  
along with a shared Mesopotamian royal ideology concerning the cultic 
role of kings and the Assyrian reworking of originally Babylonian 
compositions, it is quite plausible, even in the absence of written 
documentation, that the two cultures shared a specific notion of kings as 
the image of god. If we take this together with the distinctive 
Mesopotamian background of ideas for the primeval history, it is certainly 
possible that the biblical imago Dei derives from a Neo-Babylonian 
context.
328
 
 
Though no one expects to find a missing link between Genesis 1 and contemporary 
ancient Near Eastern parallels, the circumstantial and textual evidence support the thesis 
that the Babylonian poem Enuma Elish constitutes a major catalyst and source for the 
theological cosmology encapsulated in Genesis 1.
329
 Historians and exegetes were 
conducting some of the most in-depth explorations of this connection when Ricoeur first 
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gauged the conceptual distance and relative pull between the Adamic myth and “the 
drama of creation and the ‘ritual’ vision of the world” found in Enuma Elish.330 While 
mapping out his metaphorical cycle of myths, Ricoeur assumed that the conceptual 
distance between the Babylonian and Israelite creation mythologies correlated to a lack of 
gravitational influence. Yet comparative studies consistently conclude that while “the 
‘Adamic’ myth and the ‘eschatological’ vision of history” eventually took up residence in 
the center of Ricoeur’s mythic solar system, Enuma Elish is quite likely its most 
influential satellite. Genesis 1 is conceptually distant from Enuma Elish, but it only 
became the “star” of Ricoeur’s cycle of myths because it absorbed, fused, and 
reconstituted so much of Enuma Elish’s material.  
The specific influence of Enuma Elish on the primeval history has been a topic of 
interest in biblical studies for over half a century. Middleton argues that this clash of 
symbolic worlds may have influenced the Priestly tradition and its creation account in the 
seventh century B.C.E or earlier.
331
 Nonetheless, a vast majority of biblical scholars agree 
that around or during the time of the Babylonian captivity in the sixth century, the 
Priestly redactor(s) of Genesis 1:1-2:4a brought this tradition together with that of the 
older Yahwistic creation account of the Garden Narrative. This composite text formed a 
new redactional whole at the beginning of the emerging canon of sacred literature that 
would become the Hebrew Bible.
332
 From this historical insight, and beginning in the late 
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1950s, biblical scholars and ancient Near Eastern historians began to draw close 
conceptual ties between Mesopotamian cosmology and the Genesis cosmology. By 
tracing this long interpretive history from the seminal works of Alexander Heidel and 
Gerhard Hasel to today, Middleton has distilled and continued these research efforts in 
recent years, providing a systematic description and analysis of the original range of 
meaning of the image of God, the social context in which that meaning emerged, and 
some ethical implications of living out that meaning. In broad strokes, this body of 
critical scholarship concludes:  
(1) The cosmology of Genesis 1, along with its mention of the image of God, is very 
likely a polemical ideological critique of the Babylonian cosmology depicted in 
Enuma Elish, in which the god Marduk ascends to power through military and 
political conquest.
333
 After becoming chief among the gods, Marduk creates the 
heavens and earth by killing and mutilating the body of Tiamat, the goddess 
representing the chaos of the deep salt seas. He and his ally Ea create human beings 
from the blood of Tiamat’s consort, Qingu, as a means of punishing this rival and for 
the purpose of bringing to life human creatures who toil in order to provide the gods 
with sustenance and occasion to rest.
334
  
 
(2) The order and means of creation and the purposes of created entities are similar in 
Genesis and Enuma Elish. Both Marduk and Elohim create through fiat
335
 and 
separation—light from dark, waters from waters, heavens from earth, and water from 
land. Heavenly luminaries also bear similar functions in each account. Both 
cosmologies define the role of the sun, moon, and stars in marking the passage of 
days and seasons. However, since the Hebrews do not involve heavenly bodies in 
worship, the luminaries are given a lower status—they “serve” not as divine sources 
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of light but as carriers of light to govern the day and night.
336
 Further, Elohim does 
not create by separating the body parts of dead deities.
337
 The forces of chaos that 
Marduk must overcome in order to create are utterly de-personified in the Genesis 
cosmology. The goddess Tiamat is almost unrecognizable as the tehom—the deep 
sea—over which the breath of God so effortlessly hovers.338 In Enuma Elish Marduk 
must breathe or otherwise conjure a great wind to disturb the insides of Tiamat, 
affording him the opportunity to kill her, and only then to create. Yahweh Elohim is 
not a mere replacement of Marduk. The Hebrew God has no personal rivals, and 
whatever semblance of primordial chaos can be found in Genesis 1, it is brushed 
aside by the constitutive utterance, “Let there be…”339 In Genesis created reality and 
its purposes come about through acts of divine freedom and generosity, rather than 
retribution and necessity. 
 
(3) Finally, both cosmologies call for political and ethical mimesis.340 With Enuma Elish 
the move from myth to ritual and politics is more straightforward than with Genesis 
1. Political conquest, such as that of the Southern Kingdom of Judah ca. 593-587 
B.C.E, is a reenactment Marduk’s rise to power over the forces of chaos. Captive 
peoples then provide the labor force on which Babylonian society and its elite 
depended. In the drama surrounding the annual New Year’s festival, the Babylonian 
king stood in as Marduk, a representation or “image” of this god on earth, set there to 
implement divine purposes.
341
  
 
In the Genesis 1 cosmology this royal image concept is democratized. It still bears 
a functional purpose, but in very different ways. If Genesis 1 is redacted in an exilic 
setting, it calls the Hebrews in hope against hope to bear the image and likeness of God 
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as divinely appointed rulers. In the midst of being “subdued” and “ruled over” in 
captivity, the exiles are invited to “fill the earth, and subdue it; and rule over” its 
creatures (Gen. 1:26-30). Yahweh Elohim is able to rest after creating humankind, but not 
due to the fruits of human labor (Gen. 2:3). Rather, this creator calls humankind to join in 
this Sabbath rest, as Exodus 20:8-11 records. More thoroughly than a solitary king, a 
royal statue, or a mute idol, all humankind bears an “image” of God that is a “likeness” 
unto beneficent divine agency. As D.J.A Clines argues in his classic scholarship on this 
biblical concept, the image of God in Genesis is representational, not merely 
representative.
342
 Or, as Hefner suggests, “humans are, in some manner, created to be an 
explicit representation and presence of God’s will in the creation. Humans have the 
created calling to articulate within the natural world what God’s intentionality might 
be.”343  
Yet what clues does the primeval history give to indicate “what God’s 
intentionality might be”? If novel meanings emerge from the collision and integration of 
ancient symbolic worlds, one of Deacon’s readers might search for them in what is 
constitutively absent from the text—a contextualizing hermeneutical dynamic 
constraining the meaning of the text and its application. What is conspicuously absent—
but hermeneutically relevant—is a positive role for creation through violence in Genesis. 
Unlike Marduk, Yahweh Elohim does not create through conquest. Being created in the 
image of this God entails strong prohibitions against interpersonal violence (Gen. 9:6). 
From Cain and Abel (4:5-15) to Lamech (4:23-24) to Noah (6:11; 9:6) to Babel (11:4), 
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the primeval history condemns the temptation to establish divine favor, political power, 
and social order through violent means.
344
  
The Genesis cosmology reframes the concept of creation through violence by 
praising the power of speech, extending an invitation to participate, and thus describing 
the human condition of freedom to co-create something “very good.” Old Testament 
scholar Graeme Auld highlights the first of these developments and its theological and 
anthropological implications:  
One of the most remarkable features of the opening of Genesis (1:1-2:3) is 
the prominence of speech. This is not only a relative judgment, in 
comparison with chapters 5 and 9. It also emerges from a simple internal 
examination of the wording of the chapter. No less than 40 percent of the 
verbs denoting the divine actions are explicitly verbs of speaking: “said” 
(’mr, 10x), “called” (qr’, 5x), and “blessed” (brk, 3x), eighteen out of a 
maximum of forty-five relevant verbal forms. But even that is to 
understate the matter. Because the report of every “day” of creation opens 
with “and God said” and is followed by the divine fiat, all the making 
(8x), separating (2x), granting (2x), and sanctifying (1x) were also 
achieved by divine word. In Genesis 1, God is a God who speaks, and who 
acts by speaking. It stands to reason, then, that human beings created by, 
and made very like such a God would be preeminently speakers.
345
  
 
  Coincidently, the biocultural conception of human uniqueness constructed in the 
above chapters emphasizes very much the same thing. For good and ill much of what 
makes Homo sapiens qualitatively distinct among species is the conscientious ability to 
(co-)create the symbolic universe of what really is and ought to be.  
Hence, cognitive linguistics not only provides hermeneutical insight as to how 
new meanings might emerge through integrating ancient and current concepts, but also 
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that this uniquely human capacity did not escape the notice of the biblical writer(s). Auld 
gives hints that the Priestly contributor(s) to the Hebrew Bible may have understood, in a 
pre-scientific way, that humankind’s cognitive fluidity, embodied in language, made us 
unique among creatures and somehow similar to the God before, behind, and beyond the 
creation. After reading van Huyssteen’s 2004 Gifford Lectures,346 Auld “suggested to 
him that his emphasis on speech as marking off the human from the rest of the world was 
in fact consistent with a plausible reading of Genesis 1:26-27, and the novel insistence 
there on humanity created in the image and likeness of God.”347 Auld holds that van 
Huyssteen’s “fascinating interdisciplinary account of speech” in Alone in the World? 
could have benefited from greater engagement with Genesis 1 in conjunction with this 
work’s more thorough interdisciplinary exposition of Genesis 3.348 
 In Genesis 1 the creator invites all constituents of the creation to participate in the 
process to the utmost of their inherent ability and degree of freedom. Light is called to 
“be”; waters are called to “be gathered”; the earth is called “to sprout vegetation”; 
celestial objects are called to “govern” the passage of time and “give light”; waters are 
called to “teem with swarms of living creatures”; birds are called to “fly above the earth”; 
the earth is called to “bring forth living creatures”; all life is called to “be fruitful and 
multiply.” Middleton praises “the text’s depiction of the process of creation as God 
sharing power with creatures, inviting them to participate (as they are able) in the creative 
process itself.”349  
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 Still, the grammar of Genesis 1 implies that one creature’s ability and freedom to 
fulfill its created role is qualitatively distinct. Until verse 26, God speaks to no one in 
particular, manifesting and empowering created realities through jussive fiat. Then there 
is a shift. The participle of verse 22 becomes a direct address in verse 28: “God blessed 
them, saying, ‘Be fruitful […]’” becomes “God blessed them; and God said to them, ‘Be 
fruitful […].’” As Auld highlights, the formula, “‘And God said’ is used absolutely nine 
times in this opening prologue. Only once do we read ‘and God said to [someone].’”350 In 
Genesis 1:28-30 human beings are given a say in the future of the creation, including 
their own.  
 Re-reframing the ancient myth-symbol of the image of God though an emergentist 
biocultural evolutionary perspective is no more or less complicated than hearing God 
“speak” through the natural processes that have resulted in Homo sapiens and the 
conceptions of a “very good” world we are co-responsible for envisioning and establishing 
cooperatively as culturally-constituted creatures. Of course, this task raises many more 
questions about how to construct a second naïveté understanding of Genesis 1 within the 
framework of creation through evolution. One of the more vexing of these questions is 
how resolve the apparent clash between the theme of non-violent (co-)creation and “nature 
red in tooth and claw.” While no one can claim to have resolved this issue, the next 
chapter looks for direction in Genesis and the natural sciences for how to reexamine the 
knowledge of good and evil that makes such questions possible and necessary. The 
following section explores in greater depth how the creation is called to “bring forth living 
creatures,” including human beings and the image of God they bear.  
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The image of God as a product of nature in Genesis and biocultural evolution 
 
 
 The blending diagram in figure 4 below lists a number of concepts in an 
emergentist, biocultural perspective which bring into focus certain features lying within 
and behind the text of Genesis 1, its depiction of human creatures, and the image of God 
they bear. Allowing these biblical and scientifically-informed concepts to frame one 
another generates the interpretive inference that as God creates through evolutionary  
 
Figure 4: Image, Knowledge, and Nature 
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processes, bearing the image of God (with a knowledge of good and bad/evil) may be 
understood as a biocultural product/process of nature (and nurture). 
Despite centuries of highly spiritualized and dualistic interpretations of the imago 
Dei, most biblical scholars today agree that the Hebrew terms for image—tselem—and 
likeness—demut—in Genesis 1 refer to a creature wrought of the creation and embedded 
within it to the same extent as all other animal species. While the primeval history 
indicates in its own way that humankind bears this bottom-up origin and kinship with the 
rest of creation, emergentism and a biocultural understanding of human uniqueness 
provide new modes of interpreting how this human condition has come about and what it 
might mean to image God through it.  
The human creature, like all other land dwellers, is an animated amalgam of dust, 
breath, and blood. In Genesis human beings are no less “earthly” than other animal 
species. Read as a redactional whole, the first two chapters of Genesis recount that 
humankind and all other land animals are created from the “earth” or the “dust of the 
ground”—’adamah (Gen. 1:24; 2:7, 19). The human hails from the humus. Likely an 
intentional play on words, ’adam is created from ’adamah to bear the demut—a likeness 
to the creator. Likewise, although Gen. 2:7 speaks of a unique inbreathing of life for the 
first human being, the “breath of life” (nishmat chayyim) is not identical to the “spirit” or 
“breath of God” (ruah ’elohim ) in Gen. 1:2. According to Gen. 6:16 and 7:22-23 all 
creatures dwelling or nesting on land are counted among those “in whose nostrils was the 
breath of the spirit of life.” Even the special in-spiration of Gen. 2:7 causes the human to 
become a “living creature/being” (nefesh chayyah), a designation shared by the animal 
species called forth from the earth on sixth day (1:20, 24; cf. 2:7, 19).  
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Another vital element shared by humankind and other animal species is 
“blood”—dam—which bears sacred (even cultic) significance, requiring special attention 
in meat preparation and retributive justice in cases of human bloodshed (Gen. 9:3-6). 
Thus, in four interrelated anthropological terms arising in the primeval history of 
Genesis, the consonants dalet (ד) and mem (מ, ם—final mem) point to a creature whose 
vital elements and their integration, functioning, and flourishing are consonant and 
contiguous with the rest of creation. As an animated amalgam of dust, breath, and blood, 
the human creature derives every aspect of its life from the world in which it is imbedded 
among the other nefesh chayyah.  
Even so, and without taking leave of this ontological plain, one of these Hebrew 
terms signifies a special calling and set of capacities borne for the purpose of discerning 
and enacting the creator’s intentions for the creation with freedom and responsibility. In 
this way ’adam bears a demut, a “likeness,” to God.  
The visual similarity of these terms is especially apparent in the unpointed 
Hebrew text:  
   םד      dam blood  
   םדא   ’adam human(kind), Adam   
 המדא  ’adamah ground, earth 
תומד     demut likeness 
 
The simplest form, םד, is the common thread among the terms; םדא and המדא are linked 
by their initial guttural א (’alef); and המדא and תומד bear a connection through the visual 
similarity of their final ה (he’) and ת (tav).351  
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 One biblical scholar, J. Maxwell Miller, submits evidence that the Priestly 
redactor(s), and perhaps earlier contributors to the primeval history, were well aware of this 
visible and audible pun, citing Gen. 9:6: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall 
his blood be shed; for in the image of God, he created man” (מד terms italicized). 
Conspicuously, this passage points out that humankind deserves this special moral 
consideration because it is made “in the image”—tselem—of God, without any mention of 
the divine “likeness”—demut. This break in consonance, Miller supposes, is to avoid any 
suggestion that the image of God is created from a divine substance. In Enuma Elish and 
other ancient Near Eastern parallels, human beings are made from divine blood—dam.352 
However, Yahweh Elohim has no blood and has no need to spill any in order to create. In 
the final form of the text, the Priestly redactor interpolates, or at least interprets and 
extends, this anti-anthropomorphic aspect of Israelite theology and cosmology. Through 
humankind, as through every other living creature, the ground breathes, not God.  
 Middleton ventures further, arguing that the concept creation from the blood of a 
lower god is meant to devaluate humankind in Enuma Elish: 
As the consort of Tiamat and leader of her forces, [Qingu] is one of the 
arch enemies of Marduk. The text thus attributes to humans, who are 
created from Qingu’s blood, an essentially rebellious and degraded nature, 
much as the cosmos contains within it an evil or chaotic principle, 
constructed as it is out of the dead carcass of Tiamat. […T]he mythology 
of Enuma Elish proclaimed in no uncertain terms the servitude (even 
bondage) of humanity, “created out of evil substance,” as cheap slave 
labor to do the “dirty work” of the lower gods.353 
 
In Enuma Elish creation from blood is a reminder of the violence needed to create and 
maintain order in the godly and creaturely realms. In Genesis creation in the divine image 
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means that human blood is precious in its own right. As an indication of status and role, 
Genesis implies that the image of God is borne out in the dynamic likeness humanness 
bears to (a singular kind of) godness. Being made from dust of the ground in the image 
and likeness of Yahweh Elohim is a much more positive job description than being made 
from the blood of Quingu.  
In this vein, many biblical scholars interpret the terms for image and likeness to 
overlap semantically and modify one another, in both a negative and positive sense.
354
 
Negatively, image may keep likeness from becoming a reference to a divine substance 
running through human veins; likeness may keep image from becoming a reference to a 
mute and non-agential conduit of the divine, an object of cultic devotion, or a despotic 
ruler disseminating the divine will in the socio-political sphere.
355
 Positively, while many 
exegetes point out that the definitions of image and likeness are not self evident, several 
scholars agree that together the terms portray humanity as not merely representative of 
the creator, but representational as well—a likeness-bearing image.356  
This ideological trajectory of Genesis 1 warrants Hefner’s conclusion that fully 
embedded within the creation is a “created co-creator.” Divinity is not the only form of 
self-conscious intentionality and causality. From the ground has emerged a fully 
creaturely form of personhood. As a pre-scientific prelude to Hefner’s hypothesis that 
Homo sapiens “have the created calling to articulate within the natural world what God’s 
intentionality might be,” the primeval history implies that one of God’s intentions for 
                                                 
354
 See Wenham, Genesis 1-15, 29; Clines, “The Image of God in Man,” 90-92; Miller, “In the ‘Image’ and 
‘Likeness’ of God,” 293-94, 299-304; Auld, “imago dei in Genesis,” 259-61. 
355
 See Brueggemann, Genesis, 31-32; Middleton, The Liberating Image, 88-90, 176-84; J. F. A. Sawyer, 
“The Meaning of ‘םיהלא םלצב’ in Genesis I-XI,” Journal of Theological Studies 25 (1974): 420-21; 
Andreas Schüle, “Made in the ‘Image of God’: The Concepts of Divine Images in Gen. 1-3,” Zeitschrift für 
die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 117.1 (2005): 11-20. 
356
 See Clines, “The Image of God in Man,” 90-92; Middleton, The Liberating Image, 88; Sawyer, “The 
Meaning of ‘םיהלא םלצב’ in Genesis I-XI,” 424-26; Van Huyssteen, Alone in the World?, 156-57.  
158 
creation is that one of its creatures discerns and enacts the creator’s purposes freely, 
according to their God-imaging response-ability.
357
 As I argue in greater detail in chapter 
5 below, this human condition includes the original and ever-present possibility of getting 
things wrong—of encountering and effecting both good and evil.358 In parallel, 
complementary ways, both the biblical and biocultural narratives of human origins 
indicate that this condition of freedom is the de facto necessary and ambivalent result of 
emerging as an animated amalgam of dust, breath, and blood.  
An emergentist understanding of the evolutionary origins of Homo sapiens is able 
to inform a second naïveté Christian understanding of the human person as a unique, 
God-imaging creature, because the exegetical insight that humankind derives from and is 
embedded within creation to the same extent as all other nefesh chayyah (living 
creatures/beings) is commensurable with this scientifically-informed conception of 
human development and uniqueness. For Hefner, “the fact that the co-creator is created 
through nature’s evolutionary processes justifies the inference that nature itself 
participates in the image of God. This is a novel interpretation.”359 But is it really novel? 
And in what ways? As Hefner alludes, what is novel about a conception of human 
uniqueness which synthesizes exegetical and scientific findings is that it forces present-
day theologians to reconsider and reformulate what it means for God to “speak,” “form,” 
and “breathe” humanity into life, what it means for the natural world to be a “creation” 
open to the ongoing creative and redemptive influence of the creator.  
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Imaging God as an emergent vocation 
 
 
 Figure 5 below illustrates the meaning-making process of defining the image of 
God, which also encapsulates a uniquely human creative capacity through which we 
might be said to bear the divine image. Following the hermeneutical trajectory evident in 
Genesis 1, I argue that blending ancient and contemporary understandings of human 
uniqueness warrants the theological conclusion that bearing the image of God (with a 
knowledge of good and bad/evil) is the vocation of behaviorally modern Homo sapiens.  
Figure 5: Image, Knowledge, and Emergent Vocation 
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Through biocultural processes, our species has emerged with the calling to re-present the 
beneficence of the God who shares power with created entities and does not create 
through violence.   
Any faith perspective which understands God to be the insuperable 
contextualizing element of what really is must understand human thought and action as 
one avenue presumably open to divine influence. Broadly speaking, a theistic conception 
of deity, such as in Christianity, presume that created reality is valued by its creator, that 
the creator God wills the wellbeing of creaturely processes and/or entities, that God 
communicates or reveals divine beneficence and its normative implications, and that 
humanness affords a singular form of receptivity to divine (self-)communication. Having 
a theology of this sort cannot but lead to real-world consequences.  
To be a culturally-constituted creature is to live out of a particular set of values-
laden distinctions. What human persons understand themselves to be informs what they 
find appropriate or imperative to do or not to do. Our is informs our ought. Theistic 
conceptions of our is can be some of the most empowering and relativizing modes of 
thinking, because they set human existence and activity against a trans-cosmic backdrop. 
Those who consider themselves to bear the image of God have accepted a calling to 
discern, construe, and enact the beneficent intentions of the creator for the creation. As 
the indeterminate future of the cosmos continues to unfold, bearers of the divine image 
have emerged with the freedom and response-ability to cooperate with one another and 
the rest of the creation in order to co-create a very good world. Re-presenting the 
beneficent creativity of God is humankind’s emergent theological vocation—a call to 
bear the image of God with a conscientious knowledge of good and evil.  
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For good or ill theological motivation for human action means that “God” finds a 
loophole in the causal closure principle “that the basic causal laws of the universe also 
form a closed system—all changes come from within.”360 This is not to say that God 
somehow acts directly on the cosmos from “without.” Indeed, the much more tenable 
theological view in light of current science is that any divine activity in the creation 
would come from within. Rather, the seeming violation of the causal closure principle 
emerges with the concept that a trans-cosmic reality might exist, that its necessary 
existence is source and constraint of all contingent existence, and that this relationship is 
relevant to what people ought to think and do. Many look beyond the material world for 
guidance as to what to do within it. Deacon may be correct that all causal influence 
comes from within the cosmos. Yet this view does not entail that all causally efficacious 
emergent dynamics are wholly immanent to the space-time of our universe. The 
emergence of the image of God is the emergence of a uniquely human behavioral domain 
in which Homo sapiens “hear” the divine—however faintly and faultily—calling across 
the infinite qualitative distinction between creator and creation. 
 In every major strain of interpretation, the image of God concept denotes a 
creature able to perceive this ontological disjunct. The way in which believers describe 
the qualitative ontological distinction between God and the image of God frames—for 
good and/or ill—how they might live out that reflection of divinity in the world.  
Historically, there are at least three major strands of Christian interpretation of the 
imago Dei in Genesis, which I term the rational, the relational, and the royal. The 
rational conception of the image points to humanity’s psycho-spiritual capacities and/or 
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the substantive spirit possessing them as the locus of the image. The relational school of 
thought looks primarily to interpersonal or God-human interaction to find God imaged in 
the “I-Thou” existential of personhood. The royal interpretation already outlined is the 
most tenable of these and depicts humankind as bearing the image of God though its 
creaturely function and calling to discern and disseminate the rule of God on earth.  
The eschatological interpretation of the image of God, based on the New 
Testament portrayal of Jesus Christ as the quintessential image or icon of divinity, can be 
read as an extension of the functional-royal interpretation, since “image” passages in the 
New Testament characterize Christ as the redeeming “Lord” who reveals and inaugurates 
God’s righteous reign on earth as in heaven.361 In both Old- and New- testaments, 
imaging God as royal representative involves conscientious human participation. 
 The sections above have outlined much of the evidence supporting the functional-
royal interpretation of the image of God in Genesis. The bulk of this historical and 
intertextual evidence lends credence to the conclusion that the image of God in Genesis 
criticizes and democratizes Neo-Babylonian royal ideology.
362
 In a synthetic study of 
Gen. 1:26-28 over a hundred years of Old Testament scholarship, Gunnlaugur A. Jόnsson 
has discerned an emerging consensus in biblical studies that the image and likeness of 
God in this passage pertains largely to the commands given to humankind in verse 28—to 
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fill and subdue (kavash) the earth and rule over (radah) its creatures.
363
 In addition to 
Jόnsson and Middleton, eminent commentators such as Gordon Wenham and Nahum 
Sarna come to the same conclusion.
364
 Being created in the image and according to the 
likeness of God means bearing a response-ability to hear and act upon the call of the 
creator to co-create the future of the cosmos. 
 Yet, despite the mounting exegetically relevant evidence, Jόnsson notes that 
systematic theologians too often succumb to the momentum of the traditional rational 
interpretation or the popular relational interpretation. The rational interpretation, which J. 
Wentzel van Huyssteen calls the “substantive interpretation,” finds humanity to bear a 
likeness to divinity in its psycho-spiritual capacities of reason, personality, self-
consciousness, free-will, intellect, and speech.
365
 This line of interpretation traces its 
origins to Philo of Alexandria, Augustine, and other prominent ancient writers. While 
elements of this interpretation are visible in the text, there are several reasons why the 
rational-substantive interpretation is incomplete at best, and misleading at worst.  
First, these cognitive capacities are not explicitly mentioned in the immediate 
context of Gen. 1:26-27. Second, a purely spiritual definition of the divine image and 
likeness would imply a dualist anthropology foreign to the text. Clines is not alone in 
insisting that the human person is always portrayed as a “psychosomatic unity” in the 
Hebrew Bible, and that the conceptual background for the image of God passages 
includes the same basic anthropological framework.
366
 Third, Old Testament scholars like 
Phyllis Bird rehearse well-founded complaints that this hierarchical spirit-body dualism is 
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intertwined with countless historical instances of humanity-over-nature and male-over-
female dualisms contrary to both the letter and spirit of the text.
367
  
These hierarchical dualisms also bear the danger of surfacing in the relational 
interpretation made especially popular by Karl Barth in his Church Dogmatics (III.1, 
182ff.). This influential strand of theological exegesis focuses on the plural jussive (“Let 
us…”) of Gen. 1:26, the creation of ’adam as male and female, and the capacity for 
interplay between God and human creatures expressed in the final verses of Genesis 1.
368
 
This interpretation sees human beings as uniquely capable of a God-like “I-Thou” 
relationality among themselves and between themselves and the divine. The Barthian 
reading locates the divine image within creative relationality, rather than within the 
person or a created substance. While this theological development is an encouraging 
move in the direction of a more dynamic conception of the image of God, Jόnsson 
cautions that this interpretation is a product of the dialectical philosophy of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
369
 This philosophical framework may not be the 
most tenable for theological exegesis today, because natural-scientifically based 
paradigms for analyzing human cognition and behavior are arguably more coherent and 
comprehensive than the existential paradigms of dialectical philosophy.  By synthesizing 
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data from evolutionary biology, paleoanthropology, and neuroscientific research, 
evolutionary psychology is a much stronger framework for understanding the human 
condition today than is the philosophical psychology born out of the Enlightenment. As a 
result, the second naïveté reappropriation of biblical understandings of human nature is 
better served today by biocultural conceptions of humankind’s evolutionary emergence. 
Nonetheless, Jόnsson finds that the Barthian interpretation remains prevalent in both 
dogmatic and biblical studies and that it provides the only rival to the recent functional-
royal consensus concerning the biblical meaning of image and likeness.
370
  
Bird adds that regardless of the ethical dangers and opportunities inherent to the 
sexualized relational interpretation, the divine announcement of blessing and bisexuality 
in Genesis 1 is most likely a provision for the capacity to “be fruitful and multiply, and 
fill the earth.” This inherent capability facilitates the functional vocation of rulership. For 
Bird a reproductive capacity intrinsic to humanity and the rest of the “male and female” 
creatures (cf. Gen. 6:19; 7:3, 9, 16) also implies the lack of need for a fertility cult, 
perhaps augmenting the monotheizing thrust of Genesis 1 over against its contemporary 
parallels.
371
  
Still, the rational and relational interpretations are not completely devoid of merit. 
The functional-royal interpretation certainly entails the understanding that humankind 
bears unique cognitive and relational capacities. However, against a Neo-Babylonian 
backdrop and the theme of creation, the image and likeness language of Genesis 1 seems 
to point beyond these capacities to the kinds of things people ought to do with them. 
Though not in Hefner’s post-critical sense that human uniqueness emerges through 
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biocultural evolution, Genesis depicts humankind as a created co-creator, able to hear and 
respond to the direct address of the creator, to detect the movement of God in the world 
(Gen. 1:28, 2:17, 3:8-13). This unique creature is called to do very creator-like things—
filling the earth and ruling (1:28-30), resting on the seventh day (2:2-3; Exod. 20:8-11), 
naming things (Gen. 2:19, 23, 3:20). Though Yahweh Elohim equips and calls all created 
things to participate in the creative process, only one creature participates in a manner 
qualitatively similar to God’s own modus operandi of “saying,” “calling,” and deciding 
for itself whether things are “good” or “not good”/“evil.”372 Auld emphasizes that  
throughout the days of creation, previously created entities participate as agents in 
future making. It is consonant with this that the first actions reported of the 
earthling in the garden are that he “names” (qr’) those brought to him by the deity 
(2:19) and “says” (’mr) why his new partner should be called “woman” (2:23)—
exactly as God’s first actions (1:3-5) had including saying and calling.373 
 
This exegetical observation supports the interpretive inference that bearing the 
image of God means exercising a singular form of social and environmental 
responsibility and creativity—to image the creator’s beneficent rulership, evoking from 
the creation and one another whatever “good” each is equipped to produce for their own 
sakes and the common good. As Middleton concludes, the image of God in Genesis is an 
affirmation of dynamic human agency, rather than “static status or privilege”: 
Essential to the meaning of the image in Genesis 1 is the dynamic power 
or agency that God grants humans at creation (signified in the terms rule 
and subdue). Although it is not explicitly stated in Genesis 1, it is 
reasonable to think that this power is to be exercised responsibly, with 
God’s own exercise of power in creation perhaps as the model.374 
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Implicit but integral to understanding the way in which Yahweh Elohim operates is the 
constellation of concepts emerging from the clash of symbolic worlds underlying the text. 
This God does not create through violence but enables and allows the waters and land of 
the earth to bring forth everything that environs and constitutes humankind. Likewise, 
and in a unique manner, human beings are invited to make and keep things “very good” 
throughout the earth. 
 There is a sense throughout the first chapters of Genesis that God’s invitation to 
“let there be” informs but does not determine the exact shape nature and culture will take. 
Bringing the language of emergence into the realm of biblical interpretation, Middleton 
proposes that “[t]he God who is artisan and maker, reflected rhetorically in the complex 
literary artistry of the text, does not overdetermine the order of the cosmos. There is a 
helpful analogy here to what chaos theorists call a ‘strange attractor.’”375 Following the 
ideological trajectory of Genesis 1, Middleton finds that the text “depicts a creator less 
like a Newtonian lawgiver and more like a strange attractor.”376 In Deacon’s terms, 
divine reality acts much like an attractor or constraint, facilitating new orthograde 
statistical tendencies to be explored in and by the cosmos.  
 What does this depiction of divine creativity mean for a second naïveté 
understanding of the image and likeness of God? What does it mean to bear the royal 
vocation of filling, subduing, and ruling over creation as a species of bioculturally-
constituted created co-creators in the 21
st
 century? For the tribes of Israel in the sixth 
century B.C.E., filling and subduing the earth were not the immanent possibilities and 
problems they are today. For good and ill the scope of humankind’s technological, socio-
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economic, political, military, and ecological impact has increased astronomically over the 
past few millennia, and especially over the past few centuries. Our species must now 
collaborate world-wide to develop and articulate the values and norms by which it will 
exercise and temper its capability to “be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and 
subdue it; and rule over” its creatures and their environments. The very survival of each 
and/or every one of earth’s species may depend on our willingness to recast our ability to 
rule over other creatures in terms of cooperating with them to ensure a sustainable global 
ecology.  
As a message originally addressed to a minority people group, the commands and 
provisions listed in Gen. 1:28-30 are more a message of hope that the meek will inherit 
the earth than a warrant to treat and mistreat it as a cache of resources designed for 
human consumption. For 21
st
-century believers, the expectation for struggle connoted by 
the verbs “subdue” and “rule over” must open our eyes to the reality that our earthly 
home has always presented meaningful challenges to our ability to discern and implement 
the good intentions of the creator. Read through this interpretive lens, the commands of 
Gen. 1:28 are not an open invitation to bend the creation to human will, but to bend 
human will to the creator’s plan for the world to be a “very good” home for all kinds of 
creatures.    
While biblical scholars like Bird and others note that the verbs of dominion in 
Gen. 1:28 were harsh, even in their original context, these commands to represent and 
extend the rule of God throughout the earth must be read as an extension of the creator’s 
“Let there be”—Yahweh Elohim’s invitation to bring forth “good” in all parts of the 
creation.  Today, answering God’s call in Genesis 2 to “name” all living creatures and 
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“serve” the “garden” in which we have been placed together with them means seeking to 
know everything we can about the world in which we live and acting to promote the well-
being of everything in it. Imaging a God who does not create through violence and who 
“sees” the “good” in the simplest created entities means identifying, avoiding, and 
remedying human-created causes of undue harm to ecological, biological, personal, and 
cultural realities. In emergentist terms, the call to embody the creator God’s beneficence 
in and to the creation is most urgent where the minimal requirements for teleodynamic 
constraint propagation are most threatened—among the impoverished and the 
endangered. Human beings create through violence and ignore their vocation when they 
knowingly and avoidably seek the perceived “good” of some in ways which 
systematically restrict or eliminate the ability of other persons, other cultures, or other 
species to seek and achieve their own well-being.   
As creatures who are products of co-evolution, we owe our emergence in the 
image of God to the interactions of our evolutionary ancestors among themselves and 
other species in various environments of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). It stands to 
reason, therefore, that the vocation to discern, construe, and enact the beneficent 
intentions of the creator in the world today entails a self-critical and empathetic analysis 
of the value—the “good”-ness—of every created entity to every other, from the bottom-
up, from the least complex to the most. In Deacon’s terminology, the emergence and 
enjoyment of the image of God has always depended upon the presence of diverse and 
sustainable boundary conditions, from the proto-biotic emergence of the first autogens, to 
the biodiversity characterizing the EEA of our earliest behaviorally modern ancestors, 
and from today into the future.  
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The emergence of the image of God—of human-being—is the emergence of the 
response-ability to define, evaluate, and envision our impact on one another and the rest of 
the creation. The emergence of the image of God is the emergence of the response-ability 
to “rule over” the creation in a unique way, to cooperate in order sustain and perhaps 
expand its “very good”-ness. The ongoing created co-creation of the image and likeness of 
God through biocultural processes will continue to take shape based in no small part on 
humankind’s ecological and social legacy from each moment to the next. For good or ill, 
the conscientious choices of Homo sapiens constrain the future open or closed to bearers 
of the image of God, other animal species, our home planet, and beyond.      
Imaging God with a condition of freedom 
 
 
 The biocultural perspective outlined in input 2 of figure 6 below focuses attention 
upon several features of Genesis 1-3. According to Genesis, created entities are called to 
participate in the act of creation as an actualization of their God-given potential to “be,” 
to “be gathered,” to “sprout,” to “separate,” to “govern,” to “swarm,” to “bring forth,” to 
“be fruitful and multiply,” to “fill,” to “subdue,” to “rule over,” to “eat” and/or choose 
not to eat, to “serve” or “cultivate the ground,” to “name” other creatures and other 
people, to “know good and bad/evil.” Integrated with a biocultural understanding of 
human evolution, these aspects of the Genesis cosmology support the theological 
inference that the emergence of the image of God culminates in an ambivalent condition 
of freedom emblematic of humankind’s biocultural nature. Described as the human 
condition of “knowing good and bad/evil,” this ambivalent aspect of bearing God’s 
image is the topic of the following chapter. 
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Figure 6: Image, Knowledge, and Freedom 
 
Homo sapiens have emerged in biocultural history to bear the image and likeness 
of God as free and responsible creators of their symbolic worlds. Our species evolved to 
become culturally-constituted creatures who embody the kind of freedom Hefner 
describes as “the condition of existence in which humans unavoidably face the necessity 
of both making choices that govern their behavior and of constructing the stories that 
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contextualize and hence justify those choices.”377 Following the hermeneutical trajectory 
of Genesis 1 and Hefner’s interpretation of the image of God, to exercise this condition of 
freedom as a theological vocation is to take on the role of created co-creator. Affirming 
this call requires cooperating across cultures and species to strike a harmonious and 
sustainable coexistence which upholds the value of the creative potential emerging from 
every person, species, and the world we must learn to share.  
 While I would not claim that the imago Dei is only borne by those who take on 
this label for themselves, in the strictest sense, the divine image is borne uniquely by that 
species who has emerged with all the psycho-somatic, biocultural conditions of 
possibility for developing this kind of person-constituting distinction. In both the biblical 
and biocultural narratives of human origins analyzed above, the freedom conditioning the 
creation of the dynamic, living image and likeness of God is such that the imago Dei is 
itself a continually co-created reality. In Deacon’s terminology, one could say that the 
imago Dei emerges diachronically through the ever-changing teleodynamics, 
morphodynamics, and homeodynamics constraining and constituting humanity’s 
biocultural existence. As culturally conditioned creatures, we are responsible for many 
developments in our recent biocultural history and its future. Human-being is dynamic 
and self-constituting in this strong sense because the cultural singularities of behaviorally 
modern Homo sapiens are not reducible to the Darwinian dynamics through which the 
much more open-ended processes and results of human cognition and culture emerge. 
The biocultural future of created co-creation is an open question. The imago Dei is still 
evolving, and its bearers are co-responsible for what it will become. 
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For good and ill human-being emerges within a matrix of unique behavioral 
domains, including ethics and religion. By framing this external scaffolding of our 
culturally-constituted existence, and by allowing its emergent meanings to shape our 
every thought and action, we open up ourselves to new conceptual, behavioral, and 
ethical possibilities. We open up ourselves to new ways of discerning and construing 
God’s past, present, and future activity in the world. As an act of created co-creation, we 
open up ourselves to new ways of imaging God with faith, hope, and love. As a test case, 
this construction of a second naïveté understanding of the image of God is a theological 
act of created co-creation—of faith seeking understanding. From the “bottom-up” and the 
“top-down,” human-being, knowing, and doing emerge dynamically as embodied 
functions of this kind of hermeneutical circle. Bearing a condition of freedom, 
humankind must continually employ its collective and individual biocultural inheritance 
to co-create the symbolic university of what really is and ought to be for us.  
Inspired by Hefner, I seek to rediscover how the biblical myth-symbols of the 
image of God and the knowledge of good and evil might “provide genuine knowledge of 
reality, for the sake of our wholesome living.”378 This journey of rediscovery requires 
investigating the conditions under which Homo sapiens pursue wholesomeness. There are 
at least three elements in Genesis 1 intimating that the image of God entails a condition 
of freedom already fraught with the possibilities of both fulfillment and frustration. First, 
the direct address of Gen. 1:28 indicates that humankind bears a conscious response-
ability to obey God’s open-ended commands concerning their oversight of the creation. 
Yet how should humankind respond to the mandates to “fill,” “subdue,” and “rule over”? 
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How does humanity respond to these commands in the primeval history? Second, the 
harsh verbs of dominion in verse 28—“subdue” (kavash) and “rule over” (radah)—imply 
that the “very good” creation will nonetheless present challenges to human well-being. 
Does the inclusion of these verbs negate the apparent departure from Mesopotamian royal 
ideology outlined above? Third, these first two elements, along with other intertextual 
connections to biblical and extra-biblical texts, imply that that Garden Narrative of 
Genesis 2-3 is likely taken up into Genesis 1 as an elaboration of how humankind came 
to “become like one of Us, knowing good and evil” (Gen. 3:22). It may be that the image 
of God, in all its ambivalence, is not fully fledged until humankind (’adam) is driven east 
of Eden to cultivate the ground (’adamah) from whence it came (3:23).  
How does this interpretation challenge popular readings of the primeval history 
and present new opportunities for contemporary interpretation engaging natural scientific 
conceptions of Homo sapiens’ biocultural emergence? Establishing these connections 
within the text and integrating this exegetical understanding with natural scientific data 
concerning the morally ambivalent evolutionary origins of humanity’s ethical 
wherewithal is the task of the next chapter, which constructs a second naïveté 
interpretation of the knowledge of good and evil.  
Conclusion 
 
 
 Figure 7 below combines the blends pictured in the four diagrams above, 
highlighting many of the main concepts used to integrate biblical and scientifically-
informed conceptions of human-being for the purpose of generating a second naïveté 
understanding of Christian anthropology. The numbered points in the blended space 
correspond to the four sections of this chapter (and the following), which describe the 
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image of God (as a concept and/or human condition) in terms of (1) its precipitation from 
double-scope blending capacity or cognitive fluidity, (2) a product/process of nature (and 
nurture), (3) an emergent theological vocation, and (4) an ambivalent condition of freedom. 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to blend sound biblical scholarship and 
current understandings of human uniqueness and its evolutionary emergence in 
biocultural history. The integration of parallel, commensurate, and complementary 
ancient and contemporary modes of describing human uniqueness sharpens the 
interpreter’s focus on the surprisingly similar features of these first- and second naïveté 
Figure 7: Emerging in the Image of God: A Second Naïveté 
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depictions of the image and likeness of God. From this hermeneutical perspective, the 
subsections of this chapter have drawn the following conclusions.  
First, implicit in the pre-critical biblical understanding of the image is that 
theological developments often emerge from a complex clash and integration of 
conceptual frames or entire symbolic worldviews. The careful exegesis of Middleton and 
his many sources support the historical and hermeneutical claims that the theological 
cosmology of Genesis 1 and the primeval history as a whole results from a polemical 
blend of Neo-Babylonian and Israelite understandings of divine identity and agency. 
Emerging from this conceptual clash is a symbolic world in which all human beings 
image a single nonviolent creator. The democratization of the image of God is antithetical 
to the ideology in which the cultural elite bear the image of their despotic deities. The 
offices of rest and rule become the privilege of the many and of the lowly, despite the 
prevailing political and ideological climate of the day. This chapter’s second naïveté 
interpretation of the image of God in Genesis 1 follows both the procedural precedent and 
ideological trajectory of this hermeneutical move guiding the composition and redaction 
of the primeval history.  
Second, characterizing the image of God as the result of creation through 
evolution helps to highlight the fact that in Genesis, humankind is wrought of the creation 
and embedded within it to the same extent as all other living creatures. Every aspect of 
human-being, including those through which it images the creator, is established from the 
ground up. Human uniqueness, in both biblical and evolutionary views of the world, 
arises in organic contiguity with the rest of the creation. “’adam” is an animated amalgam 
of dust, breath and blood.  
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Third, the functional-royal language of Genesis 1 and the dynamic ontology of 
emergentism both denote a culturally-constituted creature whose personhood is a living 
function of psycho-somatic fusion. As a nefesh chayyah (“living creature/being”), human 
beings are not embodied souls, but soulful bodies. Emerging from humanity’s unique 
form is the unique function of bearing a response-ability to the creator’s call—a blessed 
vocation to “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it; and rule over the 
fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky and over every living thing that moves on the 
earth” (Gen. 1:28).  
Fourth, backlit by Neo-Babylonian notions of divine and human agency, the 
blessing and commands of Gen. 1:28 place the human condition of freedom in stark 
contrast. Yahweh Elohim seems to liberate human beings and the rest of the creation in 
several ways. Though God rests on the seventh day, there is no mention that humankind 
is created to facilitate this rest through slave labor. Genesis 1 elevates the status and 
function of humankind and democratizes the office of God’s royal representative. The 
harsh verbs of dominion commanding humankind to “subdue” and “rule over” the earth 
and its creatures are colored by the implicit understanding that whatever environmental, 
social, or political struggles humanity faces are not mimetic extensions of a henotheistic 
Chaoskampf. The character of human rule ought to mirror that of the God who shares 
power and creates by uttering an invitation for the world to bring forth what good it will.  
The integration of these exegetical insights and a biocultural model of the 
emergence of human uniqueness supports Hefner’s theological theory that Homo sapiens 
bear the image of God as free and responsible co-creators of potentially humanizing 
cultural meanings. The second naïveté interpretations of the image of God and the 
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knowledge of good and evil constructed in this chapter and the next seek to make good on 
Hefner and Ricoeur’s wager that these myth-symbols can blend with current knowledge 
to promote a more intellectually satisfying theological conception of what really is “for 
the sake of our wholesome living.”379 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL: WITHIN A BIBLICAL AND 
EVOLUIONARY VIEW OF THE WORLD 
 
 
While there is an emerging consensus among biblical scholars on the meaning of the 
knowledge of good and evil in Genesis 2 and 3, there are two basic and divergent strains 
of interpretation concerning the broader import of this myth-symbol for biblically-based 
Christian anthropology. The more traditional strain in both Jewish and Christian 
interpretation characterizes the knowledge of good and evil as a wholly (or nearly 
wholly) negative development—a kind of knowledge that Yahweh Elohim either did not 
intend for humankind to have at all, or a knowledge that the creator did not want 
humankind to come by of their own accord. In this light the Garden Narrative recounts a 
drastic transition in both subjective and objective aspects of human existence before and 
after gaining the knowledge of good and evil. That is, according to the narrative, human 
life was once objectively free of suffering, and human beings had no firsthand knowledge 
of an alternative. Accordingly, the expulsion from the garden in Gen. 3:22-24 marks both 
an objective and subjective “fall” from this paradisiacal state, as a consequence of 
asserting moral autonomy through disobedience.  
The less traditional, though perhaps more tenable, strain of interpretation 
highlights the ambivalent nature of the knowledge of good and evil in the narrative, 
pointing out that this knowledge is constitutive of both human and divine existence. For 
these scholars the “like one of us” of Gen. 3:22 parallels and expands the “Let us” of 
1:26, signifying that the knowledge of “tov vara‘,” “good and bad,” fulfillment and 
frustration, is an integral aspect of what it means to bear divine image and likeness in a 
world where human beings discover that they must “subdue” the earth and “rule” over its 
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creatures in order to survive (1:28). This interpretation lends itself to reversing the notion 
that life in the garden was a paradisiacal, ideal, or fully-fledged state of existence for 
humankind. From this exegetical perspective, gaining a knowledge of good and evil does 
not constitute a dramatic change in the human characters’ objective state of affairs. 
Rather, the mythic first pair’s eye-opening encounter with the serpent and the tree marks 
a shift in human consciousness regarding the ambivalence of creaturely existence. The 
God-imaging creatures discover their ability to encounter and effect both good and evil 
through singular varieties of freedom and responsibility. The complication here is not so 
much a rebellious assertion of moral autonomy through disobedience, but an inevitable, 
yet perilous, discovery of practical and ethical wherewithal through a process of 
maturation. Where the “curses” of Genesis 3 look more like growing pains, scholars steer 
away from concepts like “fall” and “(original) sin,” because these wholly negative 
concepts are both foreign to the immediate narrative context and obscure the possibilities 
for finding an upside to a knowledge which Yahweh Elohim admits in verse 22 makes 
the human creatures “like one of us.” 
I argued in chapter 4 that viewing the image of God through a hermeneutical lens 
framed by Homo sapiens’ biocultural emergence in recent evolutionary history brings 
into focus four guidelines for interpreting the meaning of this myth-symbol today. These 
tools aid in developing a second naïveté construal of conceptual elements already present 
in the original text. Likewise, through this lens first- and second naïveté formulations of 
the knowledge of good and evil present parallel, commensurate, and complementary 
modes of understanding this human condition, which open up potentially fruitful avenues 
for reasserting its explanatory power and moral fruitfulness today. The following four 
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sections of this chapter argue that in these pre-critical and post-critical conceptions of the 
knowledge of good and evil (1) the emergence of this concept and the human condition to 
which it refers employ a unique cognitive fluidity that is evident in linguistic and ethical 
ability; (2) the knowledge of good and evil is a product of nature, a cognitive and cultural 
development arising from human interaction with one another and their environments; (3) 
the knowledge of good and evil is an ambivalent but integral aspect of what it means to 
bear the image and likeness of God as a function and calling—a vocation—incumbent 
upon a unique “living creature/being” (nefesh chayyah); and, (4) imaging God with a 
knowledge of good and evil involves a condition of freedom, a conscientious response-
ability to discern and respond to God’s invitation to act as beneficent co-creators in a 
“very good” world.  
The emergent meaning of the knowledge of good and evil in Genesis and 
contemporary interpretation 
 
 
 Biblical and hermeneutical scholars have identified motifs and symbolism in 
mythology contemporary to the textual tradition of the Garden Narrative which shed light 
on the meaning of the knowledge of good and evil in the primeval history. In cognitive 
linguistic terms, a biblical conception of the knowledge of good and evil emerges through 
a cross-cultural process of conceptual integration. Biblical commentator Claus 
Westermann locates thematic similarities among several ancient texts, while 
hermeneutical philosopher Paul Ricoeur highlights the distinctiveness of the Adamic 
myth among various mythologies concerning the origins of evil.  
For example, Westermann traces a leitmotif through several sources, concluding 
that the human desire to attain god-like knowledge/wisdom is a theme common to many 
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ancient Near Eastern mythologies. Wisdom, in these contexts, may be defined generally 
as a kind of self-mastery which includes the ability (however fallible) to direct one’s own 
actions and destiny toward beneficial ends. Westermann notes that the Adapa Myth 
contained in the Gilgamesh Epic is among the manuscripts comprising the textual and 
conceptual prehistory of the Hebrew Bible’s primeval history. Like the Garden Narrative 
in Genesis, the Adapa Myth recounts how a theophanic encounter allots human beings a 
certain portion of wisdom but not everlasting life. Similarly, according to another episode 
in the Gilgamesh Epic, Enkidu is created by the god Aruru in order to subdue Gilgamesh. 
When Enkidu is seduced by a cult prostitute, he loses his immortality and many aspects 
of his virility, but he gains wisdom. Though Westermann does not find any biblical or 
extra-biblical narratives presenting definitive parallels or precursors to Genesis 2-3, he 
does locate a set of common motifs among these texts. Shared themes include envy of the 
gods, strong human aspirations for both life and knowledge, a working definition of 
“knowledge” or “wisdom” connoting a mastery of one’s own existence and actions, a 
categorical denial to human beings of immortality, and a complex fulfillment and 
frustration of the human desire for wisdom.
380
  
As summarized in chapter 1, Ricoeur compares and contrasts “the ‘Adamic’ myth 
and the ‘eschatological’ vision of history” with three other symbolic worlds: “the drama 
of creation and the ‘ritual’ vision of the world,” “the wicked god and the ‘tragic’ vision of 
existence,” and “the myth of the exiled soul and salvation through knowledge.”381 
Ricoeur concludes that within the gravitational sphere of influence he calls the “cycle of 
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the myths,” the Adamic myth and the biblical tradition in which it is embedded have 
taken residence at the center of this symbolic universe. Among Western religious 
traditions, the Adamic myth has gained this place of preeminence through a complex 
relationship of appropriation or accretion vis-à-vis these other myths orbiting it.
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biblical witness integrates and resignifies concepts from these other myths concerning the 
beginning and end of evil.  
Moving beyond Ricoeur’s original interrelation of these myths, I argued in 
chapter 4 that the myth-symbol of the image and likeness of God relates more to “the 
drama of creation and the ‘ritual’ vision of the world” found in Enuma Elish than any of 
the other myths. Yet with respect to the biblical account of how human beings attain the 
knowledge of good and evil, Ricoeur argues convincingly that the Adamic myth relates 
most “closely” to a tragic vision of existence, while sublimating a number of chaotic 
elements. In the Chaoskampf of Enuma Elish, the serpent character Tiamat hypostatizes 
that chaotic and untamable aspect of reality which precedes human evil and personifies 
the impetus for it. However, in contrast to the myth of chaos, the serpent in the garden is 
not a divine being but an especially crafty creature—a “beast of the field which the Lord 
God had made” (Gen. 3:1). As a tragic symbol, the serpent represents a quasi-fatedness 
about the commission of evil to which human beings are blind, except perhaps in 
hindsight. The human creatures in the garden are tragic heroes in the sense that their 
freedom and responsibility to effect good and avoid or eradicate evil is already 
conditioned by a tragic element “which is already there and already evil.”383 According 
to Ricoeur, this quasi-adversarial characterization of human peccability symbolizes the 
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conviction that “the evil for which I assume responsibility makes manifest a source of 
evil for which I cannot assume responsibility.”384  
Reading Genesis 1 as a Priestly prologue to the Garden Narrative supports the 
narrative-critical inference that Yahweh Elohim’s “very good” creation is originally open 
to bringing about, of its own capacities, the “bad.” The primeval history bears no 
indication that this ambiguity of the creation is vicious in itself. The text does allude, 
however, that the creator is well aware of this state of affairs, that attaining the 
knowledge of good and bad/evil requires human creatures to come to terms with this state 
of affairs, and that human creatures have taken on a novel form of freedom and 
responsibility underscored by the creator’s announcement that they have “become like 
one of Us, knowing good and evil” (Gen. 3:22).  
Yet despite the presence of an extra-human impetus for evil, Ricoeur insists that 
the “Adamic myth is anti-tragic.”385 There is no malevolent god blinding and fating the 
heroes to commit the transgressions for which they are somehow still culpable. The 
emergence of bad/evil in Genesis is a mystery presented as a negative reality belonging to 
the shadow side of an open-ended creation, rather than a positive reality fated by a 
wicked and over-determining deity.  
Whether conclusions consonant with Ricoeur’s can emerge through blending 
biblical and biocultural understandings of human beginnings is the topic of the next 
section, which focuses on the knowledge of good and evil as a product of nature. By 
exploring the conceptual background of the Garden Narrative as a foundational step 
toward constructing a second-naïveté reappropriation of biblical myth, Ricoeur’s 
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hermeneutical insights effectively demonstrate that one purpose of this tale is to 
appropriate and recast common motifs for narrating the problem of evil in ways that 
sublimate chaotic and tragic elements which cast blame on divine agents for hardship and 
wickedness. The conceptual blending which resulted in the Garden Narrative presents a 
hermeneutical-procedural precedent for framing a second naïveté understanding of the 
biblical myth-symbol of the knowledge of good and evil, its origins, and implications.   
To this end, the following two subsections exegete in greater detail the 
significance of what the woman and man have come to know in the Garden Narrative—
(1) the meaning of the knowledge of good and evil in Genesis and (2) how this definition 
might be situated within a functional-royal interpretation of the image of God.  
The biblical meaning of the knowledge of good and evil 
 
  
While Westermann’s comparative study of common motifs in ancient Near 
Eastern texts helps to shed light on the meaning of the knowledge of good and evil in 
Genesis 2-3, careful study of this concept in the context of the primeval history and the 
wider canon of the Hebrew Bible yields similar results and a more detailed picture of this 
myth-symbol’s meaning. Like Westermann, the majority of biblical scholars in more 
recent years have concluded that the knowledge of Good and evil refers to the kind of 
wisdom associated with making values-based distinctions and moral judgments 
without—or even against—heteronomous guidance or mandates like divine commands. 
Although this definition is not self-evident from the immediate literary context of the 
Garden Narrative, exegetes have established its relative plausibility over against several 
competing proposals. Taking a brief look at one of these other definitions helps to clarify 
what the knowledge of good and evil is by ruling out what it is not. None of these other 
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exegetical proposals are completely without merit. However, they all lack or contain 
elements which have prompted biblical scholars to scour the Hebrew Bible and other 
texts for the variety of themes, terms, and accounts that have led to the present consensus 
in contradistinction to other definitions of this myth-symbol. These other definitions 
variously characterize the knowledge of good and evil as a consequence of disobedience, 
knowing “right” from “wrong,” sexual knowledge, and even omniscience.386 Two of 
these possibilities warrant further explanation. 
First, commentators Gordon Wenham and Nahum Sarna list “moral discernment” 
as a popular definition for the knowledge of good and evil explored by various 
scholars.
387
 However, as a basic understanding of the difference between right and 
wrong, “moral discernment” seems much too narrow and unilaterally positive a definition 
for the knowledge of good and evil in its narrative context. Additionally, the decision to 
eat presupposes that the mythic first pair already possessed this kind of knowledge. The 
woman necessarily understands the meaning of both disobedience and consequences in 
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the first few verses of Genesis 3. Without this capability, the divine command and 
warning would be pointless.  
Second, Gerhard von Rad made popular the omniscience interpretation by 
suggesting that “tov vara‘” constitutes a merism meaning “everything.” Accordingly, the 
terms tov and ra‘ represent the inclusive bookends of an infinite symbolic universe. The 
phrase “heaven and earth” often serves this literary function. However, there is no 
indication that the couple in the garden expected to become omniscient by eating the 
fruit. The narrative may hold an element of irony in that the quality of the knowledge 
gained by eating was other than expected. Yet there is no hint that the quantity either 
exceeded or fell short of expectations.
388
 As implied by the “curses” and violent exploits 
of the remainder of the primeval history, perhaps the human knowledge of good and evil 
is fraught with so much peril precisely because it is not omniscient. The divine 
pronouncement of Gen. 3:22 leaves little room for denying that the human creatures gain 
a God-like capacity to discern and effect good rather than evil, but not good to the 
exclusion of evil.  
Citing Julius Wellhausen’s commentary, Westermann endorses a qualified 
version of von Rad’s interpretation, according to which “good” means helpful or useful 
and “evil” means harmful or injurious. Westermann affirms Wellhausen’s “functional” 
and “all-embracing” definition of the knowledge of good and bad, which is not exactly 
knowledge of everything without remainder, but a practical wisdom for distinguishing the 
helpful from the harmful, the virtuous from the vicious, the good from the bad.
389
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Likewise, Sarna states succinctly that “it is best to understand ‘knowledge of good and 
bad’ as the capacity to make independent judgments concerning human welfare” in any 
arena.
390
 This lesser infinity presents a plausible via media between the moral 
discernment presupposed at the opening to Genesis 3 and the omniscience found nowhere 
in the narrative. Also, in rare biblical parallels, the phrase tov vara‘ connotes a mature 
and sound ability to make values-based judgments autonomously and responsibly. The 
writers of Deut. 1:39 and 2 Sam. 19:35 presuppose that the young and old can anticipate 
the consequences of disobedience and understand the difference between right and 
wrong. Yet they hold that the immature “have no knowledge of good or evil,” and the 
elderly sometimes lose the ability to “distinguish between good and bad.”391 Westermann 
and Sarna’s interpretation of the knowledge of good and evil falls into the semantic range 
connoted by these verses and has entered the conceptual background of current exegesis 
colored by legal and royal conceptions of wisdom and knowledge in the Hebrew Bible. 
The royal and legal background for the knowledge of good and evil 
 
 
Bringing greater precision to the definition of the knowledge of good and evil, 
many biblical scholars have discovered promising exegetical paths in the royal and legal 
background of this myth-symbol. Where the image of God democratizes the concept of a 
royal figure acting as a representative of the divine, a correlative conception of the 
knowledge of good and evil has come to light against the backdrop of biblical passages in 
which God occasionally grants kings a special ability to pronounce judgment or in which 
prophets and priests bear a singular ability to disclose or interpret the “Law” or 
“instruction” of God mediated through the Torah. 
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Two recent biblical scholars exploring the legal and royal background for the 
knowledge of good and evil are W. Malcolm Clark and William N. Wilder. Clark makes a 
strong case that there are two sets of passages in the Hebrew Bible’s primary history 
shedding light on the meaning of the knowledge of good and evil in Genesis.
392
 
 In the first set of passages—1 Kings 3:9; 2 Sam. 14:17, 20—kings Solomon and 
David are granted the ability by God to pronounce judgment between “good and evil” in a 
legal context. In a comprehensive analysis of these and similar passages, Clark concludes 
that the knowledge of good and evil is best understood in many contexts as the God-given 
ability to discern and pronounce a judgment of “yes” or “no” in ambiguous and/or high-
stakes situations. Highlighting the biblical writers’ claim that the human judges in these 
passages often “hear” God before “saying” “good” or “bad,” Clark defines this kind of 
wisdom as the God-guided judgment of an authoritative person, like a king, priest, or 
prophet.
393
 In these passages the ability to discern between good and bad is a divine 
prerogative, beyond the immediate purview of any person, let alone every person.  
 Analyzing a second set of passages—Deut. 1:39; 2 Sam. 19:35—Clark, like 
Sarna, expresses confidence that the knowledge of good and evil described in these 
passages is the kind of autonomous judgment concerning human welfare gained through 
maturity or coming of age. According to Clark, the Priestly formulation of Deut. 1:39 is 
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the closest parallel to Genesis 2-3 but postdates the Yahwist’s use of the formula 
“knowledge of good and evil” in the Garden Narrative. In Deuteronomy the knowledge 
of good and evil likely refers to a kind of legal responsibility which the youngest 
members of the exodus generation had not yet attained. Being legal minors, these young 
ones are not held accountable for those transgressions keeping their elders from entering 
“the good land.”394  
Like Clark, Wilder cites 1 Kings 3 and 2 Samuel 14 as portraying a divine 
“investiture” of wisdom which brings about an “illumination” expected but not fully 
attained in Genesis 3, when the eyes of the human beings are opened to knowing good 
and bad. He notes that in biblical literature this kind of illumination and investiture is 
usually the privilege of kings and is God’s alone to bestow.395 Therefore, Wilder ties this 
interpretation of the knowledge of good and evil directly to the functional-royal 
conception of the image and likeness of God, according to which human beings act “as 
God’s vice regents over the earth.”396  
Against this backdrop, Wilder understands the Yahwist to paint the primordial 
pair as a couple of unruly rulers. Their disobedient and premature grasping at the 
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knowledge of good and evil short circuits the royal illumination and investiture of 
wisdom God intended to give them. Failing to await God’s blessing frustrates forever 
humanity’s prospects for attaining the more lavish illumination and investiture they might 
have expected otherwise. The command not to eat from tree of the knowledge of good 
and evil does not represent a cruel temptation or a categorical prohibition. Rather, human 
creatures might reasonably expect to partake from the tree when both they and the fruit 
are ripe, as it were. Having their eyes opened by God in this way, they would have also 
been clothed in God-like royal splendor or light (’or), rather than mere skins (‘or).397  
Still, Wilder concludes that at the close of the Garden Narrative, God grants the 
pair a gracious portion of both illumination and investiture, which nonetheless falls short 
of the unmentioned expectation for God-like royal wisdom and splendor that come with 
patient obedience. God does not leave the couple naked or clothed in inadequate 
garments of their own fabrication. Rather, the Lord God clothes the couple with sturdier 
garments as a lasting reminder to these royal image bearers of the ultimate source of their 
dignity, splendor, and wisdom.
398
  
In light of the functional-royal interpretation of the image of God, Wilder proposes 
that at the end of Gen 2 there is the sense that naked Adam and Eve must 
be clothed simply because the completion and fulfillment of their rulership 
demands such an investiture, as it would for any “image of god” in the 
ancient Near East. The only question is how and under what circumstances 
this investiture will be accomplished.
399
 
 
 Discovering the ambivalent but integral role the knowledge of good and evil plays 
in a functional-royal interpretation of the image of God, many recent exegetes have 
become divided over this question of circumstances and whether or not the Yahwistic and 
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Priestly contributors to the primeval history had something like Wilder’s idealistic 
alternative in mind. Taking the traditional tack, Wilder asks the “what if?” questions the 
narrator has left out: “What if Adam and Eve had not sinned? What if they had obeyed 
instead? What if they had passed their test and had been escorted into God’s presence 
with honor instead of shame?”400  
 However, the writer(s) and/or redactor(s) of the primeval history may not have 
shared these questions. Other biblical scholars wonder whether recent understandings of 
the primeval history’s rhetorical thrust render these questions moot. For example, 
theologian Neil B. MacDonald, finds the Garden Narrative to raise a different set of “ifs” 
than Wilder. Instead of asking, “What if…?,” MacDonald states, “Even if….” According 
to MacDonald’s “subjunctive conditional” interpretation of Genesis 2-3, “The story is 
essentially a deflationary tale whose moral is that even had the natural history of 
humankind begun life in a paradisiacal ideal state (which it did not), it would still have 
arrived at the less than perfect place it is now.”401 MacDonald’s “Even if” may ring truer 
than Wilder’s “What if?” when considering that in Genesis 1-3 chaos and tragedy are 
always waiting in the wings, because Yahweh Elohim’s “Let there be” and “Let Us 
make” grant ever greater shares of creative freedom and power to the finite and fallible.  
Many scientifically-informed theologians today, including J. Wentzel van 
Huyssteen and Gregory R. Peterson, latch onto this more complex “falling up” reading of 
the Garden Narrative, because it is both exegetically plausible and more conducive to an 
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evolutionary reframing of the biblical concept of the knowledge of good and evil.
402
 
Evolutionary history is morally ambiguous, as should be any cognitively fluid biocultural 
species emerging within it.  
Section summary and conclusion 
 
 
This opening section has cited many exegetes who argue that in Genesis 2-3 the 
formula “knowledge of good and evil” and the human condition to which it refers derive 
from a unique cognitive fluidity evident in linguistic and ethical ability. Westermann and 
Ricoeur have shown that the concept of the knowledge of good and evil is an integration 
and reformulation of background concepts belonging to several sources of ancient 
mythology. In a post-critical, second naïveté interpretation, their hermeneutical insight 
warrants the inference that this myth-symbol is a product of what it describes—a unique 
capacity to blend concepts across diverse behavioral domains in order to construct 
values-laden distinctions like “good” and “bad.”  
Through intertextual analysis, many biblical scholars argue convincingly that this 
special form of wisdom bears legal and royal connotations. For Wilder and others, this 
functional-royal interpretation of the knowledge of good and evil feeds into that of the 
image and likeness of God, implying that the biblical writers understood the former 
condition as part and parcel of the latter. Although human creatures discover that they 
could never exercise their God-like wisdom without erring, to bear the image and 
likeness of God is to know good and evil.  
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The following section develops the thesis that in pre-critical and post-critical 
conceptions of this human condition, a fallible knowledge of good and evil is an 
ambivalent consequence of being wrought of the creation and embedded within it to the 
same extent as all other creatures. 
The knowledge of good and evil as a product of nature in Genesis and  
biocultural evolution 
 
 
 If the writers and redactor(s) of the primeval history understood the human person 
to be an animated amalgam of dust, breath, and blood, and if they understood the 
knowledge of good and evil to be an integral aspect of bearing the divine image, it stands 
to reason that according to the narrative this ambivalent condition is wrought of the 
creation to the same extent as every other God-imaging aspect of human life. Clues in the 
text imply that the biblical writers conceived of a “very good” creation immanently 
capable of producing tov vara‘. Although there are chaotic and tragic concepts (in the 
Ricoeurian sense) latent in the cosmology of Genesis 1-3, there is nothing divine or 
diabolical about the sources of the knowledge of good and evil in the Garden Narrative. 
The following two subsections explore the creaturely harbingers of (the knowledge of) 
good and evil in the Garden Narrative and the biocultural evolutionary perspective which 
bring them into focus.  
Creaturely sources of the knowledge of good and evil in Eden 
 
 
Contrary to popular belief, the Garden Narrative may not be a simple tale of 
paradise lost. As mentioned just before the conclusion of chapter 4, there are at least three 
elements in Genesis 1 suggesting that the creation is fraught with the possibilities of both 
fulfillment and frustration “in the beginning.” These include (1) the open-endedness of the 
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divine commands to humanity in Gen. 1:28, (2) the harsh verbs of dominion within these 
commands, and (3) the repetition of the divine first person plural in Gen. 1:26 and 3:22.  
The direct address of Gen. 1:28 suggests that the Priestly writer(s) redactor(s) of 
the primeval history understood humankind to bear a conscious response-ability to obey 
God’s open-ended commands concerning their role within the creation. However, there 
appears to be no assumption that humankind has the ability to discern and disseminate the 
beneficent rule of the creator perfectly. Admittedly, this absence of evidence should not 
count for evidence of absence. The first positive evidence that the creation is able to both 
sustain and challenge humankind from the beginning are the harsh verbs associated with 
enacting the image of God in an earthly environment.
403
 These verbs imply that 
humankind must struggle to “fill the earth”; that flourishing means having to “subdue” 
(kavash) the natural environment and “rule over” (radah) its creatures. The harsh 
verbiage of the Priestly writer(s)/redactor(s) suggests a perception that relating to the 
creation, one another, and God in unique ways means being aware of the original and 
ever-present possibility of fulfillment and frustration, cooperation and conflict, “good and 
evil.” The so-called “curses” of Genesis 3 list the looming trials of one kind of creature 
who has come to a conscientious awareness, somehow similar to God’s, that maintaining 
and producing life can be fraught with all sorts of hardship, that conflict and power 
disparities can arise in the most intimate of relationships. There are dangerous animals 
lurking in the Garden, crafty creatures of the Lord God’s making (Gen. 3:1), sources of 
wisdom able to open human eyes to all these dangers and more.  
In this light, Eden does not appear to be what most people would call a paradise. 
The tree and the serpent are fully part of God’s good creation. A talking snake and an 
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eye-opening tree are certainly unusual beings, but there is nothing in the narrative to 
suggest they are in any way supernatural. According to Genesis 1-3, the origins of tov 
vara‘ are creaturely, intimating that the knowledge of good and evil is wrought of the 
creation and embedded within it to the same extent as all other created realities, including 
the image of God. As liberating and empowering as it is for all created entities, there 
appears to be a shadow side to God’s “Let there be….” 
Hebrew Bible scholar John F. A. Sawyer makes a convincing case that the verses 
framing the passages in which the creation of human beings is the main topic ought to 
give pause to anyone presuming to dissociate the image of God from the knowledge of 
good and evil. He draws attention to the fact that Gen. 1:26 and 3:22 are the only passages 
in which the divine first person plural is used to describe the resemblance of humanity to 
God: “‘Let us make [humankind] in Our image, according to our likeness…’”; “‘Behold, 
the [human] has become like one of Us, knowing good and evil….”404  
These parallel pronouncements affirm human agency and its likeness to God’s in 
some potentially surprising ways. At the end of Genesis 1, the creator “saw” all of the 
creation and pronounced it “very good.” By the end of Genesis 3, the human creatures’ 
eyes have been opened to see for themselves the “good and bad” they will encounter and 
cause outside Eden. In an ironic twist of imagery, “God blessed them…” (Gen. 1:28) 
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becomes, “the Lord God sent [them] out…” (3:23). Expulsion in Genesis 3 parallels 
God’s blessing in Genesis 1 in two ways. First, both the blessing and the expulsion 
follow the use of the divine first person plural in describing humanity’s similarity to God. 
Second, both God’s blessing and the expulsion extend humankind’s God-imaging 
function to the whole of the creation. The human creatures are not fruitful and cannot 
hope to fill the earth and rule over the whole of it until leaving Eden. In this sense, 
expulsion from Eden might be considered a blessing in disguise, an unceremonious 
emptying of the nest, a bit of tough love.  
Beyond this striking parallel suggesting in yet another way that for the biblical 
writers the image of God is not complete without the knowledge of good and evil, there 
are additional hints that the so-called “curses” of Gen. 3:14-19 are less about changes in 
the world than changes in worldview. Having their eyes open to the knowledge of good 
and bad, human creatures come to realize that they and their environment are capable of 
being harbingers of “bad” as well as “good.” In other words, the first pair’s illicit action 
does not bring about a change in their objective circumstances so much as their subjective 
means of encountering, evaluating, and changing them for better and worse.  
If the Garden Narrative is presupposed by Genesis 1 and its Priestly 
writer(s)/redactor(s), the commands to “be fruitful,” “fill the earth,” “subdue it,” and 
“rule over” its creatures seem to be reserved for the world outside Eden. According to 
Sawyer and other exegetes already cited, this understanding that the Yahwist’s creation 
account is taken up into the Priestly redaction of the primeval history as an elaboration of 
its prologue alleviates the exegetical difficulty that the image and likeness to God is 
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largely undefined in Genesis 1.
405
 The intricate connections among Genesis 1-3 support 
Sawyer’s hypothesis that (1) the material following Genesis 1 ought to clarify the 
ambiguous definition of image and likeness from the previous passage, and that (2) 
Yahweh Elohim’s first person plural declaration that the human creature “has become 
like one of us” (3:22) announces in language parallel to that of Gen. 1:26 that all the 
conditions have been met for human creatures to bear the divine image outside the 
relative sanctuary of Eden. In Genesis and biocultural evolution, these conditions are 
products of nature.  
However ironic the narrator intended to be in recounting the primordial pair’s 
eye-opening experience, Yahweh Elohim’s announcement at the climax of the narrative 
calls attention to an irreversible development in humankind’s likeness to their creator—a 
new creative potential rife with the realization of the enormous challenges and 
opportunities it confers.  
Yet this new, ambivalent, and perilous God-likeness does not rain down from the 
creator directly; nor is it mediated through the spoken or written word from a prophet or 
priest of Yahweh. This knowledge is there for the picking from a plant, and the 
encouragement to take and eat comes from a “beast of the field,” presumably named by 
the man and subject to human rule (Gen. 1:28-30, 2:19-20, 3:1). Although “the Lord God 
caused [the tree of knowledge] to grow,” in this sense, it is no different than any other 
“tree that is pleasing to the sight and good for food” (2:9). The knowledge of good and 
evil comes directly from below, and only indirectly from above. In light of the 
intertextual studies of Clines and Wilder, this narrative element may symbolize the 
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conviction that while God’s very good creation is replete with sources for knowing the 
good from the bad, human beings are not the kind of creatures who can read, understand, 
or apply them perfectly.  
In Genesis, as in a biocultural understanding of humanity’s physical and symbolic 
universe, human beings discover that for good and ill we are only able to seek knowledge 
and wisdom from our cultural and ecological surroundings. Even if one believes there is 
no surer source of guidance than God, no one could ever claim immediate access to 
divine wisdom. Bearing God’s image is a trial and error process—a hermeneutical circle 
of discernment, decision, action, and critical reflection. By the end of Genesis 3, the 
biblical writers appear to be suggesting that no matter how “very good” one believes the 
creator and creation to be, surviving and thriving are not guaranteed, and people are 
prone to exacerbating this state of affairs.    
Defending this understanding of the Garden Narrative, Sawyer describes how the 
serpent aptly symbolizes the kind of practical wit and wisdom needed to survive and 
thrive in challenging circumstances. In ancient Near Eastern contexts, snakes are as 
revered as they are feared, able to deal death in a single bite and equipped to thrive in 
environments from sea to sand that often kill human beings in short order. In Genesis 3 
the serpent is an otherwise ordinary creature whose ability to talk is not unlike that of the 
animals found in Aesop’s fables and other cautionary tales.406 At the same time, 
according to the narrator, “the serpent was more crafty [‘arum] than any beast of the field 
the Lord God had made” (Gen. 3:1). Citing Prov. 12:16, 23; 13:16; 14:8, 15, 18; 22:3; 
27:12; Exod. 21:14; Josh. 9:4; and Isa. 5:21, Sawyer notes that the term ‘arum is 
ambiguous and ambivalent, signifying everything from thoughtful prudence to sinister 
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guile, depending on the context.
407
 The wily ways of serpents are praised in both Prov. 
30:18-19 and Matthew 10:16. In the latter reference, Jesus purportedly instructs his 
followers to “be shrewd as serpents and innocent as doves,” in a world where literal and 
metaphorical wolves prey on sheep. In popular ancient Near Eastern parlance and the 
mythology emerging from it, the snake’s ‘arum relates to its ability to move quickly and 
evade capture without legs, its seeming perpetual youth and renewal through shedding its 
skin, its near imperviousness to heat and dehydration, and its venomous bite.
408
 All of 
these characteristics make snakes ideal survivors.  
Much like Bird, Sawyer associates this concept of survival with the verbs of 
dominion in Gen. 1:28. The harshness of kavash (“subdue”) and radah (“rule over”) 
carry a sense that from the start humanity must always struggle in order to subsist.
409
 As a 
heuristic articulation of this notion, the Garden narrative signifies that acquiring the 
knowledge of good and evil means gaining the self-conscious awareness that life is full of 
tov vara‘, “happiness and catastrophe, success and failure, life and death,” and that 
human beings bear the freedom and responsibility to bring the good along with the 
bad.
410
 Sawyer claims that because the most “crafty” of beasts facilitates this shift in 
perspective the human creatures receive a God-like wisdom exceeding that of the serpent, 
a shrewdness with strong inclinations toward singular forms of good and bad/evil.  
Sawyer emphasizes that in becoming wise—‘ârum—like the serpent, the human 
creatures discover that they are naked—‘ārum—vis-à-vis certain harsh realities of life 
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and death.
411
 He also suggests that after becoming aware of this “cursed” state, the 
“garments of skin” mentioned in Gen. 3:21 may allude to snake skin. The snake’s ever-
regenerating skin becomes a symbol of renewal and immortality. By contrast, the skins 
worn by the couple exiled from the garden serve as a reminder that the tree of life and its 
promise of immortality are out of reach, and that humankind must struggle in order to 
fulfill the creator’s commands to “‘be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue 
it; and rule over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky and over every living 
thing that moves on the earth’” (Gen. 1:28).412 Gaining enlightenment (’or) means 
needing a thicker skin (‘or), because becoming wise (‘ârum) means discovering that we 
are naked (‘ārum). 
Does this narrative development create a contradiction between the closing verses 
of Genesis 1 and Genesis 3? Are there loose ends and open seams in the redacted text? Or 
do biblical and contemporary cosmologies and anthropologies suggest ways for 
describing the world as both “very good” and immanently capable of producing both 
good and bad from “the beginning”? The final verse of Genesis 1 implies that the 
primeval history’s writer(s)/redactor(s) saw something “very good” about the unique 
creative possibilities that enter the world with the creation of humankind. Yet they also 
saw fit to caution that when the creation is at its “best,” its future is also at its most 
uncertain, due to humankind’s open-ended, ambiguous, and ambivalent response-ability 
to discern and extend the beneficent intentions of the creator to one another and the rest 
of the creation. The shift in Genesis 1 from “good” to “very good” corresponds to the 
shift from the jussive—“Let there be…”—to the imperative—“Be fruitful…” This 
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grammatical shift may imply the advent of humankind’s unique response-abilities 
demarcates the beginning of a “very good” stage of creation in that through humankind 
the creation is now able to envision, decide, and “see” for itself what novel goodness it 
will include.  Hence, (Yahweh) Elohim’s occasion to “rest.” For good and ill, ’adam 
steps into the roles encapsulated by the formulae, “Let there be…” and “Let us make…”  
Human creatures certainly bear unique capacities to enjoy, evaluate, and 
manipulate their world. But to glean wisdom from the Genesis cosmology today, biblical 
interpreters must underscore the writers’ conviction that (Yahweh) Elohim “sees” the 
“good” of all created entities—heavenly bodies, earth, air, water, plants, and animals—
independent of and prior to the creation of humankind. Theologians and ethicists today 
stand to gain from amplifying the text’s non-anthropocentric elements and the intrinsic 
good its writers locate in the nonhuman world.  
As theologian Philip Hefner and I have suggested, human beings bear the image 
of God by acting as free and responsible created co-creators of the cultural meanings by 
which we describe and justify our roles and actions in the world. Similarly, in Genesis 1-
3 the positive commands to “fill,” “subdue,” and “rule over”; the invitation to name all 
the animals; the negative command not to eat; and the encounter with the serpent all 
suggest that the biblical writers understood human creatures to have been given a co-
operative role in the creative process and that the undetermined character of the creation 
will present meaningful challenges and opportunities to humanity’s God-imaging 
response-ability to co-create a future outside Eden. Because ’adam is wrought of the 
creation and embedded within it to the same extent as all other creatures, created co-
creation ought to be understood in terms of co-operation among all human creatures, as 
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well as the rest of the natural world. Only this characterization of human creativity as 
God-imaging can re-present the modus operondi of a God who shares power and does not 
create through violence.  
The inherent challenges to creaturely wellbeing “outside Eden” do not necessarily 
detract from the primordial goodness of the creation or the creator, which are 
quintessential to Judeo-Christian cosmology. However, a non-paradisiacal conception of 
the creation’s “very good-ness” in Genesis reframes or discredits “paradise lost” 
interpretations of the Garden Narrative. At the same time, this exegetical reframing 
facilitates a theology of nature perspective—a doctrinal development in light of current 
science—emerging from a complex consonance and clash between ancient and 
contemporary understandings of human uniqueness and its development. Locating the 
potential for tov vara‘ always latent in Yahweh Elohim’s “very good” creation 
strengthens Hefner and Ricoeur’s wager that a conceptual integration of ancient and 
contemporary symbolic worlds will allow the myth-symbols under investigation to 
remain integral to an intellectually and ethically fruitful (second naïveté) understanding 
of Homo sapiens’ origins, uniqueness, purposes, and destiny.  
Natural sources of the knowledge of good and evil in biocultural evolution 
 
 
An evolutionary hermeneutical lens helps the present-day interpreter of Scripture 
to focus on the non-paradisiacal elements in Genesis 1-3, because evolution means 
looking back at the beginning through “nature, red in tooth and claw.” The theologian 
today must engage the evolutionary perspective that Homo sapiens’ unique ability to 
construe and cause good and the bad has emerged within—and because of—a biocultural 
milieu already beset by cooperation and conflict. This is not to read Darwin into Genesis, 
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but to emphasize that the biblical writers experienced the need to account in their own 
way for the realization that the creation is a wild and ambivalent place, capable of 
bringing human beings to the heights of joy and the depths of sorrow. The Garden 
Narrative encapsulates the perennial struggle to account for the good and bad human 
beings and their environments are capable of producing, while attempting to preserve the 
primordial goodness of the creator and the creation. Underlying the “curses” of Genesis 3 
are vexing questions about why there are dangerous creatures like snakes with which 
human beings seem to have an innate enmity, why relationships become power struggles, 
why subsistence is arduous, why producing offspring is so painful. In short, the 
knowledge of good and evil emerged when our species’ eyes were opened to a world 
begging for an explanation to these mysteries. The knowledge of good and evil emerged 
through the cognitive fluidity of behaviorally modern Homo sapiens in recent 
evolutionary time and has directed the course and content of humanity’s biocultural 
history ever since. 
As a biocultural reality, knowledge of good and evil is a product of nature and 
nurture because, in the words of evolutionary psychologists John Tooby and Leda 
Cosmides, “more nature allows more nurture.”413 For good and bad, although the specific 
behavior of an individual person is not reducible to biological or cultural processes, the 
entire gamut of conscientious human behavior is bioculturally constrained. For good and 
bad, human beings are culturally-constituted creatures, blessed and cursed with the 
condition of having to contextualize and justify our actions and experiences. In 
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biocultural and theological terms, the knowledge of good and evil and the image of God 
are co-emergent. 
 According to neuroscientist and emergentist Terrence W. Deacon, the rudiments 
of this condition emerged with the first self-propagating—i.e., teleodynamic—systems. 
Through the autogenic capacities of self-constitution, self-repair, and self-replication, “a 
very basic form of value has emerged,” because the components of these teleodynamic 
processes can be defined in terms of autogenic integrity or lack thereof.
414
 The much later 
arrival of sentience brought with it “the emergence of ethical value,” because “the 
background ‘feeling of being here’” enables the perception of comfort and pain, joy and 
suffering, fulfillment and frustration.
415
 With the symbolic threshold and the emergence 
of consciousness comes the emergence of morality, because personhood facilitates the 
(co-)creation of a symbolic universe framed by concepts like “good” and “evil.”  
 I suggested in chapter 3 that Hefner’s bottom-up “basis for beginning to reflect 
upon values” harmonizes with Deacon’s to such an extent that neither should object to 
Hefner redubbing his “teleonomic axiom” the “teleodynamic axiom.” Hefner’s axiom 
states that “[t]he structure of a thing, the processes by which it functions, the 
requirements for its functioning, and its relations with and impact upon its ecosystem 
form the most reasonable basis for hypothesizing what the purpose and meaning of the 
thing are,” within its ecological and/or cultural context.416 The evolutionary roots of the 
knowledge of good and evil are as deep and ancient as the first selection pressures 
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threatening the systemic integrity of the earliest autogens, which evolved into the first 
organisms, which evolved into every other species, including ours. 
 This perspective begs a vexing set of questions. For instance, what if an animal 
species has evolved to be an apex predator and “the requirements for its functioning” 
include killing and consuming other animals? A successful hunt is of great value to the 
predator, but what is in it for the prey besides fear, pain, and death? Like it or not, 
predation and other forms of calamity often called “natural evil” have been the catalysts of 
biodiversity and ecological balance, of sensation and reaction, of quick feet and minds, and 
of the physical and cultural tools Homo sapiens have constructed in order to manipulate 
their ecological and social environments for the sake of their wholesome living. 
Both first- and second- naïveté readings of Genesis leave open the question of 
whether the various forms of freedom bestowed to all created entities by God’s “Let there 
be” is a kind of “good” capable of offsetting the creation’s inherent capacity to include 
the “bad.” As the creative wellspring of biotic complexity and diversity on earth, is the 
evolutionary arms race of horns and hooves, teeth and claws, brains and tools self-
redeeming? Ultimately, these philosophical and theological questions must remain open 
to some extent. The mystery of the origins of evil defies any comprehensive 
rationalization. Through his Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur reminds the philosopher and the 
theologian that myth and the second naïveté interpretation thereof facilitate the kind of 
docta ignorantia required for wrestling with these perennial questions.  
Approaching this paradox from an evolutionary angle, philosopher Holmes 
Rolston, III suggests that creativity and tragedy in evolutionary processes are two poles 
of a dialectic with a track record of producing positive net results. For Ricoeur Genesis 1-
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3 sublimate and reconfigure tragic and chaotic understandings of reality. Similarly, 
Rolston attempts to transvaluate the chaos and tragedy of evolutionary history. For him 
the term tragic is an evaluative translation of the fact that “in amoral nature” exist 
“predation, parasitism, selfishness, randomness, blindness, disaster, indifference, waste, 
struggle, suffering, death.”417 Blending imagery from Genesis 2-3 and Romans 8, he 
suggests that “perhaps the poetry of nature as garden and as groaning in travail can be 
demythologized, or remythologized, for our scientific era.”418 The evolutionary labor 
pains of bringing forth new life and new life forms are “redeemed” by their own positive 
results. From the perspective of a creature complex enough to enjoy its own existence, 
complexification is an intrinsic good. The Darwinian processes driving biological and 
cognitive complexification are ambivalent and indifferent but have led to every valuable 
reality, including the ability to value. Examining both sides of the evolutionary coin, 
Rolston explains: 
Nature is random, contingent, blind, disastrous, wasteful, indifferent, 
selfish, cruel, clumsy, ugly, struggling, full of suffering, and ultimately, 
death? Yes, but this sees only the shadows, and there has to be light to cast 
shadows. Nature is orderly, prolific, efficient, selecting for adapted fit, 
exuberant, complex, diverse, regenerating life generation after generation. 
There are disvalues in nature as surely as there are values, and the 
disvalues systematically drive the value achievements […]. Translated 
into theological terms, the evils are redeemed in the ongoing story.
419
 
 
The “good” results of the competition-driven emergence of novel forms of life and 
mentality are not redeemed from “sin” or “guilt” but from entropy, from chaos—the 
enemy and engine of emergence.
420
 Life has made spectacular gains in its ongoing 
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struggle to fill the earth. Rolston emphasizes that eco-systemically speaking, the so called 
circle of life is self-renewing—“[p]lants become insects, which become chicks, which 
become foxes, which die to fertilize plants.”421 But this circle does more. Evolutionarily 
speaking, the circle of life is more like a self-ratcheting spiral. Rolston notes that human-
being could only emerge, “at least in life as we know it,” in a natural history fraught with 
predation, blind chance, and catastrophe.
422
  
 In the evolutionary emergence of the image of God and the knowledge of good 
and evil, do the evolutionary ends justify the means? Well, yes and no. This question 
holds a twofold category mistake. First, ends can only follow means; ends cannot elevate 
or diminish the moral status of means. Second, ethical or juridical categories like 
“justification” do not apply to amoral processes. Catholic theologian Denis Edwards 
emphasizes that “it is important to understand natural selection in a nonmythological and 
nonanthropomorphic way.”423 Although a great deal of animal life is able to experience 
pain, animals do not suffer or cause suffering within a values-laden symbolic universe of 
“good” and “evil.” The tragedies which animals, persons, and their environments incur at 
the hand of the nonhuman world are not insignificant, but they are also exempt from 
moral evaluation. There is no one to blame for so called “natural evils.” 
By contrast, the undue and avoidable tragedies which animals, persons, and their 
environments incur at the hand of the conscientious human world are indeed subject to 
moral evaluation. Human action is accountable to a knowledge of good and evil. 
According to Rolston, here is where the more traditional, theological sense of redemption 
begins to take root. For him, although “[s]uffering in a harsh world did not enter 
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chronologically after sin and on account of it,” the biocultural arrival of culpability 
“introduces a novel tragedy.”424 According to a biocultural perspective and a second 
naïveté reading of Genesis 1-3, the possibility and necessity for morality emerge from the 
creation itself when our species’ eyes were opened to the knowledge of good and evil. 
From that point on, human creatures have been blessed and cursed with the response-
ability to give an account for the tov vara‘ they produce in the course of living out the 
God-imaging vocation to participate conscientiously in ongoing drama of creation.  
Knowing good and evil as an emergent vocation 
 
 
Clark and Wilder have argued convincingly from intertextual evidence for the 
royal and legal background of the concept of the knowledge of good and evil in Genesis 
2-3. These findings are strengthened by their consonance with a functional-royal 
interpretation of the image of God. According to Wilder, “the completion and fulfillment 
of” humankind’s capacity to rule over the earth as the creator’s royal image-bearers 
requires the illumination and investiture that comes with gaining the knowledge of good 
and evil.
425
 Finding that the image and likeness of God is largely undefined in its 
immediate context, Sawyer also argues that for the biblical writers the Garden Narrative 
chronicles the completion of the image of God and begins to specify what it means to fill, 
subdue, and rule over.
426
 In the garden the human creatures learn that fulfilling their 
vocational response-ability to the commands of God means naming other creatures and 
other people, falling into power struggles among themselves, toiling to produce 
sustenance, laboring to bear children, and navigating a world of fierce creatures. These 
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scholars conclude that for the writers of Genesis, bearing God’s image ultimately means 
leaving Eden. The following two subsections describe this call out of Eden according to 
one recent strain of biblical scholarship and a scientifically-informed perspective with the 
potential to blend with it.  
Called up and called out—exegetical considerations 
 
 
For Wilder and Sawyer the knowledge of good and evil is part and parcel of 
bearing the image and likeness of God in, to, and through the creation. However, their 
analyses differ when they begin to draw interpretive conclusions from their exegetical 
findings. In Wilder’s interpretation part of the narrator’s intended message is that if the 
primordial pair had only awaited further instructions from God about the tree of 
knowledge things would have turned out much better for them and perhaps the rest of the 
world. In Sawyer’s interpretation part of the narrator’s intended message is that bearing 
God’s image means discovering some harsh realities about the good and bad the world 
and human creatures are capable of producing. Called to be co-operators with God, one 
another, and the rest of the creation, human beings have a unique response-ability to 
discern, construe, and pursue the good the creator intends for the creation. However, as 
the remainder of the primeval history implies, human beings have a penchant for making 
things very bad, as well. Setting the stage for the sobering reminders of human fallibility 
in Genesis 4-11, the Garden Narrative represents a time-honored attempt to account for 
the realization that human creatures have always stumbled only too late upon the 
ambivalence of their condition, their singular but fallible capacity to effect the good, their 
unique ability to appropriate, but also misappropriate, what they and their communities 
have considered to be mediations of divine wisdom.  
211 
In this light the Garden Narrative is less about falling from something than it is 
about stumbling into something as wonderful as it is wild, as promising as it is perilous. 
The Reverend John Baker interprets the forbidden fruit of the tree of the knowledge as a 
symbol of the realities to which it introduces humankind in the narrative—the unknown 
and knowledge. As loci of power capable of taking away ignorance as well as innocence, 
both the unknown and knowledge/wisdom present opportunity as well as danger.
427
 
Accordingly, Baker understands the Garden Narrative to chronicle an “awakening,” not a 
“Fall.” That is, Genesis 2-3 mythologizes a transition from “an unconscious innocence, an 
identity of [the hu]man with God (similar to that of animals with nature)” to the possibility 
of a self-consciously chosen harmony with God’s intentions, “even in the face of 
temptation and stress.”428 The path to maturity is fraught with growing pains. Yet mature 
knowledge inevitably trumps the bliss of ignorance and innocence. Like the pair expelled 
from the garden, those with the potential to do the most good are also those whose eyes 
have been opened to the realities of hardship, death, and the human capacity to bring about 
both or to shield one another and the rest of the creation from avoidable harm. 
Choosing to step beyond the protection of the Garden and the sheltering, 
heteronomous world of “eat this, don’t eat that” means having one’s eyes opened to a 
potentially richer but much more challenging existence “east of Eden.” Growing up 
means moving out and having to face all the dangers and opportunities of the world with 
new eyes, even when feeling naked at the prospect. In Baker’s terms, “now that 
[humankind] has claimed knowledge for [itself], and the power that goes with it, [we] 
must learn to use that power under God’s guidance, and for that [we] must find, of [our] 
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own free will, a new harmony with God.”429 Discerning and enacting this new kind of 
harmony with God’s intentions for the creation is the vocation of humankind beyond the 
bounds of Eden. “In those conditions,” remarks Baker, “the choice of freedom cannot be 
called ‘sin,’ nor can the resultant state be called a ‘Fall.’ The true story of [humankind’s] 
Fall could, for a theologian determined to find it in the Bible record, only begin with the 
sin of Cain, who exercised his power to do an evil deed.”430  
While Baker and others have good reason to interpret Genesis 2-3 as a tale of 
awakening, Clines and Clark both point out that the story does not contain a simple, 
linear “progression from immaturity to maturity.”431 However accurate the latter insight 
may be, it also implies an assumption that the biblical writers envisioned a world in 
which the maturation process could be relatively painless and drama-free. However, 
given the exegetical considerations of Sawyer, Baker, Bird, and to a certain extent 
Wilder, the more likely message of the Garden Narrative is that the transition from 
immaturity to maturity is not simple or straightforward at all. The response-ability to bear 
the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil is a vocation harboring a great 
variety of occupational hazards, including many of humanity’s own making. This call and 
response-ability to co-create means remembering that Yahweh Elohim does not create 
through violence. It means re-presenting, though often mis-re-presenting, the creator’s 
good intentions. It means opening oneself to hearing those convicting words, “Where is 
your brother,” whenever others suffer or perish needlessly (Gen. 4:9). It means striving 
penitently and empathetically to make things right or better wherever it is in one’s power 
to do so. 
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Called up and called out—evolutionary considerations 
 
 
 Viewing these biblical passages and relevant ancient Near Eastern parallels from 
a hermeneutical perspective informed by biocultural and emergentist understandings of 
human uniqueness and its development helps the 21
st
 century interpreter of scripture to 
highlight and magnify (though not necessarily distort) the developmental and dynamic 
nature of the image of God in Genesis. The final verses of Genesis 1 present an 
ambiguous picture of what it means to bear the image of the creator in and to the rest of 
the creation. These verses recount that (Yahweh) Elohim creates a creature—male and 
female—who bears the response-ability to carry out the commands that the creator 
addresses “to them.” Reading Gen. 1:26-2:4a through the Garden Narrative generates the 
inference that the conditions of possibility for bearing the image of God are the results of 
a creative process of “forming,” “breathing,” “building,” “eating,” “seeing,” and 
“knowing.” The human creatures participate in this process, ultimately emerging from the 
garden as co-creators who bear the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil.    
 A second naïveté interpretation of these processes of creation and co-creation 
which describes the ability to discern, construe, and enact God’s good intentions for the 
creation as the vocation of behaviorally modern Homo sapiens must incorporate the 
understanding that the cognitive fluidity necessary to discern and respond to this calling 
is the result of evolutionary processes. The biocultural emergence of humankind’s 
response-ability to their environments, to one another, to themselves, and to God was—
and is for every person—the process of having one’s eyes opened to the ambiguous and 
ambivalent character of creaturehood. The natural and cultural words have produced 
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every value and disvalue for life on earth. The advent of the cognitive-linguistic ability to 
translate values into culturally-borne concepts, moral visions, and actions to which 
human beings hold one another accountable is also the emergence of a theological 
vocation to promote personal, cultural, and ecological wellbeing. Capable of evaluating, 
envisioning, and directing ecological and cultural realities, behaviorally modern Homo 
sapiens bear a (bioculturally constrained) moral responsibility for the “good” and 
“bad/evil” they are able to “see” (discern/locate), to “know” (experience/conceptualize), 
and to “create” (imagine/effect). Human-being is constituted by a choice to act as 
blessing or curse to one another and other creatures. 
Unfortunately, human beings have displayed a deleterious tendency to conflate an 
apparently unique ability to assign value and the criteria by which we assign it. That is, 
we mistakenly make human beings and human wellbeing the measure of all things, as if 
the nonhuman world had only relative value vis-à-vis human flourishing.  
Several biblical scholars, including J. Richard Middleton, cast doubt on the 
assumption that the Genesis cosmology is unilaterally or irremediably anthropocentric, as 
it is often interpreted to be. Analyses of Genesis as ideological critique pit the symbolic 
worldview of the primeval history against the exploitative trickle-up theological 
cosmology of Enuma Elish and other parallels. If the Garden Narrative gives greater 
specificity to the vocation to bear the divine image, the command to “rule over” the land 
and its creatures is clarified by the express purpose of humankind (’adam) to “serve” 
(‘avad) and “preserve” (shamar) the garden and the earth as source and “ground” 
(’adamah) of human-being and wellbeing (Gen. 2:15; 3:23).  
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By extension, the biblical concept of “Sabbath” resists the idea that exploiting the 
land, animals, and other people is the god-imaging prerogative of the social and religious 
elite. According to Enuma Elish, the Babylonian pantheon depends on slave labor to 
provide sustenance and the occasion to rest. Conversely, Yahweh Elohim is self-
sufficient by comparison, and the creation is self-sustaining enough that members of all 
social strata, all species of domesticated animal, and even the land itself must be allowed 
to rest (Gen. 2:2-3; Exod. 20:8-11; 23:10-12; cf. Lev. 25:1-12). Over against competing 
ideologies, the primeval history and many other texts of the Hebrew Bible reflect a 
conscientious shift away from a “Let us take” ethos toward a “Let there be” and “Let us 
make” ethos.      
In parallel fashion, both an evolutionary worldview and the biblically-based 
cosmology it brings into focus are antithetical to the anthropocentric view that the 
cosmos is a cache of resources serving human enjoyment and consumption. In Deacon’s 
view, rudimentary forms of value and normativity emerged with the first autogenic 
(teleodynamic) systems. To live is to bear a values-laden existence. Responding to 
various selection pressures, all organisms have a stake in the preservation of biotic 
conditions conducive to constraint propagation across all levels of (id)entity constituting 
emergent dynamics. In a sense, evolutionary development is a function of the fact that all 
life must “subdue” the earth in order to “be fruitful and multiply.”  
Such creativity—the kind through which our biocultural species has emerged—is 
catalyzed as much by environmental pressures as ecological sustainability and 
biodiversity. If bearing the image of the creator God is a call to participate 
conscientiously in creatio continua through co-operating with one another and the rest of 
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the natural world, should not Homo sapiens of biblically-grounded faith seek to value, 
preserve, and enhance the immanent creativity of diverse and sustainable ecosystems? 
Should not God-imaging creatures seek just and equitable cultural practices and policies 
that acknowledge the equal stake of all human beings in the biocultural future of 
humankind? By delimiting the creative potential of persons and their environments, 
social injustice and ecological degradation silence the creator’s “Let there be” and distort 
the call to bear the image of God in, to, and through the creation. 
Knowing good and evil as imaging God with a condition of freedom 
 
 
 Following the ideological trajectory of the Genesis cosmology, if human creatures 
bear the image of a God who does not create through violence, the condition of freedom 
into which we have emerged calls us first to distinguish between amoral and moral 
aspects of created co-creation in an evolving world. On the one hand, nature, red in tooth 
and claw is not culpable for the disvalues natural selection produces in catalyzing the 
increased complexity and diversity of life. On the other hand, mature, mentally 
competent human beings can be morally culpable for actions which lead to the creation’s 
inability to sustain its ecological and cultural complexity and diversity in response to 
God’s “Let there be.”432  
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Now, more than ever before, forgetting or failing to discern that human beings 
bear the image of a god who does not create through violence has meant threatening and 
even delimiting the earth’s ability to respond to the creator’s “Let there be.” Likewise, 
this failure has meant threatening, delimiting, and too often extinguishing other people’s 
ability to realize their creative potential. Theologically speaking, bearing a condition of 
freedom in God-imaging ways means acknowledging that seeking some “good” (or the 
good of some) by willfully, knowingly, and avoidably producing some “bad” for other 
people or the environments that sustain them and all other life is creation through 
violence, a misuse of the knowledge of good and evil, and a violation of the vocation to 
act as co-creators in a very good world. 
                                                                                                                                                 
1:28-29, God places meat on the menu, but only under certain conditions. These verses imply that the 
condition of freedom with which human beings bear the image of God generates the cognitive imperative 
to specify the conditions under which it is permissible to extinguish sentient life for the purpose of 
achieving some other perceived good, such as nourishment.  
There is something both noble and tragic about perceiving the need to contextualize the taking of 
life for the purpose of sustaining it. Genesis 9:3-6 records that human beings may eat the flesh of another 
creature as long as its life—its blood—has been thoroughly drained. These verses also contain much 
stronger prohibitions against human bloodshed, for the reason that human beings are created in the image 
of God. This passage seems to place theological significance behind the conviction that there is something 
disordered about taking the life of a creature that can suffer and something wrong about taking the life of 
creature who can suffer existentially. Animals can only become meat when there is no more “life” in them 
to continue dying, when they are more like plants than a nefesh chayyah, when they are dust without breath 
or blood. Human beings are allowed to take animal life, perhaps because nature eventually does that on its 
own, but they are not allowed to take in the life of another creature, to make the source of its life and death 
a means of sustenance and a part of themselves. Perhaps the prohibition to consume blood relates to J. 
Maxwell Miller’s insight that Gen. 9:6 and its use of “image” (tselem) instead of “likeness” (demut) is an 
implicit way of emphasizing that human beings are not created from divine “blood” (dam), as in Enuma 
Elish (“In the ‘Image’ and ‘Likeness’ of God,” Journal of Biblical Literature 91 [1972]: 299-302, 304). 
These instructions to Noah in Genesis 9 appear to be a ritualized reminder that despite humanity’s failings 
it must still image a creator who does not create or sustain life by means of another’s blood.  
Admittedly, this principle to avoid blood seems to be at odds with a prima facie understanding of 
Israelite sacrificial rites. However, these same cultic practices may uphold an anti-violent theological ethic 
in a painfully ironic way—by evoking empathy for victims and repentance for wrongdoing through bloody 
spectacle. The role ritualized bloodshed plays in the cultic lives of biblical communities is well beyond the 
scope of this study. Its concluding chapter, however, touches upon this topic among several others to which 
it may contribute.  
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Facing phenomena such as famine, poverty, war, genocide, and ecological crises, 
many recent biblical scholars and theologians lament that some interpretations and 
applications of the image of God concept may have motivated attitudes and actions which 
have led to environmental degradation and various social ills. A host of presuppositions 
underlie this problematic interpretation, including: (1) the commands of Gen. 1:28 to fill 
and subdue the earth are universal across time and culture, and (2) imaging God is a form 
of “dominion” best expressed in dichotomous “power-over” relationships rather than co-
operative, power-sharing relationships—e.g., humanity over against nature, male over 
against female, and mind over against matter.
433
 
Offering a more plausible and palatable alternative to this variety of functional 
interpretation, Van Huyssteen seeks to “revision the idea of the dominium terrae without 
a power-centered and violent anthropocentrism.”434 His dynamic conception of the 
“imago Dei as embodied self” relies heavily on Hefner’s created co-creator model and 
Middleton’s theological exegesis depicting human creatures as royal representatives of “a 
generous creator, sharing power with humans and inviting them to participate in the 
creative, historical process with responsibility and care.”435 In short, power-over models 
of imaging God misunderstand and misdirect human freedom by their failure to 
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acknowledge and appreciate Homo sapiens’ cognitively fluid form of creative freedom as 
a particularly complex emergent expression of the freedom and creativity of natural 
world in which we live, move, and have our being.  
Blending ancient and scientifically-informed concepts, Middleton compares the 
creative power of the God who speaks reality into existence in Genesis 1 to a strange 
attractor—a dynamical principle of order harnessing the constant pull of entropy for what 
in the end could be considered the “very good” purposes of producing novel and 
irreducible forms of self-organization, from snowflakes to snowy owls to synapses to 
symbolic worlds.
436
 An emergentist understanding of causal powers like Deacon’s is 
conducive to theological, ontological, and ethical understandings that are antithetical to 
power-over models of divine and human freedom and creativity. This is not to say that 
there is no longer any room in theology for “top-down” explanations for why things do or 
ought to happen. Rather, as explained in chapter 3 above, Deacon’s three-tiered 
taxonomy of emergent dynamics yields the inference that all supervenient—“top-
down”—causal powers in the world, including those constituting human personhood, 
derive evolutionarily and diachronically from the “bottom-up.” The human power to 
affect nature is also the causal power nature effects.  
Viewed from the bottom-up, imaging God with a knowledge of good and evil is 
something the creation accomplishes through the emergent dynamics constituting human-
being. The evolutionary emergence of the human condition of freedom has introduced a 
unique kind of responsibility for the ways in which one kind of living being (nefesh 
chayyah) positively and negatively affect the wellbeing of one another and the ecological 
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and cultural worlds through which they live, move, and have their being. Given the 
planetary scope of Homo sapiens’ influence today, the categorical distinctions of value 
with which we describe ourselves and our roles in the creation can greatly magnify or 
muffle the cosmic call of the creator to “Let there be” a very good world for all kinds of 
creatures and everyone who bears the image of God. Awesome response-ability begets 
awesome responsibility. 
Hefner argues that because all human self-understanding is bioculturally situated 
theologians exercise humankind’s God-imaging condition of freedom when reinterpreting 
the troubling biblical passage through which generations of religious thinkers have 
contextualized humanity’s status and role within the creation. Acknowledging “the 
traditional anthropocentrism” with which so many have read the commands Genesis 1:28, 
Hefner cautions that no understanding of what it means to bear the image of God is 
exempt from the influence of the biocultural milieu through which theological self-
descriptions emerge.
437
 For him, to bear the image of God is to be a “free creator of 
meanings, one who takes actions based on those meanings and is also responsible for 
those meanings and actions.”438 To bear the image of God is to be a created co-creator, a 
defined self-definer, knowing good and evil. The job description of “created co-creator” 
is always a provisional and revisable product of created co-creation conditioned by Homo 
sapiens’ morally ambivalent biocultural past, present, and future.  
Yet because humankind’s conscientious ability and necessity to discern, construe, 
and enact the good are necessarily conditioned, finite, and fallible, the emergence of 
human freedom introduces the likelihood—the eventuality—of mistaking the bad for the 
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good, mistaking the good for the bad, and negatively affecting ourselves, others, and our 
environments, both unintentionally and intentionally.
439
  
In this regard, the “conditioned” aspect of humankind’s condition of freedom is 
twofold: its exercise is (1) unavoidable and (2) bioculturally emergent. First, we cannot 
but make choices with social and ecological repercussions, be accountable for those 
choices, and share responsibility for the symbolic worlds environing those choices and 
our responses to their consequences. Second, human freedom is further conditioned by 
the biocultural history through which it has emerged. As a species and as individuals we 
are predisposed to repeat the triumphs and tragedies of our progenitors, but we are also 
free to reconsider and recontextualize them in potentially more humanizing ways.  
Enabling this condition of freedom, the cognitive fluidity or blending capacity of 
the culturally embedded human body-brain-mind is constantly expanding the horizons of 
human thought, behavior, and technology—for good and bad. Because more nature 
allows more nurture, behaviorally modern Homo sapiens have displayed an unparalleled 
ability to articulate, act upon, normalize, analyze, and revise the values at the epicenter of 
our experience of and interaction with the world and one another. This dynamic cognitive 
and cultural milieu is that through which we know “good” and “evil.” Because this 
hermeneutical circle of critical reflection on values, behaviors, and norms is always open 
and bioculturally situated, evolutionary psychologists like Cosmides and Tooby predict 
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that Homo sapiens are always inclined toward some bad behaviors.
440
 The work of 
humanizing ourselves is never complete, which is not to say that our efforts to better 
ourselves are ultimately unguided or that there are no reasonably universal criteria by 
which to judge our progress. Pinpointing some of these loci of moral guidance is the aim 
of the next chapter, which analyzes some of the effects of reframing Christian ethics by 
means of the scientifically-informed anthropology constructed heretofore. I contend that 
within this framework Christian ethics stand to gain intellectual credibility, moral 
fruitfulness, and precision in articulating their unique contribution to ethical discourse 
and their potential to establish harmonious moral commitments across cultural and 
confessional boundaries.  
Conclusion 
 
 
 Biblical and evolutionary understandings of human uniqueness and its 
development are parallel to one another and do not overlap in any direct way. Yet one 
can argue with integrity that it is intellectually and ethically fruitful to integrate biblical, 
philosophical, and natural-scientific concepts in order to recontextualize and 
reappropriate traditional myth-symbols which remain indispensable for theological self-
description in academic and ecclesial discourse today. Following the structure of chapter 
4, the four sections of this chapter have focused in on some surprising similarities 
between ancient mythology and contemporary anthropology. Blending these 
understandings has facilitated the construction of a second naïveté conception of the 
                                                 
440
 For example, father of evolutionary epistemology Donald T. Campbell has even observed that natural 
selection sometimes rewards behaviors that are socially maladaptive, either in their immediate context or 
later contexts. He concludes that there is often “some past adaptive usefulness” to behaviors which many or 
all cultures have come to condemn. See Donald T. Campbell, “The Conflict Between Social and Biological 
Evolution and the Concept of Original Sin,” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 10 (1975): 235. 
223 
knowledge of good and evil that is faithful to both current science and the ideological 
trajectory of the biblical witness to which this myth-symbol belongs. Viewing this 
concept through the hermeneutical lens of Homo sapiens’ evolutionary emergence, this 
chapter has engaged four theses designed to frame the discussion of how the knowledge 
of good and evil has emerged in biocultural history as both a concept and the condition of 
freedom to which it refers.  
The first of these theses claims that the concept of the knowledge of good and evil 
is a product of the uniquely human form of cognitive fluidity to which it points. Various 
exegetical definitions of this concept have characterized the knowledge of good and evil 
as a consequence of disobedience, knowing “right” from “wrong,” sexual knowledge, and 
even omniscience. Over against these definitions, and in light of the royal and legal 
contexts of biblical parallels, biblical scholars today generally agree that for the writers 
and redactor(s) of the primeval history, this myth-symbol refers to a God-like wisdom to 
make judgments concerning human welfare. This definition is consonant with the 
functional-royal interpretation of the image of God discussed in chapter 4, implying that 
the democratization of the royal image of God also includes a democratization of a form 
of wisdom usually reserved for the political and religious elite.  
Given the inter-cultural conceptual background of the image of God in Genesis, 
and following Ricoeur and Westermann, there is good reason to formulate a biblical 
definition of the knowledge of good and evil in light of extra-biblical parallels. As with 
the emergence of the Priestly understanding of the image and likeness of God, the 
conception of the knowledge of good and evil emerging in the primeval history displays a 
hermeneutical precedent for faith communities today to develop and reformulate religious 
224 
understandings through a complex collision and collusion of concepts and perspectives. 
For Ricoeur the development of a second naïveté perspective recapitulates, in a post-
critical manner, the perennial hermeneutical task of faith seeking understanding. 
Reappropriating the biblical concept of the knowledge of good and evil along the 
ideological trajectory of the primeval history and in light of a biocultural model of Homo 
sapiens’ evolutionary emergence is an example of this kind of theological endeavor.    
 The second thesis holds that in parallel ways biblical and biocultural explanations 
of human uniqueness and its development depict the knowledge of good and evil as a 
product of nature. As an animated amalgam of dust, breath, and blood, human creatures 
are necessarily finite and fallible, and their eyes are opened to a unique knowledge of 
good and bad through creaturely purveyors of wisdom—the “crafty” serpent, the tree of 
knowledge, and their own response-ability vis-à-vis these created entities, one another, 
and God. There are verbal clues in Genesis 1-3 that the garden of Eden is not exactly a 
paradise, that the world human creatures must fill and subdue is already immanently 
capable of bringing the “good” along with the “bad,” and that an essential aspect of 
bearing God’s image in and to the creation is coming “to know good and evil” and to 
understand the human capability to make things better or worse for themselves, one 
another, and the rest of the world.  
An emergentist model of biocultural evolution includes very similar views ripe 
for theological appropriation. According to Deacon, the teleodynamic threshold brings 
with it the emergence of normativity, because the holistic integrity of dynamically fused 
systems is always vulnerable to dis-integration. On a rudimentary level, “good” and 
“bad” have emerged in the natural world through autogenesis. The emergence of 
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sentience compounds this emergence of values through a perceptive and reactive 
awareness of values and disvalues. This emergence of ethical value is further 
compounded through the emergence of consciousness, which allows creatures to be 
aware of their own awareness. The capacity for recursive reflection on values and 
disvalues via language constitutes the emergence of moral wherewithal—the knowledge 
of good and evil. For good and ill, the collective and individual moral legacy of human 
beings must reflect the fact that this unique capability has emerged in the midst of and as 
a result of an evolutionary history beset with cooperation and conflict, joy and suffering, 
fulfillment and frustration, good and bad.    
 The third thesis contends that the knowledge of good and evil is the capstone 
component marking human creatures as bearers of the divine image and likeness, because 
the vocation to fill, subdue, and rule over the creation (and to recontextualize these roles in 
new contexts) requires the response-ability to discern, construe, and enact the creator’s 
beneficent intentions for the creation. The interaction with the serpent and the tree of 
knowledge in the Garden Narrative encapsulates the ambiguity and ambivalence of 
humankind’s response-ability to the creation, to one another, and to God. The perilous 
path toward maturity is a exodus from the relative security of the garden, from the 
nakedness of innocence (Gen. 2:25) to the nakedness (‘ārum) that comes with the wisdom 
(‘ârum) needed to face humankind’s vulnerabilities to temptation, coercion, conflict, 
frustration, pain, and death. Bearing the image of God in the world east of Eden means 
that in the midst of hardship, human beings are still called to discern and act in concert 
with the intentions of a creator who shares power and does not create through violence.  
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The fourth and final thesis makes explicit the presupposition underlying the three 
theses above that emerging in the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil 
entails bearing a condition of freedom uniquely open to the possibilities of encountering 
and causing all kinds of good and bad. This condition compels us to justify our actions 
and the narratives, concepts, values, and norms we employ to contextualize them. An 
evolutionary view of the emergence of human-being implies that God’s creative 
interaction with the world is ongoing. Creatio ex nihilo is also creatio continua. Ideally, 
this state of affairs means that there are new realizations of the creation’s very good-ness 
yet to emerge and that Homo sapiens will take an active and humanizing role in 
continuing to co-create a very good world. Bearing the image of a God who does not 
create through violence means amplifying and echoing Yahweh Elohim’s invitation to 
“Let there be...” It means sharing power and striving to safeguard and/or enhance the 
creative potential of all people and their cultural and ecological surroundings. To emerge 
in the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil is to be born into a biocultural 
milieu through which Homo sapiens are response-able to re-present—though we often 
mis-re-present—the creator’s beneficent intentions for the creation.   
 The next chapter explores some of the ethical implications of this second naïveté 
understanding of Christian anthropology. Other theological ethicists and anthropologists 
have already constructed similar and harmonious construals of the ambivalent epicenter 
of humankind’s moral and religious awareness. By blending what I have identified as 
these scholars’ three “(meta-) ethical camps” with one another and the re-presentation of 
the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil already discussed, I aim to 
227 
complete the constructive portion of this study by proposing an anthropologically-based 
framework for conducting ethical discourse from a Christian theological perspective.  
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CHAPTER 6 
ETHICS: IMAGING GOD WITH A KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL 
 
 
The second naïveté understanding of Christian anthropology I have proposed lends itself 
to the construction of a fundamental ethical framework that is at once universally human 
and particularly Christian in its origins and aims. An ethic of the image of God is a 
human ethic, if being human(e) means bearing the image of God. And, an ethic of the 
image of God is a Christian ethic, if Jesus of Nazareth is understood to be the revelatory, 
exemplary, and eschatological image of God. I have argued that biblical and biocultural 
depictions of human uniqueness can be mutually informative and that the integration of 
biblical and scientifically informed conceptions of the human condition support the 
following theological inferences: (1) the concepts of the image of God and the knowledge 
of good and evil have emerged and must reemerge as products of the cognitive fluidity to 
which they refer; (2) imaging God and knowing good and evil are natural, dynamic 
functions of human-being, wrought of the creation—the world of nature—and embedded 
within it; (3) bearing the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil means 
emerging with a response-ability—a vocation—to see and serve the primordial goodness 
of the creation; and (4) responding to this call is an outworking of humankind’s morally 
ambivalent condition of freedom and creativity. Looking back at “the beginning” through 
“nature, red in tooth and claw” brings focus to the shadow side of God’s “Let there be…” 
in Genesis 1-3. In the only world Homo sapiens have ever known, bearing the image of 
God with a knowledge of good and evil is an ongoing struggle through hardship and 
temptation to re-present the beneficent intentions of a God who shares power and does 
not create through violence.  
229 
 This anthropological framework gives ethical discourse a general demeanor, a 
direction, and the principles that human beings ought to preserve and augment the 
creative potential of the natural world and one another in ways that generate positive 
moral outcomes for all people, all living species, and their earthly home. The present 
chapter builds upon this framework with the help of several contemporary theological 
ethicists, anthropologists, and other scholars who also seek to locate universal 
motivations and conditions of possibility for morality, which in turn inform the normative 
content of ethics. 
I place these ethical thinkers into three camps. The first camp discovers the 
impetus and conditions of possibility for morality in the negative experience of suffering, 
which helps to indicate, by way of contrast, the positive experience of wellbeing or 
salvation. Relying on the insights of theological ethicists Patricia McAuliffe and Edward 
Schillebeeckx, I call this first camp the “negative contrast experience” (NCE) camp. The 
second camp discerns the impetus and conditions of possibility for morality in a general 
and pervasive sense of wonder about the world, a spontaneous “experience of the value 
of persons and their environment.”441 Using moral theologian Daniel Maguire’s 
terminology, I call this second camp the “foundational moral experience” (FME) camp. 
The third camp locates the motives and possibilities for morality in the human ability and 
desire to imitate others. In light of works by and indebted to Catholic structural 
anthropologist René Girard, I call this third camp the “mimetic desire” (MD) camp. Each 
of these camps’ meta-ethical concepts—NCE, FME, and MD—can be described as 
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integral and interrelated aspects of what I have defined as the knowledge of good and 
evil, and by extension, the image of God.  
Working to shape and support to this conceptual framework, I propose that these 
three camps provide a contemporary anthropological foundation for Christian ethics, as 
they relate to one another in the following four ways:  
1) All three camps share the conviction that the human “is” informs the human 
“ought.” Anthropology is foundational to the construction of ethical norms and 
the procedural frameworks through which they arise and evolve, because human 
being, agency, and experience in general entail all the essential motivators and 
conditions of possibility for being morally free and responsible in particular and 
often predictable ways.  
 
2) Proponents of all three camps argue that their fundamental ethical concept is 
constitutive of human-being and agency in a more or less self-evident way. At the 
same time, they argue that while the human capacity and propensity for the 
conscientious pursuit of both good and evil defy direct empirical observation and 
explanation, current scientific and philosophical understandings are able to help 
ethicists elucidate the pre-rational psychosomatic infrastructure making possible 
the emergence, description, evaluation, sensitization, and orientation of the NCE, 
FME, and MD. In other words, these concepts provide powerful explanations of 
how and why Homo sapiens became a moral animal—the biocultural is informing 
the ethical ought.  
 
3) While the fundamental insights of these three camps are materially different, their 
(meta-) ethical contributions are mutually inclusive, complementing one another 
and supplementing this study’s contemporized understanding of what it means to 
bear the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil. 
 
4) Scholars in the three camps discover their fundamental ethical concepts outside 
explicitly theological discourse. Yet they all argue, in a manner resembling a 
Ricoeurian wager, that the ethical affinities of the FME, NCE, and MD find firm 
footing, humanizing content, and ultimate fulfillment in religious visions of 
salvation, particularly those of Christianity.  
 
With subsections framed by these four theses, what follows is an analysis of these 
three (meta-)ethical “camps” and their integration with one another and the concepts of 
the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil.  
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Negative contrast experience (NCE), knowing good and evil, and imaging God 
 
 
Patricia McAuliffe begins her monograph entitled Fundamental Ethics: A 
Liberationist Approach by asserting that “[o]ur fundamental human experience is one of 
suffering and struggling against suffering for salvation.”442 Human beings are able to 
wage this struggle in terms of “suffering” and “salvation,” she theorizes, because of what 
theological ethicist Edward Schillebeeckx calls the “negative contrast experience.”443 For 
McAuliffe the NCE is “foundational” for ethics because the “situation of suffering in the 
world makes ethics necessary and the contrast experience which propels us to act against 
suffering makes ethics possible.”444 Thus, the “first imperative or first principle for 
ethics” is “to resist suffering.”445  
Because of what it is and what it requires, the NCE blends well with the concepts 
of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil. All of these concepts and the 
human condition to which they point emerge out of a values-laden, concrete, and 
universal experience of the ambiguity besetting creaturely existence. They all underscore 
the moral ambivalence of human agency. They all share a defiant trust in the primordial 
goodness of existence, or what McAuliffe calls the “ontological priority of positivity.”446 
And, they all require creativity, or “innovativeness” in resisting suffering and envisioning 
and promoting various forms of wellbeing or salvation.
447
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I have argued that, viewed from the bottom-up, values and norms are bioculturally 
borne expressions of the fact that increases in (teleo)dynamic complexity raise the stakes 
of their own dis-integration. With varying intensity and quality, every living thing 
“wants” to flourish. I have also argued that, viewed from the top-down, humankind’s 
creative moral wherewithal ought to take its cues from the conviction that we bear the 
image of a creator who “sees” “good” in the worlds of nature and culture, shares power, 
and does not create through violence. Similarly, McAuliffe’s bottom-up argument is that 
the NCE of “those who experience the contrast most acutely” affords them an 
“epistemological privilege […] regarding what is wrong and what would count as getting 
it right.”448 From the top-down, she looks to the ethical and eschatological NCE of Jesus 
of Nazareth and his disciples for trans-historical horizons fit to orient the NCE and guide 
human responses to negativity toward ever more humanizing ends. 
NCE as impetus and condition of possibility for ethics 
 
 
At base, the NCE is an instance of the pain and pleasure principle—the instinct to 
avoid pain and seek pleasure (in that order). In an emergentist view of human 
phenomenology, the rudiments of the NCE arose with the first teleodynamic entities. 
Recall that according to neuroscientist and emergentist Terrence W. Deacon 
teleodynamics entail normativity, because when components and processes gain 
significance in terms of the whole they constitute, they can either succeed or fail to 
achieve their ententional functions vis-à-vis the integrity of the whole. Evolutionary 
development is catalyzed by this contrast between systemic integrity and dis-integration. 
Selection pressures force organisms to adapt over generations—to get better at 
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minimizing negativity and maximizing positivity. Ironically, sensation and sentience 
emerged, in no small part, because the creature capable of suffering pain and terror stands 
a better chance at stopping harm at any given moment and avoiding it in the future. 
Therefore, the experience of negativity is good relative to the positivity it presupposes as 
remedy. McAuliffe acknowledges this analogy between human and nonhuman struggles 
against negativity, if not the organic continuity between them, as a dialectical tension 
entailed by evolution. She submits that 
the unitary experience of suffering and striving against suffering not only 
captures the rhythm of human history, but also, analogically speaking, 
captures the rhythm of the cosmos itself. Not only are we called to negate 
negation in our science as well as our ethics, but everything in the cosmos 
tends to respond in an analogous way. In nature, we can think of this as 
the necessity to adapt and seek new equilibrium.
449
  
 
McAuliffe also notes human experience is uniquely dialectical, consisting of 
“both subjective and objective dimensions.”450 Perceptions are always interpreted in light 
of past experience, as they are mediated through linguistic concepts formed in a 
community of persons.
451
 As a species of the pain and pleasure principle, the NCE 
becomes uniquely human when it is self-conscious, future-oriented, and open to the 
possibility of creative, free, and responsible reaction. For human beings “negativity […] 
is productive; it reveals the way things are by revealing the way they are not. And it 
reveals the way things ought to be by revealing how they ought not to be.”452 The 
experience of negativity is always values-laden. The situation of suffering is the 
motivation for being moral (i.e., that which “makes ethics necessary”). The agential 
avenues open to human persons through their condition of freedom are the conditions of 
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possibility for acting conscientiously (i.e., that which “makes ethics possible”). In short, 
with regard to their knowing good and evil, the NCE can be construed as humankind’s 
wide open eyes. Focusing our gaze, reflecting critically, and acting on what we see are 
the tasks of ethics.   
NCE as self-evidently constitutive of human-being  
 
 
To say that the NCE gives us ethical eyes predisposing us to see and resist 
suffering is both a metaphor and an inference based in intuition. While McAuliffe agrees 
with Schillebeeckx that the NCE is the concretely and universally human epicenter of 
ethics, she admits: 
To say that the negative contrast experience captures the starting point and 
core and first imperative of ethics is, in part, to appeal to intuition. But 
intuition is based on experience. It involves an appeal to self-evidency but 
a self-evidency which […] makes the best sense of our experience of 
history whose movement can be defined in terms of suffering and seeking 
salvation.
453
  
 
As both self-evident and fundamentally human, the NCE is what McAuliffe calls an 
“anthropological constant.”454 This constitutive aspect of human existence and agency 
implies that, despite the presence of tendencies to the contrary, human persons tend to be 
ethical—resisting suffering and seeking wellbeing, often before conscious ethical 
deliberation.
455
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Listing Schillebeeckx’s anthropological constants, McAuliffe begins with four 
phenomenological givens of human existence: “our relationship to our body and nature, 
to other humans, to social structures and institutions, and to our spatio-temporal 
context.”456 The final three anthropological constants, which have specifically to do with 
the “contrast” aspect of the NCE, are that these first four “involve the interplay between 
theory and practice, a commitment to the basic goodness of life, and finally, the synthesis 
of all these.”457  
However, some individuals are unable to live out of these anthropological 
constants in a conscientious way, requiring assistance, accommodation, or perhaps even 
institutionalization in order that they and those around them can enjoy as positive an 
existence as possible. Some human beings experience psychosomatic impairments, which 
limit their ability to identify, combat, and/or cope with negativity without the ongoing 
advocacy and aid of others.  Many more people struggle under cultural or socio-economic 
conditions which make it difficult or impossible to combat or perhaps even name the 
dehumanizing sociological and psychological dynamics in which they find themselves. 
For McAuliffe, because the NCE emerges through the socially interdependent context in 
which it functions, the experience of negativity ought to evoke sensitivity to the suffering 
of others and social solidarity in combating negativity with deliberation, diligence, and 
creativity.
458
  
 Viewed in this light, the universality of the NCE has to do not only with the 
“fundamental” part of McAuliffe’s ethics, but also her “liberationist approach.” If the 
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NCE provides the motivation and possibility for the universal norm to alleviate suffering, 
it stands to reason that those who live “out of the negative contrast most acutely, [i.e.,] 
the poor, the oppressed, and those in solidarity with them,” ought to possess an 
epistemological privilege in ethical discourse and a primary place in moral 
consideration.
459
  
Relating this principle to the concepts of the image of God and the knowledge of 
good and evil, mere subsistence is not conducive to evoking or sustaining the full creative 
potential of persons and their environments. People preoccupied with simply surviving or 
barred systemically from enriching forms of education, interaction, and amusement are 
limited in their capability and opportunity to hear and respond to their creator’s invitation 
to participate in co-creating the future. Impoverishment is an affront to the image of God 
and the God whose image we bear, because, as McAuliffe words it, “The destitute are 
furthest removed from full humanity.”460 Injustices of this kind are tantamount to creation 
through violence. Therefore, if Homo sapiens bear the image of a God who invites 
participation and does not create through violence, the image of God is a liberating 
image, and an ethic of the image is a liberating ethic. This is certainly the contention of 
biblical scholar J. Richard Middleton, whose anti-violent interpretation of the image of 
God supports the “ethic of interhuman relationships and ecological practice we are 
aiming for and that is rooted in the imago Dei, an ethic characterized fundamentally by 
power with rather than power over.”461   
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NCE as pointing to its positive counterpart  
 
 
Although negativity “reveals the way things ought to be by revealing how they 
ought not to be,” the conceptual content of positivity or salvation is not self-evident.462  
At the same time, those who experience negativity most deeply, have a keen, if intuitive, 
sense of what is most valuable.
463
 This sensitivity to what is valuable can spark insight 
into what is most normative. Creating an accurate portrait of both negativity and 
positivity requires critical reflection on the history of human experience and practice—a 
“hermeneutical circle” of combating suffering, reflecting upon those efforts, 
reconfiguring one’s approach, and combating suffering again.464  
Yet, in this constant struggle against suffering, the negation of negativity cannot 
be the ultimate aim of ethics. The remaining void must be filled with something positive 
and concrete, because the NCE as a contrast experience presupposes an actual opposite to 
the experience of negativity. As McAuliffe puts it, while there is a self-evident 
“epistemological priority” of negativity, this experience “presupposes the ontological 
priority of positivity.”465 Giving concrete content to this positivity or salvation requires 
“innovativeness” and carries a natural affinity for religious visions of salvation, since 
eschatological visions of positivity negate all negativity.
466
 
With its insistence that the creation is “good” and “very good,” Genesis 1 reflects 
a similar faith in what McAuliffe calls the ontological priority of positivity. This biblical 
passage also intimates the capability and necessity for human beings to be creative or 
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innovative in facing the challenges associated with “filling” and “subduing” the earth. 
Beginning with the Garden Narrative, the remainder of the primeval history dramatizes 
some of the kinds of struggles human creatures can expect to face and/or cause—
dangerous animals, arduous labor, physical pain, abuses of power, jealousy, violence, 
despair, confusion, and death. The biblical writers seem keen to preserve the primordial 
goodness of creator and creation, by implying that Yahweh Elohim is not the immediate 
source of these negative realities. As explicated in chapter 5, these hardships emerge 
from the shadow side of God’s “Let there be…,” from the open-endedness of the 
creation’s ability to sustain itself and the ambivalence of human freedom. Yet if the 
creator is not the immediate source of negativity, it would also seem that God is not the 
immediate object of human efforts to (co-)create positivity.  
Like McAuliffe’s bottom-up approach to theological ethics, this reading of 
Genesis “in some fundamental ways, turns classical ethics upside down.”467 When 
viewed from the bottom-up, the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are 
bioculturally emergent. They are wrought of the creation and embedded within it for the 
benefit of the creation, not the creator. As a consequence, re-presenting the beneficent 
intentions of a god who does not create through violence is a service rendered directly to 
the creation and ultimately (though indirectly) to the creator. Theological ethics add this 
top-down element of ultimacy to concepts like suffering, struggle, sin, and salvation, 
which emerge out of the NCE from the bottom-up. 
Though not directly in dialogue with McAuliffe, theologian Marjorie Suchocki 
gives a similar, and perhaps more systematic, set of reasons for why and how the 
traditional definition for the theological category of negativity known as “sin” must be 
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turned upside down. Suchocki redefines sin in terms of violence and in contradistinction 
to Augustinian-Niebuhrian definitions. The more traditional conception characterizes sin 
as first and foremost a rebellion against God. By contrast, Suchocki contends that 
“violence is the destruction of well-being”468; “sin is the participation through intent or 
act in unnecessary violence that contributes to the ill-being of any aspect of earth or its 
inhabitants.”469 These definitions of sin in terms of violence and violence in terms of 
human and ecological ill-being blend well with this study’s second naïveté interpretation 
of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil, especially in its reliance on 
Middleton’s anti-violent functional-royal reading of the imago Dei in Genesis.    
By redefining sin in terms of the ill-being of creation and by eschewing the 
traditional definition of sin as rebellion against God or the divine will, Suchocki seems to 
propose an a-theistic definition of “sin.” Her justification for this redefinition correlates 
to the insight that the reasons for being moral are not immediately theological, because 
God is not the primary object of actions that lead to well- or ill-being. She lists four 
reasons why sin is first rebellion against creation and only derivatively against God. 
First, one can account for the emergence of humanity’s “vertical” orientation to 
the infinite from within creation.
470
 Theologians in dialogue with current, non-reductive 
conceptions of evolutionary science endeavor to make plausible the idea that the ultimate 
condition of possibility for Homo sapiens’ ability to conceive of and communicate with 
the divine is the actuality of a creator God. At the same time, they must admit, as does 
interdisciplinary theologian J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, that human self-transcendence in 
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the form of religious or theological consciousness is explicable on a natural-historical 
level.
471
 
Second, self-transcendence is also social in nature.
472
 This “horizontal” self-
transcendence includes three aspects: (1) Past—the emergence of the self through 
memory; (2) Present—the empathic recognition of others as other selves; and (3) 
Future—the creative imagining of what is ethically possible.473 
Third, for Suchocki, the human person is accountable within creation.
474
 
Similarly, according to McAuliffe, any concrete vision of the ontologically prior 
positivity calling humanity to moral action must integrate an awareness that human 
persons are intrinsically embodied and socially interdependent creatures. In most cases, 
what is best for the individual in the long-term is that which is best for others and their 
environment. Therefore, any viable vision of salvation to which we might hold one 
another accountable must emerge out of an anthropology of social solidarity designed to 
articulate and promote the wellbeing of all Homo sapiens and their earthly home.
475
  
Fourth, therefore, violation of this accountability is first a violation against 
creation.
476
 However, to say that sin is first a violation against creation is not to say that it 
is only against creation. Self-consciousness, empathy, and future orientation are 
conditions of possibility for both ethics and religion. In non-pantheistic religion, where 
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deity is immanent to but ontologically distinct from the creation, (incarnation not 
withstanding) God can only be a mediate or derivative object of moral action.
477
  
Therefore, even as an anthropological concept, “sin” is already a theological 
category in Suchocki’s case, because her argument constitutes a hermeneutical circle. For 
Suchocki, an anthropologically-based fundamental ethics presupposes a radical 
distinction between creator and creation, which in turn allows religion and theology to 
exert a transformative influence on such an ethic. The emergence in natural history of 
human moral and religious consciousness allows human beings to recognize what they 
perceive to be the divine revelation of qualitatively unique visions of wellbeing which 
exceed the immanent capacities of biology and culture. Suchocki, McAuliffe, and I share 
a belief that because ethical responsibility emerges within a context that “exceeds the 
practical ability of any one person, or any one human system” to remedy, moral 
awareness has a natural affinity for religious visions of salvation.
478
  
I propose that a bottom-up, emergentist understanding of the image of God and 
the knowledge of good and evil is a fruitful framework for re-theologizing and re-
mythologizing the concepts of sin and salvation. As I have constructed it, a biocultural 
conception of Christian anthropology satisfies and extends Suchocki’s theses that the 
“vertical” and “horizontal” aspects of human-being emerge through natural process, that 
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the conscientious response-ability or condition of freedom enabled by humankind’s self-
transcendence make us accountable within the creation, and that sinful acts are therefore 
a violation of the creation and the vocation of human beings to bear the image of a 
creator who invites participation, shares power, and does not wield it violently.  
“Religion has an ethical foundation, but ethics cries out for religion”—Patricia McAuliffe  
 
 
McAuliffe admits, along with Schillebeeckx, that the non-theist is able to give a 
valid, concrete vision of the positive sphere of moral action, with the caveat that human 
efforts can never overcome negativity completely.
479
 Homo sapiens will always lack the 
capacity to eradicate the inevitability of experiencing and causing harm. Only a religious 
vision can give an account of ultimate or eschatological salvation, which preserves 
humanity’s moral accomplishments and compensates for its missteps.480 For example, 
McAuliffe lists the contrast between Jesus’ Abba experience and his rejection and 
crucifixion, the NCE of disciples from Good Friday to Easter, and the NCE of the 
already-but-not-yet character of the Kingdom of God as offering concrete content to a 
Christian vision of negativity and salvation.
481
 While all these instances of the NCE are 
recorded in the New Testament canon, the background concepts that give content to 
Christian visions of salvation in the first century are vastly different from those of the 21
st
 
century, as are the historical-cultural contexts in which these concepts emerge and 
influence action. With all due respect for (and appeal to) the organic continuity of the 
first Christian communities and the churches of today, the hermeneutical pursuit of living 
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out of these Biblical symbols in the present and future requires as much discernment, 
imagination, creativity, and faithfulness now as it did then.
482
  
Because McAuliffe describes the NCE as an anthropological constant able to 
account for the human ability and tendency to make and abide by valid moral distinction 
and sanctions prior to any religious considerations, she characterizes the relationship of 
religion or theology to ethics as one of “nonreciprocal dependence.”483  Religion needs 
ethics, but ethics does not need religion, even if ethics does tend toward a religious view 
of ultimate salvation.  
As conditioned but creative, free, and responsible agents, human persons are able 
to judge which religions and which aspects of those religions best fit their NCE by the 
ways in which each tradition describes and promotes the fullest possible flourishing of 
persons and their world. Orthodoxy unable to fulfill this task fails the moral outcome 
criterion for truthfulness—a hermeneutical principle McAuliffe gleans from the Jesus of 
the Gospels in his insistence that “the Sabbath was made for humans, not humans for the 
Sabbath.”484 Jesus’ revelatory mission and identity are not self-evident. They become 
apparent to those able to latch onto his theological ethic beholden to human flourishing, 
in contrast to a vision of human flourishing beholden to a pre-established and inflexible 
theological ethic.
485
 According to McAuliffe, as a human revelation of the divine, Jesus’ 
unwitting response to Plato’s famous Euthyphro dilemma is that the viability of 
religiously-based norms is a function of their ability to produce good. Orthopraxy (right 
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practice) is a criterion for orthodoxy (right belief). The hermeneutical circle out of which 
theological ethics emerge demands creative and critical reflection on belief and practice.  
Given the spirit of shared responsibility surrounding the biblically-based concepts 
of bearing the image of God and Christ in and to the creation, McAuliffe argues 
reasonably that humankind’s biocultural and eschatological futures are affected by 
human efforts to plumb the depths of our creative capacities in pursuit of humanizing 
moral visions. In language echoing that of theologian Philip Hefner’s theological theory 
of the created co-creator, she concludes, “Humans are seen as utterly valuable because of 
the kind of being they are, because of the kinds of things they can and sometimes do. 
Humans are also seen as valuable because they are co-creators with God of a better 
world, and because they help to shape the eschaton.” 486 This belief is distilled in the 
familiar supplication, “God’s will be done, on earth as in heaven.” 
Foundational moral experience (FME), knowing good and evil, and imaging God  
 
 
 “God saw all that [God] had made, and behold, it was very good” (Gen. 1:31a). 
“Then the Lord God said, ‘Behold, the [hu]man has become like one of Us, knowing 
good and evil’” (Gen. 3:22a). As a prelude to the Garden Narrative, the repeated message 
to those charged with the challenge to “fill,” “subdue,” and “rule over” the creation is that 
the world is “good,” that it takes bright light to cast dark shadows. The shadows are 
where the light is not, where it has been obscured or blocked from view. Evolutionarily 
speaking, the emergence of vision presupposes the presence of light. Having eyes open 
wide to a cognitively fluid knowledge of “bad” presupposes sensitization to the “good.” 
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The FME is the background experience of “knowing good” implicit in every instance of 
“knowing evil.”    
FME as impetus and condition of possibility for ethics 
 
 
As Daniel Maguire defines the FME: 
The foundational moral experience is the experience of the value of 
persons and their earthly home in this universe. This profound value-
experience is the distinctively human and humanizing experience that 
marks us as human. It is the primordial “Wow!” from which all moral 
theory and all healthy law, politics, and religion derive. This experience is 
the seed of civilization, the root of culture, and the badge of unique human 
consciousness.
487
  
 
Ethics is nothing other than the critical application of the FME to concrete reality. The 
reason for being moral is that human beings have a spontaneous sense of the intrinsic and 
inestimable value of life, the world upon which it depends, and through which it has 
come into being.  
Christian ethicist James Gustafson and expert on religion and ecology Mary 
Evelyn Tucker also appeal to something like Maguire’s FME when evoking 
anthropologist Melvin Konner’s concept of the human “sense of wonder.”488 For the 
purposes of this study, I equate the concepts of the FME and sense of wonder. Imagining 
the dawn of human wonder, Konner surmises that for one animal, 
perhaps ten million years ago, in the earliest infancy of the human spirit, 
something in the natural world must have evoked a response like this 
one—a waterfall, mountain vista, a sunset, the crater of a volcano, the 
edge of the sea—something that stopped it in its tracks and made it watch, 
and move, and watch, and move, and watch again; something that made it 
return to the spot, though nothing gainful could take place there, no 
feeding, drinking, reproducing, sleeping, fighting, fleeing, nothing animal. 
                                                 
487
 Daniel Maguire, Ethics, 31; cf. Maguire and Fargnoli, On Moral Grounds, 9. 
488
 James Gustafson, Intersections: Science, Theology, and Ethics (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1996), 19, 27, 
29; Mary Evelyn Tucker, Worldly Wonder: Religions Enter Their Ecological Phase (Chicago: Open Court, 
2003), 52-54. 
246 
In just such a response, in just such a moment, in just such an animal, we 
may, I think, be permitted to guess, occurred the dawn of awe, of sacred 
attentiveness, of wonder.
489
  
 
Seeming to echo Maguire’s definition of the FME, Gustafson quotes Konner in 
describing the sense of wonder as the “hallmark of our species” and the “central feature 
of the human spirit.”490 As uniquely human, this sense of wonder constitutes the reason 
for being morally responsible and indicates the capacity to act upon this response-ability. 
At the same time, Maguire and Gustafson hold that the FME/sense of wonder is nascent 
in two senses of the word—it is both inborn and requires nurturing, development, and 
maturation. Human beings must work to enhance the FME if it is to be not only human 
but humanizing, as well.
491
   
Konner anticipates these ethicists’ concerns, wondering in the face of what he has 
called “biological constraints on the human spirit”—rage, fear, lust, gluttony—whether 
human beings can maintain and augment a sense of wonder through the positive 
indicators of our common humanity—joy, love, and yes, even grief.492 Each of these 
biologically-borne constraints on the human spirit evolved as adaptive responses to 
specific selection pressures in Homo sapiens’ environment of evolutionary adaptedness 
(EEA). However, as evolutionary biologist Francisco Ayala, cognitive linguists Gilles 
Fauconnier and Mark Turner, and theologians like Hefner and van Huyssteen have all 
theorized, Homo sapiens reached a symbolic threshold, a degree of blending capacity or 
cognitive fluidity from which precipitated cultural singularities like ethics and religion, 
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which have afforded the human spirit a condition of freedom—a supervening influence 
on its less desirable proclivities. In hope against hope, Konner 
would paraphrase it this way: Human beings are irrevocably, biologically 
endowed with strong inclinations to feel and act in a manner that their own 
good judgment tells them to reprehend—that is, if they are in the least 
capable of sympathy with the suffering of other human creatures, or if 
they have any sense of the joy and order and beauty of life. The judgment, 
the sympathy, the sense of joy and order and beauty—all these evolved for 
other purposes than to save the human species from a protracted, dissolute 
destruction. Yet there they are. Can we not turn them now to this latter 
purpose?
493
 
 
And just as importantly, how might we do so? I strongly suggest that a second 
naïveté reappropriation of the imago Dei concept may offer a fruitful framework 
for serving “this latter purpose,” because an ethic of the image emerges out of the 
conviction that human creatures have been (co-)created and called to display a 
sacred attentiveness—a sense of wonder—reflecting that of the creator. A 
contemporized ethic of the image yields the principle that human beings bear a 
response-ability to “see” and “serve” the very-good-ness of the world which has 
evolved to include and environ human creativity.  
FME as self-evidently constitutive of human-being  
 
 
Mirroring McAuliffe’s description the NCE, Maguire and Gustafson concede that 
the FME or sense of wonder is not empirically demonstrable or provable, but that it can 
be “illustrated.”494 Maguire holds that “the supreme sacrifice” of dying for the sake of 
another’s wellbeing often garners widespread approval and admiration. The evolutionary 
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paradox of such altruism may offer a radical illustration of the FME and its pride of place 
in fundamental ethics.
495
  
Similarly, Gustafson acknowledges that the human sense of wonder cannot be 
observed or proven directly through empirical methods. Yet he maintains that its 
universality can be established “heuristically” through the anecdotal “data” of narrated 
human “experience.”496 On the one hand, Gustafson admits that the sense of wonder is 
“something of human experience which, [he thinks, Konner] has not fully backed by the 
same kind of data he uses in his examination of rage, lust, love, etc.”497 On the other 
hand, Gustafson provides two criteria of truthfulness which seem to make a strong case 
for Konner’s concept: (1) explanatory power and (2) moral outcome.498 A hermeneutic of 
wonder is able to shed light on the course of human history and prehistory and may also 
help to adjudicate what counts as a positive moral outcome. 
As in McAuliffe’s “liberationist approach,” Gustafson and Maguire’s approaches 
to ethical discourse constitute a hermeneutical circle. Wonderment begets and/or 
discloses value for its object; value drives action; and action begs for contextualization—
i.e., critical reflection on historical praxis. Ideally, this hermeneutical exercise sensitizes 
and orientates the FME in ways that guide ethical discourse toward greater explanatory 
power and positive moral outcomes, especially in the eyes of those with reasonable 
claims of epistemological privilege. In other words, in terms of consistency, coherence, 
and comprehensiveness, the outcome sought from this hermeneutical circle is moral truth, 
ripe for translation into norms to which we might hold one another accountable. 
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FME as pointing to its negative counterpart  
 
 
When piqued, the FME intimates what kinds of experiences, actions, and 
consequences are most humanizing. However, the FME needs to be developed and 
enhanced because the human sense of wonder is so often scandalized, and it is conditioned 
by biological constraints and historical-cultural situatedness. Turns of events and human 
actions do not always promote the wellbeing or wholesomeness of persons and their 
environment. And yet, human beings are not automatically aware of or sensitive to what is 
valuable or the most humanizing means of seeking wellbeing. In theological terms, there 
are no such things as a life that does not bring some “bad” along with the “good” or an im-
peccable knowledge of good and evil. This ambivalence necessitates ethics. 
Given this state of affairs, I find good reason to equate the scandalization of the 
FME with the NCE. Relating these two concepts in this way shows their 
complementarity. McAuliffe has described well this complementarity in terms of the 
epistemological priority of negativity as a contrast experience vis-à-vis the ontological 
priority of positivity.  
The complementarity of the FME and NCE is also apparent in an number of 
literary contexts. Illustrating the importance of heuristic data for establishing the 
truthfulness of the sense of wonder, Gustafson mentions that that Konner, aside from his 
scientific skills, is adept at synthesizing this body of knowledge with literary analysis.
499
 
Womanist ethicist Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas also incorporates literary analysis into her 
systematic discussion of methods in womanist ethics.
500
 What literary analysis provides 
                                                 
499
 Ibid., 17, 24.  
500
 Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas, Mining the Motherlode: Methods is Womanist Ethics (Cleveland, Pilgrim 
Press, 2006), 15-64; cf. 113-153. 
250 
for these scholars is character development—both in the sense of the fictional character 
mediated through narrative and the moral character of the reader. The exploits of literary 
heroines and heroes display and elicit an affinity for admirable values and personal 
qualities. However, this sympathetic piquing of the FME is always accomplished against 
the backdrop of adversity—the NCE. According to Floyd-Thomas, in womanist ethics and 
the Black women’s literary tradition, negativity most often arises as a collusion of race, 
gender, and class discrimination.  Because the authors of these narratives have firsthand 
experience of these dehumanizing forms of negativity, they have a reasonable claim of 
epistemological privilege for identifying them and constructing strategies of resistance.  
These heuristic examples demonstrate that it is not only the FME, but also the 
scandalization of it (i.e., the NCE), that make ethics possible and necessary. As Gustafson 
observes, there are moral dimensions of nearly all human experience.
501
 Human beings 
are involved, willy-nilly, in a values-laden matrix of social and ecological interaction and 
interdependence. When experience does not coincide with values, the cognitive 
dissonance calls for a response. Analyzing and evaluating this response, whether before 
or after the fact, is ethics. 
This description of the human condition begs the question of precisely how 
theological concepts frame the moral matrix of human experience and action. What do the 
concepts of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil add to ethics that cannot 
be gotten by other means? In Gustafson’s terms, exactly how “can ethics be Christian?”502  
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FME at the “intersections” of science, theology, and ethics  
 
 
Maguire constructs a procedural model for engaging in ethical discourse. His 
“wheel model” centers on the four interpretive and evaluative “hub” questions of (1) 
“What?”; (2) “Why?-How?-Who?-When?-Where?”; (3) “Foreseeable effects?”; and (4) 
“Viable alternatives?”503 Informing responses to these questions are the “spokes” of 
“affectivity,” “creative imagination,” moral “principles,” sources cited for their 
“authority,” “reason” and “analysis”, “individual experience,” “group experience,” 
“comedy,” and “tragedy.” These sources all inform the moral choices and characters of 
individuals and communities.  
For Maguire the “spokes” informing one’s responses to the “hub” questions of the 
wheel model may be religious or not. The FME, as an intuitive experience of what is 
valuable or sacred, “is also the foundational religious experience,” but it need not be 
developed in a theistic way in order to generate valid moral insights.
504
  Similarly, 
Gustafson acknowledges that natural piety does not always entail or lead to religious 
piety.
505
 Yet, like McAuliffe, Maguire and Gustafson both find advantages (as well as 
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some potential pitfalls) in looking to religion for a trans-historical vision of the 
fulfillment of the FME and its dynamism, because only a theological vision of salvation 
can offer eschatological faith and hope for the final negation of all negativity and the 
fulfillment of all flourishing. Gustafson lists some of the specific images and symbols 
biblical Christian faith offers as reasons for being moral.
506
 These motivators include the 
experience of God as creator, redeemer, revealer, merciful lover, shepherd, master, 
exemplar to be imitated, eternal, father, and ground of hope.
507
 Translating these religious 
symbols into moral motivators, Gustafson observes that piety toward this God can garner 
“a sense of dependence,” “a sense of gratitude,” “a sense of repentance,” “a sense of 
obligation,” “a sense of possibilities,” and “a sense of direction.”508  
The myth-symbols of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are 
able to prompt all of these (and/or other) theocentric expressions of a sense of 
wonder/FME. In this vein, and without yet paying due attention to a Christological-
eschatological account of the image of God, I have already suggested that bearing the 
image of God with a knowledge of good and evil confers a sense of vocation to co-create 
cooperatively a biocultural and ecological future reflecting the beneficent intentions of a 
creator God who shares power with created entities and does create through violence. 
Fulfilling this call requires (pre)serving and extending the creative potential human 
beings and the natural world, that in doing so we might amplify and echo the creator’s 
“Let there be…” and “Let us make…,” in order that we and future generations might look 
on the human and nonhuman world and utter, “Behold, it is very good.” Working out the 
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specifics of this job description in a particularly Christian manner takes critical reflection 
on human experience, action, and understanding.  
In orthodox varieties of Christian discourse, this hermeneutical practice must 
involve critical reflection on the human experiences and actions of God through Jesus 
Christ, as depicted in the New Testament and the church’s theological tradition. Looking 
to the human revelation of God for insight into what is humanizing helps give shape to a 
human ethic with an eschatological horizon of wellbeing or salvation. This is not to say 
that a Christian-human ethic and an a-theistic-humanist ethic will not ultimately be 
commensurable on the bases of explanatory power and moral outcome. Indeed, they 
ought to be.
509
 It is to say, however, that an eschatological view of history, such as in 
Christianity, enables the emergence of an ethic that is qualitatively unique in its 
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convincingly through this comparison of Niebuhr and Konner that the findings of many disciplines and 
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explanatory power and positive moral outcomes. 
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accountability to a co-created, trans-historical future in which all negativity really does 
become negated.      
At the same time, when attempting to understand what kind of creatures human 
beings are and ought to be, religious scholars and people of faith often need outside help. 
On their own, natural scientists can no more propose or preclude an eschatological vision 
of salvation than theologians can analyze the influence of biology on behavior. 
Nonetheless, scientific descriptions of reality may have a revisionary bearing on certain 
doctrinal formulations, theological anthropology, and theological ethics, especially where 
contemporary science provides greater explanatory power than traditional doctrinal 
formulae and the conceptual frameworks in which they operate.
510
  
On the flipside, the natural sciences sometimes need outside help when brushing 
up against the limits of their own expertise. A classic case is that of altruistic behavior, 
especially in cases involving what Maguire has called “the ultimate sacrifice.” In 
biological terms, trans-kin altruism involves risking or reducing one’s likelihood of 
survival and/or reproduction in order to enhance these opportunities for a genetic 
competitor. And in evolutionary terms, this type of behavior is a surd for a species like 
Homo sapiens. Many evolutionary psychologists argue persuasively that there are likely 
selection pressures for cooperative and generous behaviors among non-kin. However, 
even some of the most altruistic-looking behaviors studied presuppose an expectation of 
immediate or future reciprocity, a campaign of reputation building, and/or a social system 
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of policing against freeloading and other forms of cheating.
511
 These scientists 
acknowledge that Darwinian “values” cannot fully account for human ethics, particularly 
where behaviors that may not result in any benefit for the actor come to be regarded as 
good or even exemplary.
512
 Producing constraints on human behavior not reducible to 
their genetic bases, cultural values supervene upon Darwinian dynamics. Explaining how 
Homo sapiens became culturally-constituted creatures, the natural sciences can help us 
understand how it has become possible for human beings to behave unselfishly, but not 
why it might be “good” to do so, or “evil” to behave otherwise. This knowledge of good 
and evil emerges from the cultural pole of our biocultural nature. Writing about the 
ambivalent nature of aggression, evolutionary psychologist Anne Campbell concludes: 
Cultural learning is more than acquiring new behaviors as it is in other 
primates. The human abilities to assume an intentional stance, form 
symbolic mental representations, and communicate by language allow us 
to transmit values about behaviors, modify these evaluations as a function 
of context, entertain multiple interpretations of the same event, and even 
dispute the legitimacy of these various representations.
513
  
 
Likewise, to repeat Hefner, God’s image is borne through “the character of Homo sapiens 
as free creator of meanings, one who takes actions based on those meanings and is also 
responsible for those meanings and actions.”514 Human meanings and actions transcend 
their immediate contexts when set against a theistic backdrop. Theological and 
eschatological motivations for behavior can create new horizons for the moral 
imagination and any actions emerging from it. For example, Hefner argues convincingly 
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“that altruism beyond kin is transmitted culturally, not genetically, and that religious 
traditions are the chief carriers of this value.”515 
 I have argued along with Hefner that theological accounts “of what is, of how 
things really are”—including second naïveté reappropriations of key myth-symbols—
open up novel vistas for human values that can promote humanizing behavior.
516
 
Specifically, this hermeneutical dynamic lends credibility to the love command—the 
biblical imperative to love selflessly one’s neighbor and enemy out of a love for God 
rooted in that God’s love (agape, charitas) for humankind revealed in Jesus of Nazareth. 
According to Hefner, despite any and all counter-indicators to what McAuliffe would call 
the ontological priority of positivity,  
This background conviction is powerful affirmation that our moral action 
of love for God and neighbor is our way of living in harmony with the 
way things really are. The total [myth-ritual-praxis] complex—the love of 
God for us and our love for God and for the neighbor—puts in place the 
all-encompassing symbolic universe that drives the Christian tradition. It 
establishes that the fullness of the Christian proposal functions 
unmistakably as myth is supposed to function.
517
 
  
The concept that Homo sapiens bear the image and likeness of God/Christ with a 
knowledge of good and evil is a key gravitational force in this symbolic universe, able to 
steer the trajectory of human self-understanding and the actions it motivates and justifies. 
In Maguire’s wheel model of ethical discourse, this conceptual framework provides 
content for the “spokes” informing human responses to the “hub” questions raised by the 
foundational moral experience of having our eyes open to the “good” and the “bad.” 
Through interpretation, these myth symbols retain and renew their ability to shape the 
creative imagination, analytical reason, ethical principles, human affections, individual 
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and corporate experience, loci of moral authority, and our senses of tragedy and comedy. 
Whether implied or expressed, Gustafson and Hefner’s Ricoeurian wager is that Christian 
conceptions of what really is, when applied to something like Maguire’s wheel model, 
may be especially morally fruitful in terms of their explanatory power and positive moral 
outcomes.
518
 Or, as Hefner phrases it, through interpretation, the perennial myth-symbols 
of Christianity may gain renewed ability “to provide genuine knowledge of reality, for 
the sake of our wholesome living.”519  
Because bearing the image of God has come to be understood as something 
modeled first in God’s beneficent creativity and self-giving love, the concept of mimesis 
is an important analytical tool for understanding how the desire to help create a very good 
world can take root and bear fruit.  
Mimetic desire (MD), knowing good and evil, and imaging God 
 
 
Mimesis, a Greek term meaning “imitation,” has come to bear great 
anthropological, meta-ethical, and exegetical significance. Catholic structural 
anthropologist René Girard is renowned for his analyses of the interconnections among 
mimesis, desire, conflict, violence, ritual, and religious myth. Social and natural scientists 
today have built upon this legacy, exploring the neuro-cognitive roots of mimesis and 
their vital roles in human development, behavior, learning, creativity, and even moral 
motivators like empathy. Unearthing many of the pillars of ancient Near Eastern, 
Middleton locates conflicting notions of mimesis at the heart of what it means to bear the 
image of God in both Mesopotamian and biblical ideologies. Taken together, these 
scholarly developments in various disciplines disclose how mimesis propels the NCE-
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FME as a condition of possibility for ethics, which is both emblematic of humankind’s 
ambivalent condition of freedom and able to be directed toward potentially humanizing 
ends through theological (re)appropriation. As an anthropological concept framing 
Christian understandings of why and how to be moral, the imago Dei must be understood 
as the imitatio Dei and imitatio Christi. 
MD as impetus and condition of possibility for ethics  
 
 
Mimetic desire can be described as the coin of which the NCE and FME are the 
two sides. The FME and NCE are able to account for the conditions of possibility 
required to pursue and remain accountable to culturally defined conceptions of wellbeing 
and ill-being—of good and evil. However, these concepts do little to explain why most 
people experience a profound sense of scandal at the suffering of another person or 
sentient being, why the negative experiences of non-kin and even non-humans would 
evoke empathy or sympathy or compassion, why so many are blessed and cursed with a 
nagging desire to love their neighbors as themselves. The concept of mimetic desire may 
help to explain the “I feel your pain” aspect of human-being that drives the FME-NCE in 
other-seeking directions.  
Like negativity and a sense of wonder, desire indicates the perception of value by 
revealing those individuals perceived to be model persons, whether because of their 
comforts, character, appearance, possessions, power, privileges, knowledge, abilities, or 
relationships. The human ability and drive to imitate or mimic (and attempt to become) a 
model is what Girard calls “mimetic desire”—a desire “directed toward an object desired 
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by the model.”520 Girard holds that, as uniquely human, MD generates the possibility for 
adaptability and creativity that extends far beyond the behavioral potential presented by 
instinct and learning to other animal species.
521
 Wanting to be like another who portrays 
or possesses a perceived good, and the ability to become like that person, are necessary 
motivations and conditions of possibility for being moral. As Girard observes, “Without 
mimetic desire there would be neither freedom nor humanity. Mimetic desire is 
intrinsically good.”522 At the same time, MD is ethically ambivalent. Mimesis makes 
possible both technology and torture, cooperation and conflict, empathy and envy, 
compassion and covetousness, good and evil.  
Analyzing the psychological and sociological underpinnings of archaic religion, 
Girard argues that MD made it possible and seemingly necessary to sacrifice or otherwise 
scapegoat human beings in order to sublimate the violence brought about by the conflicts 
incited by MD in a limited goods society. Turning to biblical literature, Girard argues 
persuasively that mimetic desire prompted Cain to kill his brother Abel, Joseph’s brothers 
to sell him into slavery, and the religious and political elite to crucify Jesus of Nazareth. 
Conversely, mimetic desire also allows and propels people of faith to be imitators, 
followers, disciples of Christ and models of God-imaging intentions and actions.  
MD as self-evidently constitutive of human-being  
 
 
In one historical or literary example after another, Girard exposes a disturbing 
human tendency to fall into a mimetic cycle of violence, which then makes its way into 
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religious myth and ritual.
523
 This mythic cycle of violence can be characterized as a 
sacrificial version of what Hefner describes with more optimism as the myth-ritual-praxis 
complex.
524
 Girard, however, focuses on human praxis that has yielded very different—
though not unrelated—kinds of myth and ritual than the Judeo-Christian varieties on 
which Hefner focuses. According to Girard, sacrificial rites and the mythologies 
subserving them begin in the desire to have what a model has, to act as a model acts, and 
thus to be as a model is. Where the desired object or role is exclusive or privative, desire 
breeds rivalry, rivalry breeds conflict, conflict breeds violence, violence breeds more and 
more and more violence, until society verges on collapse.  
The stopgap to this cycle is to find a surrogate victim for mimetic violence—a 
scapegoat or sacrifice—that satisfies vicariously, if temporarily, the perceived need to 
oust one’s rivals. The pacifying effects of the sacrifice or lynching or witch hunt 
produces a lull in civil unrest, which becomes attributed to supernatural agency. 
Demonized in life, the victim is divinized in death, and a myth emerges to absolve the 
victimizers and explain the seemingly miraculous reinstatement of social order. To curb 
future violence, mythology gives rise to highly regulated rituals involving surrogate-
surrogate victims—often animals—as substitutes for the human victims of more 
spontaneous forms of mimetic rivalry. As an added safeguard, caste-specific mores, 
norms, and taboos are set in place in an attempt to confine desire within socially 
acceptable parameters. As one might expect, the licit ambit of desire is much broader for 
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social elites than others—a social stratification reinforced through mythology. However, 
if MD is constitutively human, then the powerful can only police it, not eliminate it.  
Furthermore, if MD is constitutively human, then Girard’s heuristic evidence and 
antiquarian analyses may suggest contemporary applications. As constitutively human, 
MD may function in a similar way to what Schillebeeckx and McAuliffe call an 
anthropological constant, which include our psychosomatic constitution, our culturally-
constituted identities, our embeddedness within social and institutional structures, our 
historical-cultural conditioning, the interplay of theory and practice, our commitments to 
the goodness of life, and the synthesis of all these elements. At the very least, MD can be 
understood as giving a particularly anthropological character to the biocultural milieu 
through which the anthropological constants emerge. Operating at the epicenter of so 
many domains of human-being, MD may provide a great deal of explanatory power for 
scholars of myriad disciplines who seek to understand the biocultural roots of human 
thought and action. Though MD may make good sense of the human condition, it remains 
to be seen whether mimetic analysis is able to produce positive moral outcomes—
Gustafson’s second test for ethical truth value. Can the concept of MD help ethicists 
expose and describe the sphere of negativity as well as imagine, propose, prescribe, 
and/or recognize humanizing visions of positivity, wholesomeness, or salvation?  
Analyzing ancient Near Eastern texts like Enuma Elish in contrast with biblical 
texts, Girard, like Ricoeur and Middleton, seeks to expose the inherent circularity and 
injustice of the myth that violence can create cosmic and social order.
525
 I explore some 
contemporary implications of this contrast more fully below. These and other scholars 
agree that myths of creative/redemptive violence only perpetuate victimization. Current 
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theorists are able to demonstrate that mimetic violence in socio-economic and ecological 
contexts still occurs on a global scale, and that exclusionary forms of desire are what 
need to be criticized in the critical reflection on historical praxis. I propose that this 
liberating ethical and theological task is a key component of the human vocation to bear 
the image of God today. 
Others have made similar claims. For example, liberation theologian and ethicist 
Jung Mo Sung employs Girard’s mimetic theory to analyze and critique the social 
exclusion emerging from the dynamic confluence of mimetic “desire, market and 
religion.” Where Girard applies mimetic theory primarily to the critique of religion, from 
archaic to contemporary, Sung finds Girard’s work to be fruitful for analyzing, 
evaluating, and potentially alleviating many of today’s socio-economic injustices. He 
hypothesizes that Christian theology may provide some fruitful ethical tools for 
combating injustice.
526
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Sung raises three hypotheses concerning the dynamics giving rise to this sacrificial mimetic cycle. 
The first is that economic growth is directly proportional to the perceived plausibility of the mythical 
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Theologian S. Mark Heim proposes an even more basic ethical reason for 
highlighting the mimetic character of human agency. Drawing upon the findings of recent 
cognitive- and neuroscientists, Heim argues that on a neuro-cognitive level, “imitation 
may be at the heart of the emergence of key elements of what we take to be human nature 
itself: consciousness, theory of mind, empathy.”527 In one of the language areas of the 
brain, human beings possess a concentration of “mirror neurons,” which fire across 
parallel and co-activated neural networks in sensory and motor fields. Integrated with 
these other brain regions, mirror neurons enable the brain to translate sensory stimuli into 
motion and, with the right symbolic tools, concepts. This neural activity facilitates a 
strong capacity and urge to do what one perceives another doing and to anticipate what it 
might be like to undergo or enact something happening with another. Mirror neurons 
allow delayed and pensive reactions and even predictions of what might happen next, 
including what another person might be intending—a kind of mind reading.528 This kind 
of off-line anticipation and analogizing is key in developing a culturally-constrained 
sense of self and, in turn, a sense of others as other selves. Other persons display 
                                                                                                                                                 
promises of progress (i.e., that everyone’s mimetic desires can or will be fulfilled) (40). The second 
hypothesis is that in archaic societies taboos served the purpose of squelching certain mimetic desires 
between various castes, since societal position determined the permissible scope of one’s desires. The 
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defines the term. 
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recognizable signs of joy, pain, elation, frustration, sadness, anger, etc., with which the 
observer can identify through past experience, and therefore empathize.  
According to Heim, MD guides behavior from birth and is vitally adaptive for 
survival because it presents a necessary condition for the exertion of effort toward 
wellbeing. He cites studies indicating that human infants do not display a robust instinct 
for self-preservation. Babies who lack attention and affection often die, even when all 
their immediate physical needs are met. Human babies thrive in response to being an 
object of another’s desire. Their own struggle, or desire, to exist (however unconscious) 
is brought about in no small way through mirroring the desire of their caretakers for their 
continued presence and well-being.
529
   
Andrew Meltzoff, expert on infant and child development, has probed 
systematically the mechanisms of mimetic interaction and their impact on psychological 
development.
530
 He has observed imitative responses in infants as young as 42 minutes old 
and has catalogued a spectrum of mimetic responses and their complexification as 
children grow, develop, and interact with others. Infants, he concludes, “learn through 
imitation but don’t need to learn to imitate,” because mirroring neural systems start the 
brain on an active mapping course that molds babies into more and more mature selves 
like those with whom they interact.
531
 Infants imitate others’ actions and expressions, 
share their objects of attention, and quickly learn through experience to track others’ 
perceptions and intentions. These intersubjective rapport-building experiences lay the 
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foundations for language development, by weaving the psycho-somatically based fabric of 
a symbolic universe containing culturally-constrained ideals of who to be like and who not 
to be like, of what is “good” and “bad,” helpful and harmful, for oneself and for others.532  
MD as making possible the NCE and FME 
 
 
The mimetic appropriation of concepts like “good” and “bad,” “right” and 
“wrong,” “positive role models” and “negative role models” is a large part of what makes 
the NCE and FME uniquely human experiences of value for behaviorally modern Homo 
sapiens. MD is a powerful driver of perception and behavior that orients the self to the 
other, often in a concerted effort to learn, to better, to best another’s behavior. This form 
of self-transcendence is a recipe for both development and conflict, but without it, there 
would be no imaging God/Christ.  
MD is as ambivalent as it is humanizing. As a human wellspring of cooperation 
and conflict, good and evil, positivity and negativity, MD makes ethics both possible and 
necessary. If from its neurological underpinnings mimetic desire allows human beings to 
see others as other selves and as model selves, then it is the sine qua non of both empathy 
and envy.  
Because of the values-laden MD that makes empathy possible, human ethics is 
able to be more and other than an epiphenomenon of self- and species preservation, 
reducible to the pain and pleasure principle. The ability to perceive others as other selves 
allows those others and their world to become worthwhile objects of moral consideration 
for their own sakes, and not just for their potential to benefit or harm the self. Mimetic 
desire enables a conscientious NCE that is both self- and other-oriented, an FME that 
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indicates the intrinsic value of one’s own existence, all other life, and the environment 
that sustains it. Good ethics catches on because positive models and moral outcomes 
become objects of desire to be imitated.  
Professor of neurophysiology Vittorrio Gallese comes to similar conclusions with 
similar caveats. He is confident that the co-activation of mirror neurons and other 
neurophysiological structures creates an “interpersonal resonance” that erupts into 
imitation and other-oriented self-identification. However, he is cautious about calling this 
dynamic “empathy,” except in a broad yet technical sense of the term.533 This socially 
facilitated neuro-cognitive activity can certainly emerge as empathy in the traditional, 
positive, affective sense of the term. Yet mimetic ability can also blossom into envy and 
many other phenomena leading to competition, conflict, and violence.  
These negative phenomena are where Girard spends most of his energy, 
prompting Gallese to wonder why more Girardians do not emphasize the more positive 
view that human beings are “equally describable as empathic creatures, capable of fellow 
feelings, love, and altruism,” and “that mimesis not only generates violence, but also art, 
culture, and creativity.”534 MD is a two-edged sword or double sided coin. Perhaps the 
pervasive focus on the negative thrust of MD correlates to McAuliffe’s point about the 
epistemological priority of negativity in the NCE. Phenomena grab our attention when 
they cause problems.  
By the same token, Gallese points out that “Girard acknowledges in his work, 
though perhaps with less emphasis, that mimetic desire is also good in itself because it is 
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the basis of love, viewed as the imitation of a positive model.”535 Because the self is 
formed through embodied interaction with other selves, he theorizes “that at the origin of 
mimetic ambivalence is humanity’s ontological openness to others. […] Our constitutive 
openness to others, of which mimesis is one of the main expressions, can be declined 
both in terms of social violence and social cooperation.”536 This “‘ontological’ desire to 
be like the other”537 supports the inference that alongside the epistemological priority of 
negativity, MD discloses an ontological priority of positivity, through a pre-thematic or 
instinctual impulse to obtain those objects and become like those models perceived to be 
worthy. Thus, MD resides at the heart of the NCE and FME as a bioculturally constrained 
sense of good and bad and those whose image one ought to bear.  
MD, ethics, and “the uniqueness of the Bible”—René Girard 
 
 
Like the NCE and FME, MD is an anthropological concept with ethical 
significance and religious affinities. Middleton compares and contrasts the image of God 
concept in Genesis with a “mimetic ideal” operating within Mesopotamian mythology, 
including that of Enuma Elish. In the latter symbolic worldview, society is charged with 
the task of recapitulating the primordial struggles through which the gods established 
order among themselves, within creation, and between the divine and created realms. 
This divinely sanctioned sociopolitical ideal holds that the might of the gods—and their 
royal-priestly intermediaries—makes right and that disruptors of the hierarchic status quo 
weaken the foundations of civil society and threaten to visit divine wrath upon it.
538
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According to Middleton and Ricoeur, Enuma Elish supplies the mimetic ideal that fueled 
the Babylonian conquest of the Israelite people, because it provided 
the mythic legitimization of the Neo-Babylonian imperial expansionism, 
where the king, standing in for Marduk (and as the image of Marduk), 
vanquishes the enemies of Babylon, who are regarded as the historical 
embodiments of the chaos monster. As Ricoeur puts it, “Creation is a 
victory over an Enemy older than the creator; that Enemy, immanent in 
the divine, will be represented in history by all the enemies whom the king 
in his turn, as servant of the god, will have his mission to destroy.”539 
 
As ideological critique, the biblical concept of the imago Dei creates an 
alternative mimetic ideal which denies the necessity and creative capacity of violence on 
two fronts. First, the primeval history democratizes the functional-royal image concept 
and cites it as an aspect of human creaturehood designed to “limit or constrain human 
violence” (see Gen. 9:6).540 Because all people bear the image of God, there is no 
theological justification for social stratification and no excuse for the kind of “violence” 
that “grieved” Yahweh to the point of starting over with humankind (Gen. 6:5-11). 
Second, the God whose image all people bear does not create through violence, but 
through enabling and inviting the earth and its inhabitants to fulfill their own creative 
potential, which includes the human vocation to (pre)serve the immanent fecundity of the 
earth and one another.   
Likewise, Girard locates MD and rivalry at the roots of Mesopotamian and other 
archaic religious traditions which rely on sacrificial rites and holy war in order to 
maintain harmony on earth and/as in the heavens. He also make a bold claim that from 
the standpoint of mimetic analysis Judeo-Christian theology may be uniquely equipped 
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among Western religious traditions to expose, dismantle, and reframe the mimetic cycle 
of desire, rivalry, violence, and sacrifice.  
By citing Girard’s claim for the uniqueness of Christianity and its scriptures, I do 
not wish to imply that other religious traditions are ill-equipped to construct valid and 
humanizing moral visions. Even from a Girardian perspective, other faiths can be shown 
to promote effective measures for nipping mimetic rivalry in the bud. Eastern religions, 
like Buddhism, for example, have longstanding and deeply embedded traditions defining 
attachment to objects and ideals as a form of suffering that breeds malcontent, envy, 
conflict, and violence.
541
 Girard’s high praise for Christianity may be politically incorrect 
in a pluralistic religious environment, but his seeming triumphalism might be mitigated 
by the view that he is making what amounts to a Riceourian wager from the perspective 
of his own religious tradition, rather than an exclusionary claim for the normativity of 
Christianity. Girard, voicing praise for Ricoeur’s systematic study of ancient Near 
Eastern and Western religious myth, argues persuasively that anthropological, religious, 
and ethical scholars can and ought to proclaim both the “continuity” of Christianity with 
earlier traditions and the “cleavage between Christianity and everything else,” especially 
for the purpose of providing a mimetic model which exposes the roots of rivalry and 
violence and redirects them toward acts of love for neighbor and enemy.
542
  
Girard’s Ricoeurian wager is that the biblical tradition systematically exposes and 
condemns the mimetic contagion of insatiable desire, and makes a long anticipated 
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exodus from the sacrificial cycle through the passion and resurrection of Jesus of 
Nazareth. In this manner, Girard argues that Christianity, with its “Old Testament” 
foundations, offers both ethical and eschatological visions of the worst and best that MD 
has to offer. On the one hand, Girard is able to cite many instances of mimetic 
victimization in both the Old and New Testaments. On the other hand, he shows how 
biblical monotheism never allows a false transcendence to legitimate the violence in these 
narratives.  
Arguing for “the uniqueness of the Bible,” Girard cites the Joseph narrative in 
Genesis as a quintessential critique of the single victim mechanism.
543
 Turning to “the 
uniqueness of the Gospels,” Girard begins by pointing out that they complete the mimetic 
cycle that the Hebrew Bible strategically leaves unfinished, by professing “the divinity of 
the collective victim.”544  
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 The crucified and resurrected Christ reveals divine solidarity with the victims of 
social exclusion and violence and presents an eschatological vision of wholesomeness or 
salvation through both bodily resurrection and the offer of forgiveness to all victimizers 
willing to repent. In these terms Girard constructs a theory of atonement “at the level of 
anthropological analysis.”545 In addition, the resurrected Jesus offers a twofold ethical 
example to his followers.  
First, by offering forgiveness without retribution, Christ short circuits the mimetic 
cycle of violence to such an extent that non-retributive forgiveness becomes an option, 
even in cases where human life is at stake. With faith and hope in a resurrection that 
vindicates the innocent victims of violence, the unique ontological horizons of the 
gospels’ symbolic world co-emerge with an ethical vision grounded in eschatology and 
                                                                                                                                                 
for the ineffectual sham it is (135). It lays open what Girard calls the “persecutory unconscious”—the self-
deceptive dynamic by which those in the lynch mob convince themselves “that they are doing good, the 
right thing; they believe they are saving their community” (126). For Girard, however, Christ’s Passion, 
culminating in resurrection—and only this revelation—dismantles the “founding murder” as the basis for 
expunging the mimetic contagion that inevitably arises in all human communities (135). In this way, the 
resurrected Jesus is the new Abel, offering what no other victim of sacralized murder could—reconciliation 
between the persecutors and the persecuted, between the betrayers and the betrayed.  
545
 Ibid., 184. Girard analyses the concept of the “scapegoat,” conjecturing that the prevalent use of this 
term in contemporary society is a testament to his claim that “[w]herever Christianity spreads, the mythical 
systems decay and sacrificial rites disappear” (154; cf. 160). Scapegoats still exist, but they are seen as the 
illegitimate victims of “the appetite for violence that awakens in people when anger seizes them and when 
the true object of their anger is untouchable” (156). Showing the mimetic cycle of victimization to be 
ineffectual at curing societal ills, Girard differentiates between this kind of uneasy “peace such as the world 
gives” and the true peace that “surpasses human understanding,” such as only Christ can give (186). While 
Girard restricts his investigation of the Passion and resurrection of Christ to “the level of anthropological 
analysis” (184), he does not deny the real transcendence of the triune God, who exposes Satan’s false 
transcendence and brings it to an end (185). This “evangelical anthropology” (182) is only available and 
intelligible in light of a bona fide “revelation” and “miracle.” As Girard puts it, “To break the power of 
mimetic unanimity, we must postulate a power superior to the violent contagion. If we have leaned one 
thing […], it is that none exists on earth” (189). Relating this anthropological and ethical vision to 
pneumatology, Girard describes the Holy Spirit is humankind’s parakletos, an advocate against the unjust 
accusations of Satan (189-90). Far from proposing that all people are purely innocent victims before God 
and the accuser Satan, the Spirit’s advocacy is predicated on the forgiveness God offers in Christ, through 
his triumphal identification with all victims, which continues beyond the resurrection. On the way to arrest 
Christ’s followers in Damascus, Saul is confronted by the risen Christ asking, “why do you persecute me?” 
(191; emphasis mine). For Girard, then, “The Resurrection empowers Peter and Paul, as well as all 
believers after them, to understand that all imprisonment in sacred violence is violence done to Christ. 
Humankind is never the victim of God; God is always the victim of humankind” (ibid.).  
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an eschatological vision grounded in ethics. Not only does such hope make turning the 
other cheek appear to be a viable option, non-retaliation or nonviolent resistance may also 
have the more immediate result of humanizing the victim in the eyes of the violator 
and/or witnesses to the situation. A humanized victim makes a less attractive target, 
turning public outrage away from the victim and toward the violator.  
Second, the kingdom or reign of God is an ethical and eschatological vision that is 
achieved not through violence but through its utter renunciation.
546
 Because following 
Christ means taking up one’s proverbial cross as opposed to gaining “the whole world,” 
discipleship is a kind of mimesis that nips rivalry in the bud.
547
  As a mimetic model, 
Christ preaches and practices a theological ethic that fully humanizes the least and the 
lowest and calls for action that alleviates unjust suffering. The Christ event and its 
inauguration of the kingdom or reign of God contain a concrete paradigm for bearing the 
functional-royal image of God which reorients MD by redirecting its dynamism from 
one-upmanship to the wellbeing of one’s neighbors and even one’s enemies.  
 Offering a very similar description of the kinds of salvation made possible by 
forgiveness, Suchocki defines forgiveness as a kind of empathy that involves actively 
“willing the well-being of victim(s) and violator(s) in the context of the fullest possible 
knowledge of the nature of the violation. As such, forgiveness holds the possibility of 
breaking the chain of violence.”548 So defined, forgiveness is a human possibility, as well 
as an eschatological one. From a Christian perspective, eschatological forgiveness comes 
through the willingness of Christ to take on a cursed fate as a wholly innocent victim of 
violent aggression, and through resurrection, to offer reconciliation without retribution. 
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Through Christ, God achieves the greatest possible solidarity of humanity with divinity, 
of creation with creator, and in this act of empathy, wills the wellbeing of the creation, 
both victims and violators. In this way, Christ is a mimetic model who offers an ethical 
vision with an eschatological horizon, by revealing—imaging—a God who does not 
create through violence, even in the face of violence.  
In a similar move, Hefner inserts Christ into the myth-ritual-praxis complex “by 
which humans move from is to ought.”549 His hermeneutical exercise of faith seeking 
understanding is also a Ricoeurian wager that the theologian and ethicist may “provide 
genuine knowledge of reality, for the sake of our wholesome living,” through the second 
naïveté interpretation of the Christian Scriptures and their myth symbols.
550
 For Hefner, 
Jesus presents a “paradigm” or “model” for being human and an as yet underdetermined 
“ontological statement” that altruistic love for the least among us is in “harmony with 
what really is.”551 The resurrection vindicates the underdetermined faith and hope that 
love—not violence—reveals the way things really are. In McAuliffe’s terminology, 
Hefner’s ontological statement is a commitment to the ontological priority of positivity in 
spite of the epistemological priority of negativity.  
Conclusion  
 
 
Having accepted Hefner’s challenge to cultivate the explanatory power and moral 
fruitfulness of Christian myth-symbols, my interactions with the scholarship of cognitive 
linguists, evolutionary psychologists, emergentists, ethicists, biblical scholars, and 
theologians have enabled me to expand his thesis that Homo sapiens have emerged as 
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free creators of meanings able to construe humankind’s cultural and ecological functions 
in terms of bearing the image of God to the creation in ways which model the beneficent 
intentions of the creator, redeemer, and sustainer of the cosmos. By construing this task 
as the emergent theological vocation of Homo sapiens, I have developed extensively 
Hefner’s hypothesis that when integrated with current scientific knowledge, the ethical 
and eschatological concept of the image of God/Christ can be morally fruitful on both 
social and ecological fronts.  
The meta-ethical concepts of the negative contrast experience, foundational moral 
experience, and mimetic desire all harmonize with Hefner’s, Deacon’s, and my claim that 
the functional requirements of complex emergent dynamics mark the “basis for beginning 
to reflect upon values,” a principle I have called the “teleodynamic axiom” in chapters 3 
and 5.
552
 According to a second naïveté interpretation of the primeval history and its 
myth-symbols of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil, the created 
purpose of the cosmos is to emerge into the wondrous array of causal powers including 
life, sentience, and consciousness. In response, God-imaging creatures bear a moral 
obligation to see and celebrate the “very-good-ness” of biotic and ecological systems for 
their own sakes and seek to ensure their sustainability—their ability to respond to the 
creator’s “Let there be…”  If, in connection with this first principle, Homo sapiens’ 
created function is to cooperate freely and responsibly across cultures and species in the 
ongoing co-creation of our social and ecological environments by nonviolent means, then 
God-imaging creatures bear a moral obligation to ensure that all people are able to access 
the means of actualizing this creative potential to contribute to the common good and 
their own wellbeing—their response-ability to mirror the creator’s “Let us make…”  
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As an outworking of the teleodynamic axiom, this latter principle contains a tacit 
endorsement of McAuliffe’s claim that those who experience the negative contrast most 
acutely have an epistemological privilege in ethical discourse, since they suffer the 
greatest depravation of their functional requirements.
553
 Emerging as biocultural 
creatures, human beings’ functional requirements are cultural as well as biological. 
Meeting the biological requirements of all human beings (e.g., food, clean water, reliable 
shelter, public safety, sanitation, and healthcare) is only the first step in making it 
possible for everyone to lay claim to their reasonable expectation to participate fully, 
creatively, meaningfully, and humanely in cultural activities and institutions (e.g., 
educational, occupational, artful, leisurely, economic, political, religious). 
From a Christian perspective, these principles and their theological framework 
comprise a hermeneutically open schema for gauging moral progress in terms of 
humankind’s vocation to bear the image of God. In one sense, a scientifically informed 
theological ethic guided by the teleodynamic axiom emerges from the bottom-up. At the 
same time, the underdetermined elements of an empirically based ethic cry out for the 
supervening influence of something like religious faith or historical revelation. For ethics, 
faith is a wager that religious values, paradigms, and eschatological visions comport with 
what really is. In the hermeneutical circle of faith seeking understanding and critical 
reflection on historical praxis, these ontological commitments guide the FME, NCE, and 
MD toward ethical and eschatological horizons where care for the creation and altruistic 
love of neighbor and enemy bear the image of ultimacy and matter ultimately.  
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Throughout this study and its restatement of the biblical concepts of the image of 
God and the knowledge of good and evil, I have attempted to construct a fruitful 
framework through which to engage Hefner’s call to embark  
on the constructive work that awaits the theologian and philosopher in 
fulfilling the task that Paul Ricoeur has set before us—to transport the 
traditional symbols, where they are important vessels of information for 
us, into the realm of contemporary, second-naiveté [sic] experience, and 
enable them to coalesce with our experience to provide genuine 
knowledge of reality, for the sake of our wholesome living.
554
  
 
More pointedly, I have assembled a set of hermeneutical tools and constructed a 
conceptual framework with which 
to restate [Judeo-Christian] myth […] and its doctrinal elaborations in the 
context of the natural and social sciences and as we encounter them in a 
global society that is faced increasingly with the question of quality of life 
on the one hand and of surviving on the other hand.
555
  
 
Thus, I have offered in this chapter a fruitful first step in investigating 
anthropological foundations for theological ethics in a contemporary context, by offering 
evidence that there are already three identifiable schools of thought or “camps” that begin 
theological ethics with the premise that human being and agency, qua human, present the 
motivations and conditions of possibility for being free and responsible in particular 
ways. The human “is” informs the human “ought.” Proponents of these three camps 
argue that the phenomenological, heuristic, and neuroscientific evidence for the NCE, 
FME, and MD is substantial enough to offer a firm, if indirect or intuitive, foundation for 
constructing valid ethical norms and holding persons and communities accountable to 
them. This foundation is strengthened by showing how the NCE, FME, and MD camps 
mutually reinforce and interpret one another. Because no human response to the negative 
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contrast experience, foundational moral experience, or the mimetic desire that drives 
them can reach the ethical horizons toward which they point, the confluence of these 
camps moves with little effort toward religious visions of wholesomeness, wellbeing, or 
salvation.  
With the help of many minds from multiple disciplines, I have wagered that an 
interdisciplinary re-presentation of what it means to emerge in the image of God with a 
knowledge of good and evil can be intellectually and morally fruitful today and offer a 
procedural guide for future studies. Throughout this endeavor, I have striven to project 
faithfully and creatively the hermeneutical trajectory of the Hebrew Bible’s primeval 
history as a theological, anthropological, and ethical statement that human beings have 
been wrought of the creation and embedded within it to the same extent as other 
creatures, for the purpose of discerning and enacting the beneficent intentions of a creator 
who shares power and does not create through violence. The final chapter offers a more 
detailed summative reflection on the findings of this study and its likely impact on my 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
Emerging in the image of God is an ongoing biocultural process constituted from the 
“top-down” by its ethical, theological, and eschatological horizons. These horizons and 
our views of them shift continually as our symbolic worlds undergo tectonic shifts 
erupting from the “bottom-up.” The chapters of this study are an embodiment of the 
Riceourian-inspired wager that a second naïveté retrieval of the image of God and the 
knowledge of good and evil might answer theologian Philip Hefner’s call “to transport the 
traditional symbols, where they are important vessels of information for us, into the realm 
of contemporary, second-naivete [sic] experience, and enable them to coalesce with our 
experience to provide genuine knowledge of reality, for the sake of our wholesome 
living.”556  
In these concluding remarks, I offer a brief, chapter-by-chapter summary of my 
argument and its major themes, followed by an overview of this project’s implications for 
several areas of theological study. Listed above in chapter 1, these related areas of 
research include further studies concerning Christian anthropology and ethics, the 
doctrines of creation and divine action, Christology, “fall” and original sin, soteriology, 
and eschatology. These considerations have long guided my research, and they are likely 
to do so for years to come.  
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Summary of Chapters 
 
 
 In chapter 1 I set out to establish the impetus, goals, scope, structure, context, 
perspective, and procedure for this study. Citing hermeneutical philosopher Paul Ricoeur, 
Hefner has pointed in the direction of some relatively unexplored territory in academic 
theological discourse. Accepting Hefner’s challenge, I catalogued some of the past 
explorations into these areas by several scholars, looking to them for guidance on how to 
develop a second naïveté reinterpretation and reappropriation of image of God and the 
knowledge of good and evil as Christian myth-symbols able to encapsulate an 
intellectually and morally fruitful conceptual framework for conducting anthropological 
and ethical discourse today.  
The construction of a second naïveté interpretation is a critical-hermeneutical 
endeavor resulting in novel, irreducible, and flexible meanings derived through 
interpretation from pre-critical (primitive naïveté) understandings of religious concepts. 
This form of interpretation is quintessentially theological because it can be described as 
both faith seeking understanding and critical reflection on historical praxis. When this 
type of scholarship engages current scientific understandings, interdisciplinary scholar 
Ian G. Barbour’s description of a theology of nature perspective provides another helpful 
descriptor for the reformative goals of this study. Hermeneutical frameworks like these 
from Ricoeur and Barbour help the 21
st
-century scholar develop up-to-date theological 
conceptions of what really is and how our is informs our ought—how to move from 
evolution to ethics in a second naïveté understanding of Christian anthropology. With 
additional help from cognitive linguists, emergentists, and evolutionary psychologists, I 
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constructed a hermeneutic of emergent meanings designed to integrate or blend biblical 
and biocultural conceptions of human uniqueness. 
 From this point, I sought to build a biocultural model of human uniqueness and its 
evolutionary development, couched in the terminology of conceptual integration theory 
and the salient features of evolutionary psychology. I argued in chapter 2 that the human 
person is constituted by the symbiotic confluence of the biological and cultural streams of 
our nature. I also presented evidence that behaviorally modern Homo sapiens became 
culturally-constituted creatures, or what Hefner calls “created co-creators,” as a result of 
the functional singularities precipitating from the neuro-cognitive adaptations subserving 
the meaning-making process of conceptual integration across various behavioral domains.  
Building upon neuroscientist Terrence W. Deacon’s hypotheses about the co-
evolution of language and the brain, cognitive linguists Gilles Fauconnier and Mark 
Turner present a persuasive argument that uniquely human functional singularities like 
linguistic ability emerged when our species developed the capacity for double-scope 
conceptual integration. The symbolic ability afforded by this psychosomatic adaptation 
allows the rapid and continual development of languages and the cultures growing up 
with them.  
Evolutionary psychologists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides characterize this 
cultural-linguistic dynamic aptly by explaining how “[m]ore nature allows more nurture.” 
557
 Human biology has equipped our species with the requisite functional conditions of 
possibility (nature) to create and hold one another accountable to cultural meanings 
(nurture). These biocultural processes generate a condition of freedom through which 
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emerge values-laden self-descriptions like “full” humanity, the image of God, and the 
knowledge of good and evil. Argued more fully in subsequent chapters, the portrait of 
human uniqueness painted in chapter 2 implies that behaviorally modern Homo sapiens 
bear the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil through the physically 
embodied, socially embedded creativity by which they define their biocultural roles and 
contextualize their choices.  
 Adding detail to this natural scientifically informed portrait of human-being, I 
turned in chapter 3 to emergence scholarship, in order to describe how the image of God 
and the knowledge of good and evil (as aspects of the human condition and values-laden 
distinctions) may be understood as developing dynamically from the “bottom-up” to 
exert a “top-down” causal influence on human thought and action. I provided a detailed 
analysis of Deacon’s three-tiered taxonomy of emergent causality, in which the 
cumulative and hierarchic orders of homeodynamics, morphodynamics, and 
teleodynamics equate roughly to the Aristotelian concepts of material/efficient causality, 
formal causality, and final causality, respectively.  
Relating these emergent orders to the concepts of the image of God and 
knowledge good and evil, I emphasized that these theological self-descriptions and the 
human condition to which they refer emerge from the matter-energy of the physical 
universe and belong to the person-constituting teleodynamics of life, evolution, 
information, significance, sentience, and consciousness. Because the (teleo)dynamics of 
human-being are not reducible to the thermodynamics which sustain them from the 
“bottom-up,” the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil cannot be identified 
as some thing which subsists in the cosmos. Rather, these realities are borne through the 
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values-laden teleodynamics always in the process of dynamically constituting the human 
person from the “top-down.”  
 Beginning with chapter 4, I integrated the contemporary portrait of human nature 
outlined above with exegetical scholarship commensurable with a biocultural conception 
of human emergence. Striving to remain faithful to the hermeneutical trajectory evident 
in the Hebrew Bible’s primeval history, I argued that an evolutionary view of human-
being brings into focus several thematic elements lying within and behind the redacted 
text of Genesis 1-3.  
First, in both ancient and current contexts, the meanings of the image of God and 
the knowledge of good and evil emerge through a process of conceptual integration—a 
complex confluence and clash of meanings across cultural, ideological, geographical, 
temporal, and disciplinary boundaries. Specifically, I relied heavily on the scholarship of 
J. Richard Middleton among other exegetes and theologians to argue that the image of 
God concept in Genesis is largely a critique of Mesopotamian royal ideology. In the Neo-
Babylonian symbolic world, political, religious, and social elites bear the image of their 
despotic deities by conquering and exploiting others. Foregoing the henotheistic 
Chaoskampf of Enuma Elish and other parallels, the Genesis cosmology monotheizes the 
God concept and democratizes the image concept. This shift generates the inference that 
all human creatures bear the image of a generous, beneficent creator who shares power 
with created entities and does not create through violence.  
Second, I demonstrated the parallel an complementary ways in which the image 
of God is a product of nature in Genesis and biocultural evolution, emphasizing the 
manner in which the biblical writers depict humankind as being wrought of the creation 
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and embedded within it to the same extent as all other creatures. I suggested that this 
contiguity with the rest of the natural world supports the claim that human participation 
in the created co-creation of the world ought to consist in cooperating conscientiously 
with one another and other species in service of the creative potential and wellbeing of all 
people, all living species, and their environments.  
Third, I explained how a biocultural view of human emergence supports the 
interpretive claim that bearing the imago Dei is Homo sapiens’ emergent vocation—a call 
to re-present the creator’s beneficent intentions in, to, and through our “very good” 
world. Over against a Mesopotamian royal ideology, the implication in the Genesis 
cosmology that Yahweh Elohim does not create through violence lends itself to a 
functional-royal interpretation of the image of God in which the commands of Gen. 1:28 
to “fill,” “subdue,” and “rule over” the creation ought to be interpreted nonviolently. 
Finally, I noted that this theological vocation presupposes a condition of freedom through 
which humankind is responsible for creating the cultural meanings by which we 
contextualize our actions and hold one another accountable.  
 In the fifth chapter, I argued that in biblical and biocultural conceptions of human-
being, the condition of freedom through which we bear the image of God is ambivalent, 
fraught with all the challenges of knowing good and bad/evil. Structuring chapter 5 to 
mirror chapter 4, I submitted first that the meaning the knowledge of good and evil in 
Genesis and contemporary interpretation emerges through a creative blending of different 
and often disparate concepts. Through this conceptual integration emerge the inferences 
that the knowledge of good and evil must be understood as a sine qua non of bearing the 
image of God in, to, and through a creation immanently capable of bringing the “bad” 
along with the “good” from “the beginning.”  
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Second, I described the knowledge of good and evil as a product of 
creation/nature in Genesis and biocultural evolution, highlighting the creaturely sources 
of godlike wisdom in the Garden Narrative and the natural sources of cognitive 
adaptations—i.e., evolutionary processes catalyzed by natural selection pressures. In the 
Genesis cosmology, the possibilities for “good” and “bad” can be understood as a side-
effect of the freedom to become connoted in Yahweh Elohim’s fiat, “Let there be…” and 
the open-ended commands given to the human creatures in Genesis 1 and 2. Because the 
emergence of “bad/evil” in Genesis is not a recapitulation of god-on-god violence as in 
Enuma Elish, the Genesis cosmology is able to preserve the primordial goodness of the 
creator and the creation. Similarly, an emergentist conception of value holds that the dis-
integration of the teleodynamics constituting life, sentience, and consciousness is the 
necessary shadow side of any reality in which complexification is catalyzed through 
natural selection. I cited philosopher Holmes Rolston, III, suggesting that creativity and 
tragedy in evolutionary processes are two poles of a dialectic with a track record of 
producing positive net results. “Nature, red in tooth and claw,” while amoral, is the 
crucible in which humankind’s moral wherewithal has been forged, for good and ill.  
Third, I described knowing good and evil as humankind’s emergent vocation. In 
Genesis gaining a conscientious knowledge of “good” and “bad/evil” allows human 
creatures to respond to their calling to bear the image of God to all creation, which is to 
say beyond the relative security of Eden. In this sense, the knowledge of good and evil 
completes the image of God. In biocultural terms, the cognitive fluidity through which 
our species is able to define itself and its roles is the same cognitive fluidity out of which 
values-laden distinctions like “good,” “bad/evil,” and “image of God” emerge. A God-
imaging creativity is a conscientious creativity. 
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Fourth, this inherent connection between imaging God and knowing good and evil 
overturns traditional notions that the process of coming to see the positive and negative 
horizons of human experience and action is a negative development in itself. On the 
contrary, both biblical and biocultural narratives of human origins imply that the condition 
of freedom through which Homo sapiens bear the image of God is an unavoidable aspect 
of stepping into maturity, as individuals and as a species. Coming to know good and 
bad/evil is as humanizing as it is ambivalent. Knowing good and evil is the curse which is 
the epicenter of all blessings and the blessing at the epicenter of all curses.  
 Understandably, Christian ethics framed by the second naïveté retrieval of the 
image of God and knowledge of good and evil outlined above undergo dramatic shifts in 
focus, content, and orientation. Or do they? In chapter 6 I tested the notion that 
theological ethics could emerge from the “bottom-up” and still serve their “top-down” 
purpose of dignifying and relativizing human behavior against a trans-cosmic backdrop. 
On the hermeneutical circle of faith seeking understanding or critical reflection on 
historical praxis, a Christian ethic is a “bottom-up” proposition, because ethical and 
theological concepts all emerge through biocultural processes. At the same time, a 
Christian ethic is a “top-down” proposition, because the definitive revelation through 
Jesus Christ of what it is to bear the image of God imbues ethical concepts and actions 
with eschatological significance.  
The insuperable horizons of human-being found in eschatology open up novel and 
potentially humanizing possibilities for behavior. Searching for guidance on how to 
describe ethics in terms of imaging God with a knowledge of good and evil, I consulted 
several theological ethicists and anthropologists whose meta-ethical concepts of the 
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negative contrast experience (NCE), foundational moral experience (FME), and mimetic 
desire (MD) support an ethic of the image of God in which these self-evidently 
constitutive dynamics of human-being provide the impetus and conditions of possibility 
for ethics. I showed that these meta-ethical concepts mutually support and inform one 
another while sharing an affinity for religious visions of wellbeing, wholesomeness, 
flourishing, or salvation.  
This orientation toward ultimacy emerges from the fact that biocultural evolution 
cannot possibly keep pace with the moral imagination. Eschatological visions of history 
allow the moral imagination to reach in faith, hope, and love toward a co-created future 
marked by the negation of all negativity and the fulfillment of all flourishing. People of 
Christian faith may hold that although an eschatological vision of the creation’s future is 
underdetermined by the data of human experience and behavior, the kingdom or reign of 
God revealed in the life and resurrection of Jesus Christ is “at hand” when human 
attitudes and actions reflect the non-violent, power-sharing spirit of the creator’s “Let 
there be…” and “Let us make…”  
Blending concepts gleaned from Hefner and Deacon, I suggested in chapters 3, 5, 
and 6 that what I have called the teleodynamic axiom supports the inference that bearing 
the image of the creator means, in part, ensuring the functional requirements and creative 
potential of all persons and their environments.
558
 Broadly speaking, therefore, to bear the 
image of God is to uphold the equal dignity of all others as other selves, the 
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epistemological privilege of the impoverished and those in solidarity with them, and the 
inherent value and creative potential of the nonhuman world through which our species 
has emerged. To bear the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil is to insist 
through word and deed, however provisionally and imperfectly, that altruistic love of 
neighbor and enemy comport with what really is. To bear the image of the God with eyes 
wide open to what really is “good” and “bad/evil” is to recall that according to opening 
chapter of Genesis, Yahweh Elohim “sees” the “good” in each and every aspect of the 
creation, prior to and independent of the arrival of human creatures. To bear the image of 
the God who does not create through violence is to adjust our vision—our knowledge of 
good and evil—accordingly.  
Implications for future research 
 
 
 Ripples from the tectonic shifts I have proposed for Christian anthropology and 
ethics can be felt in many other areas of systematic theology. These final few pages 
outline some of these implications, describing topics I intend to explore more fully in my 
future research.  
The imago trinitatis 
 
 
As I alluded in chapter 3, the second naïveté interpretation of the image of God 
constructed in this study is conducive to an emergentist interpretation of the more 
speculative and particularly Christian concept of the imago trinitatis—the image of the 
Trinity. One of the most immediate effects of an emergentist anthropology on this 
concept is the implication that a physically-based, dynamic understanding of the imago 
trinitatis reframes the traditional psychological analogies of the Trinity found in the 
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works of Augustine, Aquinas, and others. Not only does evolutionary psychology 
discredit the faculty psychology on which these analogies are based, emergentism and its 
physicalist ontology preclude the possibility of separating the human psyche/soul/spirit 
from its physical embodiment and social embeddedness. Thus, the psychological analogy 
can only reemerge as a socio-psychosomatic analogy.  
Theologian Karl Rahner’s famed “trinitarian axiom,” also known as “Rahner’s 
Rule,” has inspired many scholars at the intersections of theology and the natural sciences 
to explore the notion that a trinitarian conception of divinity has something substantial to 
add to the discussion of whether and how the eternal God of Christian theism interacts 
with a temporal world from within. I listed several of these scholars in chapter 3, citing 
works by Ted Peters, Denis Edwards, John Polkinghorne, Arthur Peacocke, and Robert 
John Russell.  
Beginning with Rahner, all of these scholars develop or can be shown to endorse 
the following theses: (1) dynamic and relational creaturely personhood can be understood 
as analogous to divine (tri-)personhood; (2) God’s threefold creative and redemptive 
activity  within the cosmos is the ultimate cause of this imago trinitatis; and (3) the 
experience of God as Christ and the Holy Spirit in the (historically mediated) economy of 
salvation is the sole primary source for knowledge of God as Trinity.  
According to Rahner, if Jesus of Nazareth is presupposed in faith to be an 
absolute self-revelation of God, then the incarnation reveals the dynamic trinitarian 
structure of both divine and human personhood. He claims: 
We need only make the quite legitimate assumption that, on account of 
God’s absolute self-communication in ‘uncreated’ Grace, the immanent 
Trinity [God in se] is strictly identical with the economic trinity [God ad 
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extra] and vice versa, and we are then able to read the doctrine of the 
Trinity ‘anthropologically’ without falsifying it.559  
 
This quote contains a restatement of Rahner’s famous axiom, which he formulates in 
order to “do justice to the biblical statements concerning the economy of salvation and its 
threefold structure, and to the explicit biblical statements concerning the Father, the Son, 
and the Spirit.”560 If Jesus, as a human person, is an absolute self-revelation of God, and 
not just the Word/Logos/Son of God, then Christ’s humanity, and ours by extension, must 
bear a trinitarian structure. Rahner finds this image—this analogia entis—in the dynamic 
apperception and actualization of human personhood.
561
 In this analogy, subjectivity—
“the background ‘feeling of being here’”562—correlates to the Father; the linguistically-
borne knowledge making subjectivity known to itself correlates to the Logos;
563
 and the 
social mediation of personhood orienting the self empathically to others as other selves 
correlates to the Spirit or love of God.  
This hasty distillation of Rahner’s imago trinitatis anthropology must be 
unpacked at a later date. At the present time, I hope only to preview the manner in which 
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an evolutionary view of human personhood and its emergence has entered the 
hermeneutical circle of faith seeking understanding. For Rahner and the other scholars 
listed above, personhood, whether infinite or finite, emerges in relation to the other. 
However, as infinite, divine personhood cannot be mediated by an other apart from the 
self. In Christian theology, therefore, God must bear the relational dynamics of 
personhood in se and eternally (i.e., apart from the free act of creation ex nihilo). Hence, 
uncreated personhood is immanently tri-personal. Created personhood, by contrast, is 
mediated bodily and socially vis-à-vis myriad personal and impersonal beings. Hence, the 
analogy of created personhood to divine personhood is a socio-psychosomatic analogy. 
I find Deacon’s understanding of emergence to be a particularly apt tool for 
exploring this analogy. For Deacon the emergence of higher-order dynamic processes and 
their integration in phenomena like life, information, sentience, and consciousness are 
constituted diachronically through the self-propagating and mutually-constraining 
“fusion” of matter-energy across what he describes as three orders of emergent 
dynamics—thermo-/homeodynamics (cp. efficient and material causality), 
morphodynamics (cp. formal causality), and teleodynamics (cp. final causality). 
Borrowing a term from trinitarian theology, I mentioned in chapter 3 that the emergence 
of human personhood involves a kind of perichoresis—a mutual interpenetration or 
fusion of constituent “parts”—an irreducible, dynamically self-constituting unity-in-
diversity. As a scientifically-informed development Christian anthropology, Christology, 
and trinitarian theology, I contend that personhood can be described as bearing a dynamic 
imago trinitatis. I hold that the tri-unity of divine personhood may be considered the 
supernatural condition of possibility for the natural emergence and evolution of living 
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beings, their constitutive properties, and causal powers, as emergentism characterizes 
these phenomena.     
Creation, divine action, and Christology 
 
 
 A rekindled discourse on the Trinity and the imago trinitatis in light of current 
cosmological, biological, and psychological understandings begs several questions and 
generates profound implications for the doctrines of creation, divine action, and 
Christology. If the cosmos is a thermodynamically closed system, how can the infinite, 
eternal God be the creator and redeemer of a contingent, temporal world? How can God 
enter and interact with a causally closed universe? According to Ted Peters, “As part of 
the problem and perhaps also the door to the solution we find the doctrine of God as 
Trinity. The first thing to note is that the eternal immanent Trinity already includes 
relationality and dynamism.”564  
In short, a dynamic conception of created being comports well with a dynamic 
conception of uncreated Being. The diachronic emergence of finite, cosmic being(s) may 
be understood as a function of the eternal emergence of infinite, divine Being. That which 
is not God—the creation—bursts forth as a manifestation of the fecund, free, self-giving 
love that is the perichoritic self-constitution of God among Father, Son, and Spirit. God 
gives being to nonbeing, while not taking away from or adding to divine Being. In a 
sense, the truism that love is the only thing one can give without giving away becomes a 
theological statement about the existence of the cosmos as a whole and the emergence of 
love within it.  
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 While this brief description of creatio ex nihilo might shed some light on the birth 
of the space-time and matter-energy of our cosmos, what of the more interesting theistic 
questions of (1) whether and how God acts in the ongoing process of creation in general 
(creatio continua) and (2) whether and how God may be considered to interact with the 
creation in any but this general way? Where is there room for things like special 
revelation, the incarnation, and the resurrection in a closed universe? 
 Again, I can only allude to more complete responses to these questions in my 
future research. However, having already explored Deacon and Nancey Murphy’s work 
in previous chapters, I believe that their distinction between “causal forces” (as 
materially-energetically present) and “causal powers” (as constitutively absent) provides 
a way of beginning to respond to these tough theological questions. Deacon’s three-tiered 
emergentist ontology “requires reframing the way we think about the physical world in 
thoroughly dynamical, that is to say, process, terms, and recasting our notions of 
causality in terms of something like the geometry of this dynamics, instead of thinking in 
terms of material objects in motion affected by contact and fields of force.”565  
Allow me to be so bold as to suggest that revisiting the questions of divine action 
“requires reframing the way we think about [God’s interaction with] the physical world 
in thoroughly dynamical, that is to say, process, terms, and recasting our notions of 
[divine] causality in terms of something like the geometry of this dynamics, instead of 
thinking in terms of material objects in motion affected by contact and fields of force.” In 
this statement I find myself concurring with interdisciplinary scholar Ian G. Barbour 
when he places himself “in agreement with the ‘Theology of Nature’ position, coupled 
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with a cautious use of process philosophy.”566 Indeed, I believe that Christian conceptions 
of God’s activity ad extra must continue to begin with the raw data of “a religious 
tradition based on religious experiences and historical revelation.”567 In the same breath, 
however, theologians working from theology of nature perspective must hold “that some 
traditional doctrines need to be reformulated in light of current science.”568  
Scholars writing from a theology of nature perspective generally presuppose a 
number of tenets designed to safeguard the freedom and indeterminacy of natural 
processes, including cognitive and cultural processes. Many, including myself, presume 
that Christological discourse must be conducted within an evolutionary conception of the 
world and the living human flesh God incarnates. We hold that divine activity, whether 
general or special, does not violate the causal closure of the cosmos at the 
thermodynamic level. In short, we assume that God’s self-revelation in/to the creation 
does not create or destroy matter-energy, negate the indeterminacy of quantum level 
events, or introduce new physical laws or forces.  
 In light of these exigencies, however, how does one open a door for divine action 
into a closed universe? Polkinghorne and Peacocke suggest finding an explanatory 
analogy in the concept of “top-down” or “whole-part” causation.569 This is not to say that 
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God can be identified as the highest-level cosmic entity or as coterminous with the whole 
of the cosmos. Rather, God can be understood as influencing the whole of the cosmos 
and complex emergent wholes within it through a form of “information input,” as 
opposed to “energy input.”  
Once more, I believe that Deacon’s emergentist treatment of both energy and 
information elucidates this concept. If divine action involved energy input, it would 
violate the first law of thermodynamics (that matter-energy cannot be created or 
destroyed) and/or nullify the quantum indeterminacy and entropic tendencies of 
homeodynamics, which energize more complex dynamics at morphodynamic and 
teleodynamic levels.  
This violation of the causal closure principle is potentially avoided if, on the other 
hand, one conceives of divine action in terms of information input. According to Deacon, 
information is a function of two or more mutually constraining teleodynamic 
processes.
570
 Thus, like all teleodynamics, information is a constitutively absent causal 
influence, which supervenes upon lower-level dynamics, as opposed to the matter-energy 
those dynamics employ to propagate themselves through various end-directed functions.  
 Thus, divine action may be thought of as a teleodynamic constraint bridging the 
ontological gap between eternity and time, infinite and finite, necessary and contingent, 
creator and creation. This conceptual shift entails a replacement of the notion of 
intervention with that of supervenience.
571
 With this conceptual shift, creation may be 
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depicted as an act of grace by which finite being is allowed to emerge freely “within” 
infinite Being ex nihilo, from the “bottom-up,” from the “big bang” forward. 
Evolutionary developments through various orders of emergence reflect the self-
constituting, self-transcending character of divine selfhood, which “acts” as a sort of 
constraint, attractor, or boundary condition from the “top-down”—from infinite to finite. 
Nature is graced by God’s presence to it and its presence to God.  
Describing the way in which the natural world partakes freely in grace, Rahner 
states:  
The proper topos for achieving an understanding of the immanence of God 
in the world in theology, therefore, is not a treatise on God worked out in 
abstract metaphysical terms, but rather the treatise on grace, admittedly 
taking this as teaching not that some created quality of grace is instilled by 
a creative act, but rather as teaching that the existence of God bears a 
quasi-formal relationship to the world such that the reality of God himself 
is imparted to it as its supreme specification.
572
 
  
The term “quasi-formal” partakes in the rich etymology behind the term 
“information.” To “inform” can be to communicate meaning or to give form to 
something. Rahner’s use of quasi-formal presupposed that God does both within the 
creation. Divine influence is quasi-formal because God’s Being and that of the creation 
remain distinct. God gives form to every aspect of the creation—including the process 
and products of evolution—without dissolving into it or overdetermining the courses of 
natural and cultural history.  
This re-conception of the doctrine of creation yields a kind of strong anthropic 
principle, which holds that (finite) personhood was bound to emerge in the cosmos 
because the material cosmos and its history are emerging freely “within” (infinite) 
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personhood. In contemporary theological parlance, the concept that the dynamic selfhood 
of infinite being informs the finite being emerging “within” it could be viewed as a form 
of panentheism—the principle that all reality is unfolding within God, as God also 
pervades all reality from within. Readily distinguishing itself from pantheism, this all-in-
God, God-in-all view specifies that the creator is immanent to but distinct from the 
creation. In the language of Genesis 1, this non-deterministic form of immanence and 
creativity is able to “let there be” the evolutionary emergence of all that is and all we hold 
it to be in our symbolic worlds. 
“Fall” and original sin, soteriology, and eschatology 
 
 
When viewed through the hermeneutical lens through which I have developed a 
second naïveté interpretation of Christian anthropology, the doctrines of sin and salvation 
also take on new contours. For example, according to a biocultural model of human 
emergence colored by evolutionary psychology, Homo sapiens are more accurately 
described as originally ambivalent than originally sinful. There is no evidence that our 
species “fell” from a state of moral purity or juridical righteousness, no basis for claiming 
that every individual is born guilty of a damnable transgression. The more tenable 
position emerging from an evolutionary framework is that our species has stumbled upon 
the realization that our common biology and various cultures have predisposed us to 
“participat[e] through intent or act in unnecessary violence that contributes to the ill-
being of any aspect of earth or its inhabitants.”573  
Perhaps this “bottom-up” definition of sin by theologian Marjorie Suchocki hints 
at an intellectually and morally fruitful way to describe members of our species as 
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originally sinful.
574
 An evolutionarily reconfigured understanding of humankind’s ethical 
ambivalence would render moot the traditional Augustinian-Pelagian dichotomy between 
sin/guilt as inherited and sinful acts as merely imitated. From a perspective in which 
“more nature allows more nurture,”575 these positions are both wrong and both right in 
certain ways. From the standpoint of evolutionary psychology, the notion of inherited 
guilt is nonsensical. However, a biocultural perspective does provide ways of describing 
how humanity’s biological and cultural inheritance has predisposed members of our 
species to act in ways deemed morally reprehensible. Human freedom is conditioned, 
positively and negatively, by both streams of its biocultural history. Human infants do 
not emerge from the womb saddled with an inherently “evil” or “good” disposition or a 
predetermined “guilty” or “justified” juridical status. Rather, they are born to emerge into 
persons bearing an ethically ambivalent condition of freedom. 
Because suffering, death, and violence emerged long before any conscientious act 
that could be called sinful, a biocultural reframing of the doctrine of sin has a correlative 
impact on doctrines of salvation. In an evolutionary view of the world, salvation becomes 
much more than a juridical category. Redemption must come to be viewed as a divinely 
accomplished process which is cosmic in its scope, historical in its inauguration, 
nonviolent in its means, and eschatological in its fulfillment as a gift of grace.  
First, not all negative aspects of creaturely existence are traceable to “sin” or even 
human activity. Therefore, Christian soteriology must expand to engage forms of ill-
being and negation not attributable to human agency. In this way, a second naïveté 
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understanding of Christian anthropology may reinvigorate ancient “Christus Victor” 
conceptions of the Pascal mystery, in which suffering and death are “enemies” of 
creaturely existence distinguishable from moral evil.  
Second, given that Homo sapiens have emerged from the material universe as one 
among many species sharing common evolutionary origins, there is little if any reason to 
assume that an eschatological future is an exclusively human prerogative. Why should all 
created entities co-emerge as interdependent in history and not in eschatology? Physicist 
John Polkinghorne expresses similar misgivings and offers the following form of 
resurrection faith and hope in his “reflections of a bottom-up thinker”: 
Surely the “matter” of the world to come must be the transformed matter 
of this world. God will no more abandon the universe than he will 
abandon us. Hence the importance to theology of the empty tomb, with its 
message that the lord’s risen and glorified body is the transmutation of his 
dead body. The resurrection of Jesus is the beginning within history of a 
process whose fulfillment lies beyond history, in which the destiny of 
humanity and the destiny of the universe are together to find their 
fulfillment in a liberation from decay and futility (cf. Rom. 8:18-25).
576
 
 
Third, this vision of “heaven” can be said to take its cues from earth in more ways 
than one. The fullest possible flourishing of any creature is anticipated by its functioning, 
“the processes by which it functions, the requirements for its functioning, and its relations 
with and impact upon its ecosystem.”577 As an eschatological extension of Hefner’s 
teleonomic axiom, these teleodynamic exigencies “form the most reasonable basis for 
hypothesizing what the purpose and meaning of the thing are”578 in this world and in “the 
life of the world to come.”579 One can reasonably conjecture that the natural course and 
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contents of evolutionary and cultural history give specific shape to the eschaton toward 
which they are proceeding. By extension, efforts to secure the wellbeing of persons and 
their environments in history are a form of partial salvation and an irruption of heaven 
into history.  
Fourth, if God does not achieve creation through violence, there is no reason to 
conclude that God achieves redemption through violence. In broad strokes, 
substitutionary theories of atonement hold that all sin is meritorious of punishment, and 
that sin against an infinite, eternal God is liable to infinite, eternal punishment. Since 
mere humans, as finite beings, all sin and cannot possibility satisfy these juridical 
demands, a substitute victim is required—one who is both sinless and infinite. Hence 
Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo. By this legal-transactional logic, God intends and utilizes the 
violent means of Jesus’ crucifixion to accomplish redemption. In other words, God 
punishes Jesus violently for the benefit of the rest of humanity. According to the work of 
structural anthropologist René Girard showcased in chapter 6, this view of the atonement 
is a unique recapitulation of the myth of redemptive violence. From this point of view, 
Jesus’ crucifixion is a singular form of ritualized violence in that its supposed finality 
forbids all subsequent forms of violent sacrifice or scapegoating.  
However, to view Jesus as a surrogate victim of God or divine wrath is to assume 
that God requires mimetic rivalry and violence to accomplish salvation and forgiveness. 
A violent theology of atonement does not comport with a nonviolent theology of creation. 
The violence of the crucifixion may be instrumental toward certain ends, but not because 
God requires bloodshed in exchange for pardon. On the contrary, the revelatory nature of 
the violence Christ endured may lie in God’s willingness to experience—as a creature—
300 
the worst our biocultural world has to offer, to empathize with our shortcomings, to 
vindicate the innocent victim of violence, and to forgive the repentant without retribution. 
In light of the incarnation, Christ is the forbearing divine victim of human violence, not 
the human victim of divine violence. In light of the resurrection, the violent nature of the 
crucifixion simultaneously exposes the sinful nature of (creation through) violence and 
the nonviolent—anti-violent—nature of salvation. 
A biocultural restatement of biblical myth-symbols of the image of God and the 
knowledge of good and evil emerges with the potential to reframe many anthropological 
and theological doctrines. I have listed the examples above in faith and hope that a post-
critical blending of ancient and current conceptions of human uniqueness and its 
development will lend credence to my Ricoeurian wager, inspired by Hefner, that a 
second naïveté understanding of Christian anthropology is able to “provide genuine 
knowledge of reality, for the sake of our wholesome living.”580 I hope through this study 
to play some small role in the ongoing emergence of the image of God.  
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